Since numeric timezone offsets are relative to GMT, initialise zone to
GMT so tm2sec(2) does not assume local time.
Note that if strtotm encounters a timezone *string* and consequently
overwrites zone then we will end up in the same mess since tm2sec(2)
only deals with GMT or local time.
there was a race between the sendproc putting the request on
the sreqrd[] id and the recvproc handling the response, and
potentially freeing the request before the sendproc() was
finished with the request (or the fid).
so we defer allocating a request id and putting it on the
sreqrd[] stage after we have completely generated the
request in vpack(). this prevents the handling of the request
before it is even sent.
this also means that the SReq should not be touched after
calling sendpkt(), submitreq(), submitsreq().
secondly, putsfid() needs to acquire the RWLock to make sure
sendproc() is finished with the request. the scenario is that
recvproc() can call respond() on the request before sendproc()
has unlocked the SFid.
move digest pointer into Mtree structrue and embed it into Idx struct
(which is embedded in Message) to avoid one level of indirection
during mtreecmp().
get rid of mtreeisdup(). instead we have mtreeadd() return the old
message in case of a collision. this avoids double lookup.
increase the hash table size for henter() and make it a prime.
on 386, the kernel memory region is mapped using huge 4MB pages
(when supported by the cpu). so the uncached pte manipulation
does not work to map the cursor data with uncached attribute.
instead, we allocate a memory page using newpage() and map
it globally using vmap(), which maps it uncached.
after issuing CR_RESETEP command, we have to invalidate
the endpoints output context buffer so that the halted/error
status reflects the new state. not doing so resulted in
the halted state to be stuck and we continued issuing
endpoint reset commands when we where already recovered.
handle the devusb Ep.clrhalt flag from devusb that userspace
uses to force a endpoint reset on the next transaction.
for servers that handle incoming network connections and authentication,
change the owner of the network connection file to the authenticated user
after successfull authentication.
note that we set the permissions as well to 0660 because old devip used
to unconditionally set the bits.
permission checking had the "other" and "owner" bits swapped plus incoming
connections where always owned by "network" instead of the owner of
the listening connection. also, ipwstat() was not effective as the uid
strings where not parsed.
this fixes the permission checks for data/ctl/err file and makes incoming
connections inherit the owner from the listening connection.
we also allow ipwstat() to change ownership to the commonuser() or anyone
if we are eve.
we might have to add additional restrictions for none at a later point...
we want devip to get reattached after hostowner has been written. factotum
already handles this with a private authdial() routine that mounts devip
when it is not present. so we detach devmnt before starting factotum,
and attach once factotum finishes.
the locking in proctext() is wrong. we have to acquire Proc.seglock
when reading segments from Proc.seg[] as segments do not
have a private freelist and can therefore be reused for other
data structures.
once we have Proc.seglock acquired, check that the process pid
is still valid so we wont accidentally read some other processes
segments. (for both proctext() and procctlmemio()). this also
should give better error message to distinguish the case when
the process did segdetach() the segment in question before we
could acquire Proc.seglock.
declare private functions as static.
there was a small window between modifying mmutop and switching the
asid where the core could bring in the new entries under the old asid
into the tlb due to speculation / prefetching.
this change moves the entering of the page tables into mmutop after
setttbr() to prevent this scenario.
due to us switching to the resereved asid 0 on procsave()->putasid(),
the only asid that could have potentially been poisoned would be asid 0
which does not have any user mappings. so this did not show any noticable
effect.
when a process state has not been saved (Proc.mach != nil)
then the contents of Proc.sched should be considered invalid.
to approximate a stacktrace in this case, we use the error
stack and get a stacktrace from the last waserror() call.
pexit() and pprint() can get called outside of a syscall
(from procctl()) with a process that is in active note
handling and require floating point in the kernel on amd64
for aesni (devtls).
This fixes ocaml on non-x86 architectures, where we have code
that looks like:
#define Fl_head ((uintptr_t)(&sentinel.first_field))
Without this change, we get an error about a non-constant
initializer. This change takes the checks for pointers and
makes them apply to all expressions. It also makes the checks
stricter, preventing the following from compiling to junk:
int x;
int y = 42;
int *p = &x + y