We are allocating blocks of pool memory for a security descriptor with its own specific tag, TAG_SEC_QUERY, so just use it when freeing when releasing the descriptor as well (aka freeing the said pool).
Fixes compilation because the Hal(Private)DispatchTable's, defined in
the bootloader's NTOS stub, are not external imports, as they would be
for a standard HAL.
- Also sort out non-localizeable lines
- Fix German translation encoding and add missing one
- Add Russian translation
Addendum to 9c79a798, 68e19a95 and 9ca32a2b.
This design, introduced in 418edcd2b, is fundamentally flawed as it
can also close windows unrelated to the running test (e.g. windows
of programs that the user can start, while the test is running).
But since we cannot do much better, mitigate instead the other main
problem of this design: Just use PostMessageW(WM_CLOSE), as it used
to be, instead of TerminateProcess().
Indeed, using TerminateProcess() otherwise could kill unrelated
processes the test hasn't created. In particular it could kill the
csrss.exe system process if, during the testing procedure, a hard-error
popup shows up.
And this is precisely the case when this test runs with limited memory,
and a hard-error
"Insufficient system resources exist to complete the requested service."
arises.
There are two fundamental problems when it comes to access checks in ReactOS. First, the internal function SepAccessCheck which is the heart and brain of the whole access checks logic of the kernel warrants access to the calling thread of a process to an object even though access could not be given.
This can potentially leave security issues as we literally leave objects to be touched indiscriminately by anyone regardless of their ACEs in the DACL of a security descriptor. Second, the current access check code doesn't take into account the fact that an access token can have restricted SIDs. In such scenario we must perform additional access checks by iterating over the restricted SIDs of the primary token by comparing the SID equality and see if the group can be granted certain rights based on the ACE policy that represents the same SID.
Part of SepAccessCheck's code logic will be split for a separate private kernel routine, SepAnalyzeAcesFromDacl. The reasons for this are primarily two -- such code is subject to grow eventually as we'll support different type ACEs and handle them accordingly -- and we avoid further code duplicates. On Windows Server 2003 there are 5 different type of ACEs that are supported for access checks:
- ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE (supported by ReactOS)
- ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE (supported by ReactOS)
- ACCESS_DENIED_OBJECT_ACE_TYPE
- ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE_TYPE
- ACCESS_ALLOWED_COMPOUND_ACE_TYPE
This gives the opportunity for us to have a semi serious kernel where security of objects are are taken into account, rather than giving access to everyone.
CORE-9174
CORE-9175
CORE-9184
CORE-14520
SepSidInTokenEx function already provides the necessary mechanism to handle scenario where a token has restricted SIDs or a principal SID is given to the call. There's no reason to have these redundant ASSERTs anymore.
In addition to that make sure if the SID is not a restricted and if that SID is the first element on the array and it's enabled, this is the primary user.
This function will be used to retrieve a security identifier from a valid access control entry in the kernel. Mostly and exclusively used within access checks related code and such.
ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE and ACCESS_DENIED_OBJECT_ACE structures must be in the XDK section of SDK as these will be used in the future in the security subsystem of the kernel.
The current code allocates memory and initializes the Everyone "World" security identifier but with a Null authority identifier. This is utterly wrong on so many levels, more so partly because a Null authority identifier is 0 so after the Everyone SID is initialized, it is actually initialized as S-1-0-0 instead of S-1-1-0.
ReactOS Setup is an integral component that is part of the operating system responsible for the installation of ROS during 2nd installation stage. The situation with current master branch is like this -- the Services component always tries to create the process
on behalf of the logged in user with its own security context. That user doesn't have the privileges and access rights like SYSTEM thus the Services component tries to create the process but it fails to do so because of lacking of required access right, TOKEN_DUPLICATE, in order for the calling thread to impersonate as self.
rpcrt4_create_pipe_security function will be held in charge to set up security descriptors specific for each named pipe upon creation in rpcrt4_conn_create_pipe. The descriptor is then freed after the pipe is no longer needed.
Currently CreateProcessAsUserCommon doesn't set a default descriptor for the newly duplicated token object for the new process nor it sets any security information for both the process and thread. This is wrong, because when the process is created on behalf of the user's security context,
it still uses the previous security information of the creator that initially gave birth to the process. CreateDefaultProcessSecurityCommon function will serve as a placeholder until CreatePrivateObjectSecurity is implemented.
Refactor the function in such a way that it can jump to a single exit but most importantly, implement a "rinse and repeat" mechanism where we assign a primary token to process by disabling impersonation first and retry with impersonation later.
More info can be found in the documention within the code.
Currently Kernel32 doesn't make any server call to Basesrv in order to create NLS section names, instead it's Kernel32 itself that handles the job of NLS section names. With that said, let Kernel32 assign a security descriptor to NLS section names. See the FIXME comment on code for further dtails
Implement code that deals with the security side of NLS, more specifically, create two security descriptors for NLS directory and NLS section names and let the server use such code.
HHHHHHHHHHAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK!!!
There are two problems concerning with network services. First, a window station should be created for every network service process that gets started although this doesn't happen. Instead, network services like RPCSS and DNS service host process (svchost.exe) attempt to access the default window station (Winsta0).
This is because the access token of these two network service processes have an authentication ID that is uniquely generated. This is incorrect, because NetworkService is a special account with its own designed authentication ID for it. As a matter of fact, no window station is created for a network service and as such
both RPCSS and DNS svchost.exe attempt to access Winsta0 which they cannot.
The second problem, albeit not quite relevant to the first one but still worth mentioning nevertheless, is that network services have an access token that is primary which it should be an impersonation token. These problems all come from LSASS as LSA infrastructure is responsible for creating access tokens with security
context for objects.
For the moment being, add a hack on Winlogon that gives allow access to the default window station to network services. When LSASS and involved components are fixed, this hack must be removed.
Refactor the security related code of Winlogon and move it to its own dedicated place, security.c. This includes code for preparation of security descriptors for window station and desktop objects when their created, helper functions which give allow access to such objects for the logged in user and whatnot.
==== DO NOTE ====
Currently new desktop security assignment fails because for whatever reason the system thinks the application desktop has no prior security even though a descriptor has been created for it before. See the FIXME comment on code for information.
When creating a window station with CreateWindowStationW, the function ignores the security descriptor provided by the caller and instead it uses whatever descriptor the system can find.
Implement a base security infrastructure with code that sets up a security descriptor for the service that we're going to connect through it. Such service is based upon a desktop and a window station.
=== DOCUMENTATION REMARKS ===
The authenticated user, represented by an access token that describes its security context, is the main holder and has ultimate power against the default created desktop and window station objects in USER. The authenticated user in question
is the actual logged in user, this is the case when the server is impersonating a client. Administrators on the other hand have some share of power against default desktop but their power in question is extremely limited against the default
window station as admins can only just enumerate the available and valid handle stations within a desktop.
LSASS implements a default ACL inside the token structure field but it doesn't actually set a protective security descriptor for the token object itself. This happens so that the kernel gets whatever default ACLs it finds for the object which is incorrect.
SYSTEM has full and supreme control over tokens, administrators can only read the token as such. The logged in user of their own token has full access. Credits and courtesy goes to Thomas Faber for the patch.
