devtls: zero secret information before freeing, cleanup

This commit is contained in:
cinap_lenrek 2016-03-23 13:50:58 +01:00
parent 44b80d48af
commit e7bc98b057

View file

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* devtls - record layer for transport layer security 1.0 and secure sockets layer 3.0
* devtls - record layer for transport layer security 1.2 and secure sockets layer 3.0
*/
#include "u.h"
#include "../port/lib.h"
@ -83,17 +83,18 @@ struct Secret
{
char *encalg; /* name of encryption alg */
char *hashalg; /* name of hash alg */
int (*enc)(Secret*, uchar*, int);
int (*dec)(Secret*, uchar*, int);
int (*unpad)(uchar*, int, int);
DigestState *(*mac)(uchar*, ulong, uchar*, ulong, uchar*, DigestState*);
int (*aead_enc)(Secret*, uchar*, int, uchar*, uchar*, int);
int (*aead_dec)(Secret*, uchar*, int, uchar*, uchar*, int);
int (*enc)(Secret*, uchar*, int);
int (*dec)(Secret*, uchar*, int);
int (*unpad)(uchar*, int, int);
DigestState* (*mac)(uchar*, ulong, uchar*, ulong, uchar*, DigestState*);
int block; /* encryption block len, 0 if none */
int maclen;
int recivlen;
int maclen; /* # bytes of record mac / authentication tag */
int recivlen; /* # bytes of record iv for AEAD ciphers */
void *enckey;
uchar mackey[MaxMacLen];
};
@ -1428,7 +1429,6 @@ initmd5key(Hashalg *ha, int version, Secret *s, uchar *p)
static void
initclearmac(Hashalg *, int, Secret *s, uchar *)
{
s->maclen = 0;
s->mac = nomac;
}
@ -1489,7 +1489,6 @@ initRC4key(Encalg *ea, Secret *s, uchar *p, uchar *)
s->enckey = smalloc(sizeof(RC4state));
s->enc = rc4enc;
s->dec = rc4enc;
s->block = 0;
setupRC4state(s->enckey, p, ea->keylen);
}
@ -1517,12 +1516,8 @@ static void
initccpolykey(Encalg *ea, Secret *s, uchar *p, uchar *iv)
{
s->enckey = smalloc(sizeof(Chachastate));
s->enc = noenc;
s->dec = noenc;
s->mac = nomac;
s->aead_enc = ccpoly_aead_enc;
s->aead_dec = ccpoly_aead_dec;
s->block = 0;
s->maclen = Poly1305dlen;
if(ea->ivlen == 0) {
/* older draft version, iv is 64-bit sequence number */
@ -1538,12 +1533,8 @@ static void
initaesgcmkey(Encalg *ea, Secret *s, uchar *p, uchar *iv)
{
s->enckey = smalloc(sizeof(AESGCMstate));
s->enc = noenc;
s->dec = noenc;
s->mac = nomac;
s->aead_enc = aesgcm_aead_enc;
s->aead_dec = aesgcm_aead_dec;
s->block = 0;
s->maclen = 16;
s->recivlen = 8;
memmove(s->mackey, iv, ea->ivlen);
@ -1556,7 +1547,6 @@ initclearenc(Encalg *, Secret *s, uchar *, uchar *)
{
s->enc = noenc;
s->dec = noenc;
s->block = 0;
}
static Encalg encrypttab[] =
@ -1700,30 +1690,30 @@ tlswrite(Chan *c, void *a, long n, vlong off)
p = cb->f[4];
m = (strlen(p)*3)/2;
x = smalloc(m);
tos = nil;
toc = nil;
tos = smalloc(sizeof(Secret));
toc = smalloc(sizeof(Secret));
if(waserror()){
freeSec(tos);
freeSec(toc);
free(x);
nexterror();
}
m = dec64(x, m, p, strlen(p));
if(m < 2 * ha->maclen + 2 * ea->keylen + 2 * ea->ivlen)
error("not enough secret data provided");
tos = smalloc(sizeof(Secret));
toc = smalloc(sizeof(Secret));
if(!ha->initkey || !ea->initkey)
error("misimplemented secret algorithm");
(*ha->initkey)(ha, tr->version, tos, &x[0]);
(*ha->initkey)(ha, tr->version, toc, &x[ha->maclen]);
(*ea->initkey)(ea, tos, &x[2 * ha->maclen], &x[2 * ha->maclen + 2 * ea->keylen]);
(*ea->initkey)(ea, toc, &x[2 * ha->maclen + ea->keylen], &x[2 * ha->maclen + 2 * ea->keylen + ea->ivlen]);
if(!tos->mac || !tos->enc || !tos->dec
|| !toc->mac || !toc->enc || !toc->dec)
error("missing algorithm implementations");
if(!tos->aead_enc || !tos->aead_dec || !toc->aead_enc || !toc->aead_dec)
if(!tos->mac || !tos->enc || !tos->dec || !toc->mac || !toc->enc || !toc->dec)
error("missing algorithm implementations");
if(strtol(cb->f[3], nil, 0) == 0){
tr->in.new = tos;
@ -2073,10 +2063,17 @@ tlsstate(int s)
static void
freeSec(Secret *s)
{
if(s != nil){
free(s->enckey);
free(s);
void *k;
if(s == nil)
return;
k = s->enckey;
if(k != nil){
memset(k, 0, msize(k));
free(k);
}
memset(s, 0, sizeof(*s));
free(s);
}
static int