authsrv: implement AuthNTLM
This commit is contained in:
cinap_lenrek
parent
87617ea25e
commit
e69cde3120
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@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
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Ndb *db;
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char raddr[128];
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uchar zeros[16];
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uchar zeros[32];
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typedef struct Keyslot Keyslot;
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struct Keyslot
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@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ void challengebox(Ticketreq*);
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void changepasswd(Ticketreq*);
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void apop(Ticketreq*, int);
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void chap(Ticketreq*);
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void ntlm(Ticketreq*);
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void mschap(Ticketreq*, int);
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void vnc(Ticketreq*);
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int speaksfor(char*, char*);
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@ -106,6 +107,9 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
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case AuthMSchapv2:
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mschap(&tr, MSchallenv2);
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break;
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case AuthNTLM:
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ntlm(&tr);
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break;
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case AuthCram:
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apop(&tr, AuthCram);
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break;
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@ -638,61 +642,156 @@ Retry:
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exits(0);
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}
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enum {
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MsvAvEOL = 0,
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MsvAvNbComputerName,
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MsvAvNbDomainName,
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MsvAvDnsComputerName,
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MsvAvDnsomainName,
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};
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char*
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getname(int id, uchar *ntblob, int ntbloblen, char *buf, int nbuf)
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{
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int aid, alen, i;
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uchar *p, *e;
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char *d;
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Rune r;
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d = buf;
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p = ntblob+8+8+8+4; /* AvPair offset */
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e = ntblob+ntbloblen;
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while(p+4 <= e){
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aid = *p++;
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aid |= *p++ << 8;
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alen = *p++;
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alen |= *p++ << 8;
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if(p+alen > e)
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break;
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if(aid == id){
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for(i=0; i+1 < alen && d-buf < nbuf-(UTFmax+1); i+=2){
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r = p[i] | p[i+1]<<8;
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d += runetochar(d, &r);
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}
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break;
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}
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p += alen;
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}
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*d = '\0';
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return buf;
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}
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static uchar ntblobsig[] = {0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
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void
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ntlm(Ticketreq *tr)
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{
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char *secret;
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char sbuf[SECRETLEN], windom[DOMLEN];
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uchar chal[MSchallen], ntblob[1024];
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uchar hash[MShashlen];
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uchar resp[MSresplen];
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NTLMreply reply;
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int dupe, lmok, ntok, ntbloblen;
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DigestState *s;
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int tries;
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/*
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* Create a challenge and send it.
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*/
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genrandom(chal, sizeof(chal));
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if(write(1, chal, MSchallen) != MSchallen)
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exits(0);
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tries = 5;
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Retry:
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if(--tries < 0)
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exits(0);
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/*
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* get NTLM reply
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*/
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if(readn(0, &reply, NTLMREPLYLEN) < 0)
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exits(0);
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ntbloblen = 0;
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if(memcmp(reply.NTresp+16, ntblobsig, sizeof(ntblobsig)) == 0){
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ntbloblen = reply.len[0] | reply.len[1]<<8;
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ntbloblen -= NTLMREPLYLEN;
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if(ntbloblen < 0 || ntbloblen > sizeof(ntblob)-8)
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exits(0);
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if(readn(0, ntblob+8, ntbloblen) < 0)
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exits(0);
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memmove(ntblob, reply.NTresp+16, 8);
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ntbloblen += 8;
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}
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safecpy(tr->uid, reply.uid, sizeof(tr->uid));
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if(tr->uid[0] == 0)
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exits(0);
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safecpy(windom, reply.dom, sizeof(windom));
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/*
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* lookup
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*/
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secret = findsecret(KEYDB, tr->uid, sbuf);
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if(!getkey(tr->hostid, &hkey) || secret == nil){
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replyerror("ntlm-fail bad response %s@%s/%s(%s)", tr->uid, windom, tr->hostid, raddr);
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goto Retry;
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}
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if(ntbloblen > 0){
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/* NTLMv2 */
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ntv2hash(hash, secret, tr->uid, windom);
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/*
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* LmResponse = Cat(HMAC_MD5(LmHash, Cat(SC, CC)), CC)
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*/
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s = hmac_md5(chal, MSchallen, hash, MShashlen, nil, nil);
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hmac_md5((uchar*)reply.LMresp+16, MSchallen, hash, MShashlen, resp, s);
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lmok = tsmemcmp(resp, reply.LMresp, 16) == 0;
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/*
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* NtResponse = Cat(HMAC_MD5(NtHash, Cat(SC, NtBlob)), NtBlob)
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*/
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s = hmac_md5(chal, MSchallen, hash, MShashlen, nil, nil);
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hmac_md5(ntblob, ntbloblen, hash, MShashlen, resp, s);
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ntok = tsmemcmp(resp, reply.NTresp, 16) == 0;
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/*
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* LM response can be all zeros or signature key,
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* so make it valid when the NT respone matches.
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*/
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lmok |= ntok;
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dupe = 0;
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} else if(memcmp(reply.NTresp, zeros, MSresplen) == 0){
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/* LMv2 */
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ntv2hash(hash, secret, tr->uid, windom);
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/*
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* LmResponse = Cat(HMAC_MD5(LmHash, Cat(SC, CC)), CC)
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*/
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s = hmac_md5(chal, MSchallen, hash, MShashlen, nil, nil);
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hmac_md5((uchar*)reply.LMresp+16, MSchallen, hash, MShashlen, resp, s);
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lmok = ntok = tsmemcmp(resp, reply.LMresp, 16) == 0;
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dupe = 0;
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} else {
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/* LM+NTLM */
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lmhash(hash, secret);
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mschalresp(resp, hash, chal);
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lmok = tsmemcmp(resp, reply.LMresp, MSresplen) == 0;
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nthash(hash, secret);
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mschalresp(resp, hash, chal);
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ntok = tsmemcmp(resp, reply.NTresp, MSresplen) == 0;
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dupe = tsmemcmp(reply.LMresp, reply.NTresp, MSresplen) == 0;
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}
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/*
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* It is valid to send the same response in both the LM and NTLM
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* fields provided one of them is correct, if neither matches,
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* or the two fields are different and either fails to match,
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* the whole sha-bang fails.
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*
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* This is an improvement in security as it allows clients who
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* wish to do NTLM auth (which is insecure) not to send
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* LM tokens (which is very insecure).
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*
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* Windows servers supports clients doing this also though
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* windows clients don't seem to use the feature.
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*/
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if((!ntok && !lmok) || ((!ntok || !lmok) && !dupe)){
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replyerror("ntlm-fail bad response %s@%s/%s(%s)", tr->uid, windom, tr->hostid, raddr);
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logfail(tr->uid);
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goto Retry;
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}
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succeed(tr->uid);
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/*
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* reply with ticket & authenticator
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*/
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tickauthreply(tr, &hkey);
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syslog(0, AUTHLOG, "ntlm-ok %s@%s/%s(%s)", tr->uid, windom, tr->hostid, raddr);
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exits(0);
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}
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void
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mschap(Ticketreq *tr, int nchal)
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{
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char *secret;
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char sbuf[SECRETLEN], windom[128];
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uchar chal[16], ntblob[1024];
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char sbuf[SECRETLEN];
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uchar chal[16];
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uchar hash[MShashlen];
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uchar resp[MSresplen];
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OMSchapreply reply;
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int dupe, lmok, ntok, ntbloblen;
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int dupe, lmok, ntok;
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uchar phash[SHA1dlen], chash[SHA1dlen], ahash[SHA1dlen];
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DigestState *s;
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long timeout;
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int tries;
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/*
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@ -713,55 +812,6 @@ Retry:
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if(readn(0, &reply, OMSCHAPREPLYLEN) < 0)
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exits(0);
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/*
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* CIFS/NTLMv2 uses variable length NT response.
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*/
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ntbloblen = 0;
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if(nchal == MSchallen && memcmp(reply.NTresp+16, ntblobsig, sizeof(ntblobsig)) == 0){
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/* Version[1], HiVision[1], Z[6] */
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ntbloblen += 1+1+6;
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memmove(ntblob, reply.NTresp+16, ntbloblen);
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/* Time[8], CC[8], Z[4] */
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if(readn(0, ntblob+ntbloblen, 8+8+4) < 0)
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exits(0);
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ntbloblen += 8+8+4;
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/* variable AvPairs */
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for(;;){
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int len, id;
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if(ntbloblen > sizeof(ntblob)-4)
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exits(0);
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/* AvId[2], AvLen[2], Vairable[AvLen] */
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if(readn(0, ntblob+ntbloblen, 4) < 0)
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exits(0);
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id = ntblob[ntbloblen+0] | ntblob[ntbloblen+1]<<8;
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len = ntblob[ntbloblen+2] | ntblob[ntbloblen+3]<<8;
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ntbloblen += 4;
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if(ntbloblen+len > sizeof(ntblob))
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exits(0);
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if(readn(0, ntblob+ntbloblen, len) < 0)
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exits(0);
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ntbloblen += len;
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if(id == MsvAvEOL)
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break;
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}
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/* Z[4] */
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if(ntbloblen > sizeof(ntblob)-4)
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exits(0);
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/* LINUX omits the final Z(4), so read with short timeout */
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notify(catch);
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timeout = alarm(50);
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if(readn(0, ntblob+ntbloblen, 4) == 4)
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ntbloblen += 4;
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alarm(timeout);
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notify(nil);
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}
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safecpy(tr->uid, reply.uid, sizeof(tr->uid));
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if(tr->uid[0] == 0)
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exits(0);
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@ -775,38 +825,8 @@ Retry:
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goto Retry;
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}
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if(ntbloblen > 0){
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getname(MsvAvNbDomainName, ntblob, ntbloblen, windom, sizeof(windom));
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for(;;){
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ntv2hash(hash, secret, tr->uid, windom);
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/*
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* LmResponse = Cat(HMAC_MD5(LmHash, Cat(SC, CC)), CC)
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*/
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s = hmac_md5(chal, nchal, hash, MShashlen, nil, nil);
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hmac_md5((uchar*)reply.LMresp+16, nchal, hash, MShashlen, resp, s);
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lmok = tsmemcmp(resp, reply.LMresp, 16) == 0;
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/*
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* NtResponse = Cat(HMAC_MD5(NtHash, Cat(SC, NtBlob)), NtBlob)
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*/
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s = hmac_md5(chal, nchal, hash, MShashlen, nil, nil);
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hmac_md5(ntblob, ntbloblen, hash, MShashlen, resp, s);
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ntok = tsmemcmp(resp, reply.NTresp, 16) == 0;
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/*
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* LM response can be all zeros or signature key,
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* so make it valid when the NT respone matches.
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*/
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lmok |= ntok;
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if(lmok || windom[0] == '\0')
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break;
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windom[0] = '\0'; /* try NIL domain */
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}
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dupe = 0;
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} else if(nchal == MSchallenv2){
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if(nchal == MSchallenv2){
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/* MSCHAPv2 */
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s = sha1((uchar*)reply.LMresp, nchal, nil, nil);
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s = sha1(chal, nchal, nil, s);
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sha1((uchar*)tr->uid, strlen(tr->uid), chash, s);
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@ -816,6 +836,7 @@ Retry:
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ntok = lmok = tsmemcmp(resp, reply.NTresp, MSresplen) == 0;
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dupe = 0;
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} else {
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/* MSCHAP (LM+NTLM) */
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lmhash(hash, secret);
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mschalresp(resp, hash, chal);
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lmok = tsmemcmp(resp, reply.LMresp, MSresplen) == 0;
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