This header is included by ntoskrnl which effectively disabled all PAGED_CODE checks since 2015. Thanks Alex.
Instead define _BLDR_ when building cmlib, which will avoid trying to import KeGetCurrentIrql()
Since we were charging the pool quota after the VAD insertion,
if the quota charge failed, the VAD would still have been inserted.
This commit attempts to resolve this issue by charging quota
before inserting the VAD thus allowing the quota charge to fail early.
Addendum to 884356a0. CORE-18028
- Use SMTO_NOTIMEOUTIFNOTHUNG to get the icon with least timeout.
- Replace GCL_* consts with GCLP_* since we're using GetClassLongPtr.
Now the icon is correctly displayed for control panel applets.
CORE-18137
On current master, ReactOS faces these problems:
- ObCreateObject charges both paged and non paged pool a size of TOKEN structure, not the actual dynamic contents of WHAT IS inside a token. For paged pool charge the size is that of the dynamic area (primary group + default DACL if any). This is basically what DynamicCharged is for.
For the non paged pool charge, the actual charge is that of TOKEN structure upon creation. On duplication and filtering however, the paged pool charge size is that of the inherited dynamic charged space from an existing token whereas the non paged pool size is that of the calculated token body
length for the new duplicated/filtered token. On current master, we're literally cheating the kernel by charging the wrong amount of quota not taking into account the dynamic contents which they come from UM.
- Both DynamicCharged and DynamicAvailable are not fully handled (DynamicAvailable is pretty much poorly handled with some cases still to be taking into account). DynamicCharged is barely handled, like at all.
- As a result of these two points above, NtSetInformationToken doesn't check when the caller wants to set up a new default token DACL or primary group if the newly DACL or the said group exceeds the dynamic charged boundary. So what happens is that I'm going to act like a smug bastard fat politician and whack
the primary group and DACL of an token however I want to, because why in the hell not? In reality no, the kernel has to punish whoever attempts to do that, although we currently don't.
- The dynamic area (aka DynamicPart) only picks up the default DACL but not the primary group as well. Generally the dynamic part is composed of primary group and default DACL, if provided.
In addition to that, we aren't returning the dynamic charged and available area in token statistics. SepComputeAvailableDynamicSpace helper is here to accommodate that. Apparently Windows is calculating the dynamic available area rather than just querying the DynamicAvailable field directly from the token.
My theory regarding this is like the following: on Windows both TokenDefaultDacl and TokenPrimaryGroup classes are barely used by the system components during startup (LSASS provides both a DACL and primary group when calling NtCreateToken anyway). In fact DynamicAvailable is 0 during token creation, duplication and filtering when inspecting a token with WinDBG. So
if an application wants to query token statistics that application will face a dynamic available space of 0.
- Update source file header per coding rules
- Store intermediate responses to display the hop address
- Add separate function to get response stats from buffer
- Add Cleanup label to free resources in a single place
- Move local variables around to allow Cleanup goto
CORE-18232
On ObpChargeQuotaForObject function, the kernel will either charge the default object type charges or the specified information charges obtained from ObCreateObject API call. What happens is that if a paged pool charge is specified on ObCreateObject call the kernel will charge that
but when an object is about to be de-allocated, the amount of quota to return back to the system is the amounting of the paged pool charge specified previously by the ObCreateObject call plus the amounting of the security descriptor charge (see oblife.c / line 98).
This will result in a fatal crash with a bugcheck of QUOTA_UNDERFLOW because we are returning quota with bits of it that was never charged and that's SecurityDescriptorCharge. A QUOTA_UNDERFLOW bugcheck occurs in two following scenarios:
-- When installing Virtualbox Guest Additions and prompting the installer to reboot the system for you
-- When logging off and on back to the system and then you restart the system normally
This bug has been discovered whilst working on #4555 PR.
