to figure out what network connection a particular tls
conversation refers to, we add the path of the underlying
we send the encrypted tls traffic over in the status file,
example:
term% grep -n '^Chan:' '#a'/tls/*/status
#a/tls/0/status:7: Chan: /net/tcp/6/data
#a/tls/1/status:7: Chan: /net/tcp/0/data
access to the axi segment hangs the machine when the fpga
is not programmed yet. to prevent access, we introduce a
new SG_FAULT flag, that when set on the Segment.type or
Physseg.attr, causes the fault handler to immidiately
return with an error (as if the segment would not be mapped).
during programming, we temporarily set the SG_FAULT flag
on the axi physseg, flush all processes tlb's that have
the segment mapped and when programming is done, we clear
the flag again.
tsleep() used to cancel the timer with:
if(up->tt != nil)
timerdel(up);
which still can result in twakeup() to fire after tsleep()
returns (because we set Timer.tt to nil *before* we call the tfn).
in most cases, this is not an issue as the Rendez*
usually is just &up->sleep, but when it is dynamically allocated
or on the stack like in tsemacquire(), twakeup() will call
wakeup() on a potentially garbage Rendez structure!
to fix the race, we execute the wakup() with the Timer lock
held, and set p->trend to nil only after we called wakeup().
that way, the timerdel(); which unconditionally locks the Timer;
can act as a proper barrier and use up->trend == nil as the
condition if the timer has already fired.
for queue like non-seekable files, it is impossible to implement an
exportfs because one has to run the kernels devtab read() and write()
in separate processes, and that makes it impossible to maintain 9p message
order as the scheduler can come in and randomly schedule one process before
another.
so as soon as we have a transition from 9p -> syscalls, we'r screwed.
i currently see just two possibilities:
- introduce special file type like QTSEQ with strictly ordered i/o semantics
- fix all fileservers and exportfs to only do one outstanding i/o to QTSEQ files
which means maintaining a queue per fid
this doesnt propagate. so exporting slow 9p mount again will be limited
again by latency of the inner mount.
other option:
- return offset in Rread, so client can bring responses back into order. this
requires changing all fileservers and drivers to maintain such an per fid offset
and change the protocol to include it in the response, and also pass it to userspace
(new syscalls or pass it in TOS)
this only works for read pipelining, write is still screwed.
both options suck.
--
cinap
theres a bootstrap problem:
when /bin/init is run, it processes /lib/namespace where we might want to
mount or bind resources to /n or /mnt. but mntgen was run later in
cpurc/termrc so these mounts would be ignored.
we already have mntgen in bootfs, so we can provide these mountpoints early.
i keep the termrc/cpurc mntgens where they are, but ignore the error
prints. this way old kernels will continue to work.
introduce cpushutdown() function that does the common
operation of initiating shutdown, returning once all
cpu's got the message and are about to shutdown. this
avoids duplicated code which isnt really machine specific.
automatic reboot on panic only when *debug= is not set
and the machine is a cpu server or has no display,
otherwise just hang.
when opening a /env file ORCLOSE, and the process exits, envgrp() would
return nil can crash in envremove() because procexit will have set up->egrp
to nil before calling closefgrp().
the solution is to capture the environment on open, keeping a reference in
Chan.aux, so it doesnt matter on what process the close happens and a
env chan will always refer to its original environment group.
instead of checking addr+len >= addr, check len >= -addr so
that addr == 0 is never valid for len > 0 even if we decide
to have memory at the zero page so theres never any chance
user can pass in "nil" pointers.
put up some signs where we fall thru the switch cases in
fixfault()
sha256 is only defined for TLS1.2, however, technically, theres
no reason not to use it in TLS1.0/TLS1.1. the choice is up to
tlshand and pushtls, not the kernel.
instead of ordering the source mount list, order the new destination
list which has the advantage that we do not need to wlock the source
namespace, so copying can be done in parallel and we do not need the
copy forward pointer in the Mount structure.
the Mhead back pointer in the Mount strcture was unused, removed.
there was a race between cunmount() and walk() on Mhead.from as Mhead.from was
unconditionally freed when we cunmount(), but findmount might have already
returned the Mhead in walk(). we have to ensure that Mhead.from is not freed
before the Mhead itself (now done in putmhead() once the reference count of the
Mhead drops to zero).
the Mhead struct contained two unused locks, removing.
no need to hold Pgrp.ns lock in closegrp() as nobody can get to it (refcount
droped to zero).
avoid cclose() and freemount() while holding Mhead.lock or Pgrp.ns locks as
it might block on a hung up fileserver.
remove the debug prints...
cleanup: use nil for pointers, remove redundant nil checks before putmhead().
we have to validaddr() and vmemchr() all argv[] elements a second
time when we copy to the new stack to deal with the fact that another
process can come in and modify the memory of the process doing the
exec. so the argv[] strings could have changed and increased in
length. we just make sure the data being copied will fit into the
new stack and error when we would overflow.
also make sure to free the ESEG in case the copy pass errors.
argv[] strings get copied to the new processes stack segment, which
has a maximum size of USTKSIZE, so limit the size of the strings to
that and check early for overflow.
this moves the name validation out of segattach() to syssegattach()
to make sure the segment name cannot be changed by the user while
segattach looks at it.
when executing a script, we did advance argp0 unconditionally
to replace argv[0] with the script name. this fails when
argv[] is empty, then we'd advance argp0 past the nil terminator.
the alternative would be to *not* advance if *argp0 == nil, but that
would require another validaddr() check for a case that is unlikely
to have been anticipated in most programs being invoked as
libc's ARGBEGIN macro assumes argv[0] being non-nil as it also
unconditionally advances the argv pointer.
to keep us sane, we now reject an empty argv[]. on entry, we
verify that argv[] is valid for at least two elements:
- the program name argv[0], has to be non-nil
- the first potential nil terminator in argv[1]
when argv[0] == nil, we throw Ebadarg "bad arg in system call"
we already export mntauth() and mntversion(), so why not stop
being sneaky and just export mntattach() so bindmount() and
devshr can just call it directly with proper arguments being
checked.
we can also avoid handling #M attach specially in namec()
by having the devmnt's attach function do error(Enoattach).
to avoid double caching, attachimage() and setswapchan() clear
the CCACHE flag on the channel but this keeps the read ahread
state of the cache arround (until the chan gets closed), so also
call cclunk() to detach the mcp and free the read ahead state.
avoid the call to cread() when CCACHE flag is clear.
use the actual iounit returned from Ropen/Rcreate to chunk reads and writes
instead of c->mux->msize-IOHDRSZ.
dont preallocate the rpc buffers to msize, most 9p requests are rather small
(except Twrite of course). so we allocate the buffer on demand in mountio()
with some rounding to avoid frequent reallocations.
avoid malloc()/free() while holding mntalloc lock.
this changes devmnt adding mntrahread() function and some helpers
for it to do pipelined sequential read ahead for the mount cache.
basically, cread() calls mntrahread() with Mntrah structure and it
figures out if we where reading sequentially and if thats the case
issues reads of c->iounit size in advance.
the read ahead state (Mntrah) is kept in the mount cache so we can
handle (read ahead) cache invalidation in the presence of writes.
as the Fgrp can be shared with other processes, we have to
recheck the fd index after locking the Fgrp in fdclose()
to make sure not to read beyond the bounds of the fd array.
using the user buffer has a race where the user can modify
the buffer from another process before it is copied into the cache.
this allows poisoning the cache for every file where the user
has read access.
instead, we update the cache from kernel memory.
Wnode gets two new counters: txcount and txerror
and actrate pointer that will be between minrate
and maxrate.
driver should use actrate instead of maxrate for
transmission when it can provide error feedback.
when a driver detects a transmission failed, it calls
wifitxfail() with the original packet. wifitxfail() then
reduces wn->actrate.
every 256th packet, we optimistically increase wn->actrate
before transmitting.
- reject files smaller or equal to two bytes, they are bogus
- fix out of bounds access in shargs() when n <= 2
- only copy the bytes read into line buffer
- use nil for pointers instead of 0
imagereclaim(), pagereclaim():
- move imagereclaim() and pagereclaim() declarations to portfns.h
- consistently use ulong type for page counts
- name number of pages to free "pages" instead of "min"
- check for pages == 0 on entry
freepages():
- move pagechaindone() call to wakeup newpage() consumers inside
palloc critical section.
putimage():
- use long type for refcount
addresses va's of 0 and -BY2PG cause trouble with some memmove()/memset()
implementations and possibly other code because of the nil pointer
and end pointers wrapping to zero.
unlock()/iunlock():
we need to place the coherence() *before* "l->key = 0", so that any
stores that where done while holding the lock become observable
*before* other processors see the lock released.
cas()/tas():
place memory barrier before successfull return to prevent reordering.
making sure to close the dot in every kproc appears repetitive,
so instead stop inheriting the dot in kproc() as this is usually
never what you wanted in the first place.
give kernel processes and local disk file servers (procs
having noswap flag set) a clear advantage for page allocation
under starved condition by giving them ther own wait queue so
they get readied as soon as pages become available.
the intend of posting a note to the faulting process is to
interrupt the syscall to give the note handler a chance
to handle it. kernel processes however, have no note handlers
and all the postnote() does is set up->notepending which will
make the next attempt to sleep raise an Eintr[] error. this
is harmless, but usually not what we want.
there's no need to waste space for a error buffer in the Segio
structure, as the segmentio kproc will be waiting for the next
command after an error and will not overwite it until we issue
another command.
