devtls: TLS1.1 explicit iv support

using nrand() to fill the explicit iv, which isnt great but better
than no iv.
This commit is contained in:
cinap_lenrek 2015-08-15 17:50:44 +02:00
parent 76f21ca715
commit 74d1f67b05

View file

@ -11,22 +11,22 @@
#include <libsec.h>
typedef struct OneWay OneWay;
typedef struct Secret Secret;
typedef struct Secret Secret;
typedef struct TlsRec TlsRec;
typedef struct TlsErrs TlsErrs;
enum {
Statlen= 1024, /* max. length of status or stats message */
/* buffer limits */
MaxRecLen = 1<<14, /* max payload length of a record layer message */
MaxRecLen = 1<<14, /* max payload length of a record layer message */
MaxCipherRecLen = MaxRecLen + 2048,
RecHdrLen = 5,
MaxMacLen = SHA1dlen,
RecHdrLen = 5,
MaxMacLen = SHA1dlen,
/* protocol versions we can accept */
TLSVersion = 0x0301,
SSL3Version = 0x0300,
ProtocolVersion = 0x0301, /* maximum version we speak */
SSL3Version = 0x0300,
TLS10Version = 0x0301,
TLS11Version = 0x0302,
MinProtoVersion = 0x0300, /* limits on version we accept */
MaxProtoVersion = 0x03ff,
@ -801,8 +801,20 @@ if(tr->debug) pprint("consumed unprocessed %d\n", len);
/* to avoid Canvel-Hiltgen-Vaudenay-Vuagnoux attack, all errors here
should look alike, including timing of the response. */
unpad_len = (*in->sec->dec)(in->sec, p, len);
/* excplicit iv */
if(tr->version >= TLS11Version){
len -= in->sec->block;
if(len < 0)
rcvError(tr, EDecodeError, "runt record message");
unpad_len -= in->sec->block;
p += in->sec->block;
}
if(unpad_len >= in->sec->maclen)
len = unpad_len - in->sec->maclen;
if(tr->debug) pprint("decrypted %d\n", unpad_len);
if(tr->debug) pdump(unpad_len, p, "decrypted:");
@ -815,7 +827,8 @@ if(tr->debug) pdump(unpad_len, p, "decrypted:");
rcvError(tr, EBadRecordMac, "short record mac");
if(memcmp(hmac, p+len, in->sec->maclen) != 0)
rcvError(tr, EBadRecordMac, "record mac mismatch");
b->wp = b->rp + len;
b->rp = p;
b->wp = p+len;
}
qunlock(&in->seclock);
poperror();
@ -1210,6 +1223,13 @@ tlsread(Chan *c, void *a, long n, vlong off)
return n;
}
static void
randfill(uchar *buf, int len)
{
while(len-- > 0)
*buf++ = nrand(256);
}
/*
* write a block in tls records
*/
@ -1220,7 +1240,7 @@ tlsrecwrite(TlsRec *tr, int type, Block *b)
Block *nb;
uchar *p, seq[8];
OneWay *volatile out;
int n, maclen, pad, ok;
int n, ivlen, maclen, pad, ok;
out = &tr->out;
bb = b;
@ -1253,21 +1273,24 @@ if(tr->debug)pdump(BLEN(b), b->rp, "sent:");
qlock(&out->seclock);
maclen = 0;
pad = 0;
ivlen = 0;
if(out->sec != nil){
maclen = out->sec->maclen;
pad = maclen + out->sec->block;
if(tr->version >= TLS11Version)
ivlen = out->sec->block;
}
n = BLEN(bb);
if(n > MaxRecLen){
n = MaxRecLen;
nb = allocb(n + pad + RecHdrLen);
memmove(nb->wp + RecHdrLen, bb->rp, n);
nb = allocb(RecHdrLen + ivlen + n + pad);
memmove(nb->wp + RecHdrLen + ivlen, bb->rp, n);
bb->rp += n;
}else{
/*
* carefully reuse bb so it will get freed if we're out of memory
*/
bb = padblock(bb, RecHdrLen);
bb = padblock(bb, RecHdrLen + ivlen);
if(pad)
nb = padblock(bb, -pad);
else
@ -1283,9 +1306,15 @@ if(tr->debug)pdump(BLEN(b), b->rp, "sent:");
if(out->sec != nil){
put64(seq, out->seq);
out->seq++;
(*tr->packMac)(out->sec, out->sec->mackey, seq, p, p + RecHdrLen, n, p + RecHdrLen + n);
(*tr->packMac)(out->sec, out->sec->mackey, seq, p, p + RecHdrLen + ivlen, n, p + RecHdrLen + ivlen + n);
n += maclen;
/* explicit iv */
if(ivlen > 0){
randfill(p + RecHdrLen, ivlen);
n += ivlen;
}
/* encrypt */
n = (*out->sec->enc)(out->sec, p + RecHdrLen, n);
nb->wp = p + RecHdrLen + n;
@ -1563,12 +1592,12 @@ tlswrite(Chan *c, void *a, long n, vlong off)
if(tr->verset)
error("version already set");
m = strtol(cb->f[1], nil, 0);
if(m < MinProtoVersion || m > MaxProtoVersion)
error("unsupported version");
if(m == SSL3Version)
tr->packMac = sslPackMac;
else if(m == TLSVersion)
tr->packMac = tlsPackMac;
else
error("unsupported version");
tr->packMac = tlsPackMac;
tr->verset = 1;
tr->version = m;
}else if(strcmp(cb->f[0], "secret") == 0){