experimental ntlmv2 server authenticaion support for cifsd
extending factotums and the auth servers mschap implementation to handle variable length NT response for NTLMv2. fix some minor bugs. only tested with cifs so far.
This commit is contained in:
cinap_lenrek
parent
d7f90a9096
commit
c940e98630
3 changed files with 199 additions and 53 deletions
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@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ void mkkey(char*);
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void randombytes(uchar*, int);
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void nthash(uchar hash[MShashlen], char *passwd);
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void lmhash(uchar hash[MShashlen], char *passwd);
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void ntv2hash(uchar hash[MShashlen], char *passwd, char *user, char *dom);
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void mschalresp(uchar resp[MSresplen], uchar hash[MShashlen], uchar chal[MSchallen]);
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void desencrypt(uchar data[8], uchar key[7]);
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int tickauthreply(Ticketreq*, char*);
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@ -629,19 +630,59 @@ printresp(uchar resp[MSresplen])
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syslog(0, AUTHLOG, "resp = %s", buf);
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}
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enum {
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MsvAvEOL = 0,
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MsvAvNbComputerName,
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MsvAvNbDomainName,
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MsvAvDnsComputerName,
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MsvAvDnsomainName,
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};
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char*
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getname(int id, uchar *ntblob, int ntbloblen, char *buf, int nbuf)
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{
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int aid, alen, i;
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uchar *p, *e;
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char *d;
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Rune r;
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d = buf;
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p = ntblob+8+8+8+4; /* AvPair offset */
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e = ntblob+ntbloblen;
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while(p+4 <= e){
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aid = *p++;
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aid |= *p++ << 8;
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alen = *p++;
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alen |= *p++ << 8;
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if(p+alen > e)
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break;
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if(aid == id){
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for(i=0; i+1 < alen && d-buf < nbuf-(UTFmax+1); i+=2){
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r = p[i] | p[i+1]<<8;
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d += runetochar(d, &r);
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}
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break;
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}
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p += alen;
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}
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*d = '\0';
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return buf;
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}
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static uchar ntblobsig[] = {0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
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void
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mschap(Ticketreq *tr)
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{
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char *secret, *hkey;
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char sbuf[SECRETLEN], hbuf[DESKEYLEN];
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uchar chal[CHALLEN];
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char sbuf[SECRETLEN], hbuf[DESKEYLEN], windom[128];
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uchar chal[CHALLEN], ntblob[1024];
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uchar hash[MShashlen];
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uchar hash2[MShashlen];
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uchar resp[MSresplen];
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OMSchapreply reply;
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int dupe, lmok, ntok;
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int dupe, lmok, ntok, ntbloblen;
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DigestState *s;
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uchar digest[SHA1dlen];
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@ -657,6 +698,43 @@ mschap(Ticketreq *tr)
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if(readn(0, &reply, sizeof(reply)) < 0)
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exits(0);
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/*
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* CIFS/NTLMv2 uses variable length NT response.
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*/
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ntbloblen = 0;
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if(memcmp(reply.NTresp+16, ntblobsig, sizeof(ntblobsig)) == 0){
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/* Version[1], HiVision[1], Z[6] */
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ntbloblen += 1+1+6;
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memmove(ntblob, reply.NTresp+16, ntbloblen);
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/* Time[8], CC[8], Z[4] */
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if(readn(0, ntblob+ntbloblen, 8+8+4) < 0)
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exits(0);
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ntbloblen += 8+8+4;
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/* variable AvPairs */
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for(;;){
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int len, id;
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if(ntbloblen > sizeof(ntblob)-4)
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exits(0);
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/* AvId[2], AvLen[2], Vairable[AvLen] */
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if(readn(0, ntblob+ntbloblen, 4) < 0)
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exits(0);
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id = ntblob[ntbloblen+0] | ntblob[ntbloblen+1]<<8;
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len = ntblob[ntbloblen+2] | ntblob[ntbloblen+3]<<8;
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ntbloblen += 4;
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if(ntbloblen+len > sizeof(ntblob))
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exits(0);
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if(readn(0, ntblob+ntbloblen, len) < 0)
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exits(0);
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ntbloblen += len;
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if(id == MsvAvEOL)
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break;
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}
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}
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safecpy(tr->uid, reply.uid, sizeof(tr->uid));
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/*
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* lookup
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@ -670,6 +748,25 @@ mschap(Ticketreq *tr)
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exits(0);
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}
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if(ntbloblen > 0){
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getname(MsvAvNbDomainName, ntblob, ntbloblen, windom, sizeof(windom));
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ntv2hash(hash, secret, tr->uid, windom);
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/*
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* LmResponse = Cat(HMAC_MD5(LmHash, Cat(SC, CC)), CC)
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*/
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s = hmac_md5(chal, 8, hash, MShashlen, nil, nil);
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hmac_md5((uchar*)reply.LMresp+16, 8, hash, MShashlen, resp, s);
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lmok = memcmp(resp, reply.LMresp, 16) == 0;
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/*
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* NtResponse = Cat(HMAC_MD5(NtHash, Cat(SC, NtBlob)), NtBlob)
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*/
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s = hmac_md5(chal, 8, hash, MShashlen, nil, nil);
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hmac_md5(ntblob, ntbloblen, hash, MShashlen, resp, s);
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ntok = memcmp(resp, reply.NTresp, 16) == 0;
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dupe = 0;
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} else {
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lmhash(hash, secret);
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mschalresp(resp, hash, chal);
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lmok = memcmp(resp, reply.LMresp, MSresplen) == 0;
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@ -677,6 +774,7 @@ mschap(Ticketreq *tr)
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mschalresp(resp, hash, chal);
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ntok = memcmp(resp, reply.NTresp, MSresplen) == 0;
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dupe = memcmp(reply.LMresp, reply.NTresp, MSresplen) == 0;
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}
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/*
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* It is valid to send the same response in both the LM and NTLM
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@ -707,8 +805,7 @@ mschap(Ticketreq *tr)
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exits(0);
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if(debug)
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replyerror("mschap-ok %s/%s(%s) %ux",
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tr->uid, tr->hostid, raddr);
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replyerror("mschap-ok %s/%s(%s)", tr->uid, tr->hostid, raddr);
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nthash(hash, secret);
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md4(hash, 16, hash2, 0);
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@ -723,19 +820,52 @@ mschap(Ticketreq *tr)
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void
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nthash(uchar hash[MShashlen], char *passwd)
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{
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uchar buf[512];
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int i;
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for (i = 0; *passwd && i + 1 < sizeof(buf);) {
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DigestState *ds;
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uchar b[2];
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Rune r;
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ds = md4(nil, 0, nil, nil);
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while(*passwd){
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passwd += chartorune(&r, passwd);
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buf[i++] = r;
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buf[i++] = r >> 8;
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b[0] = r & 0xff;
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b[1] = r >> 8;
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md4(b, 2, nil, ds);
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}
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md4(nil, 0, hash, ds);
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}
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memset(hash, 0, 16);
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void
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ntv2hash(uchar hash[MShashlen], char *passwd, char *user, char *dom)
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{
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uchar v1hash[MShashlen];
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DigestState *ds;
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uchar b[2];
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Rune r;
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md4(buf, i, hash, 0);
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nthash(v1hash, passwd);
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/*
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* Some documentation insists that the username must be forced to
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* uppercase, but the domain name should not be. Other shows both
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* being forced to uppercase. I am pretty sure this is irrevevant as the
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* domain name passed from the remote server always seems to be in
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* uppercase already.
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*/
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ds = hmac_md5(nil, 0, v1hash, sizeof(v1hash), nil, nil);
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while(*user){
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user += chartorune(&r, user);
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r = toupperrune(r);
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b[0] = r & 0xff;
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b[1] = r >> 8;
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hmac_md5(b, 2, v1hash, sizeof(v1hash), nil, ds);
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}
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while(*dom){
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dom += chartorune(&r, dom);
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b[0] = r & 0xff;
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b[1] = r >> 8;
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hmac_md5(b, 2, v1hash, sizeof(v1hash), nil, ds);
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}
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hmac_md5(nil, 0, v1hash, sizeof(v1hash), hash, ds);
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}
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void
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@ -745,12 +875,12 @@ lmhash(uchar hash[MShashlen], char *passwd)
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char *stdtext = "KGS!@#$%";
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int i;
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memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
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strncpy((char*)buf, passwd, sizeof(buf));
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for(i=0; i<sizeof(buf); i++)
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if(buf[i] >= 'a' && buf[i] <= 'z')
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buf[i] += 'A' - 'a';
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memset(hash, 0, 16);
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memcpy(hash, stdtext, 8);
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memcpy(hash+8, stdtext, 8);
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@ -130,14 +130,14 @@ chapwrite(Fsstate *fss, void *va, uint n)
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{
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int ret, nreply;
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char *a, *v;
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void *reply;
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Key *k;
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Keyinfo ki;
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State *s;
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Chapreply cr;
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MSchapreply mcr;
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OChapreply ocr;
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OMSchapreply omcr;
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Chapreply *cr;
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MSchapreply *mcr;
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OChapreply *ocr;
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OMSchapreply *omcr;
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uchar reply[4*1024];
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s = fss->ps;
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a = va;
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@ -150,17 +150,28 @@ chapwrite(Fsstate *fss, void *va, uint n)
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if(ret != RpcOk)
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return ret;
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v = _strfindattr(k->privattr, "!password");
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if(v == nil)
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if(v == nil){
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closekey(k);
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return failure(fss, "key has no password");
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}
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setattrs(fss->attr, k->attr);
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switch(s->astype){
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default:
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abort();
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closekey(k);
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return failure(fss, "chap internal botch");
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case AuthMSchap:
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if(n < ChapChallen){
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closekey(k);
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return failure(fss, "challenge too short");
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}
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doLMchap(v, (uchar *)a, (uchar *)s->mcr.LMresp);
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doNTchap(v, (uchar *)a, (uchar *)s->mcr.NTresp);
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break;
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case AuthChap:
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if(n < ChapChallen+1){
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closekey(k);
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return failure(fss, "challenge too short");
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}
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dochap(v, *a, a+1, (uchar *)s->cr);
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break;
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}
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@ -181,26 +192,28 @@ chapwrite(Fsstate *fss, void *va, uint n)
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default:
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return failure(fss, "chap internal botch");
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case AuthChap:
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if(n != sizeof(Chapreply))
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if(n != sizeof(*cr))
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return failure(fss, "did not get Chapreply");
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memmove(&cr, va, sizeof cr);
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ocr.id = cr.id;
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memmove(ocr.resp, cr.resp, sizeof ocr.resp);
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memset(omcr.uid, 0, sizeof(omcr.uid));
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strecpy(ocr.uid, ocr.uid+sizeof ocr.uid, s->user);
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reply = &ocr;
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nreply = sizeof ocr;
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cr = (Chapreply*)va;
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nreply = sizeof(*ocr);
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memset(reply, 0, nreply);
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ocr = (OChapreply*)reply;
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strecpy(ocr->uid, ocr->uid+sizeof(ocr->uid), s->user);
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ocr->id = cr->id;
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memmove(ocr->resp, cr->resp, sizeof(ocr->resp));
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break;
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case AuthMSchap:
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if(n != sizeof(MSchapreply))
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if(n < sizeof(*mcr))
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return failure(fss, "did not get MSchapreply");
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memmove(&mcr, va, sizeof mcr);
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memmove(omcr.LMresp, mcr.LMresp, sizeof omcr.LMresp);
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memmove(omcr.NTresp, mcr.NTresp, sizeof omcr.NTresp);
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memset(omcr.uid, 0, sizeof(omcr.uid));
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strecpy(omcr.uid, omcr.uid+sizeof omcr.uid, s->user);
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reply = &omcr;
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nreply = sizeof omcr;
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if(n > sizeof(reply)+sizeof(*mcr)-sizeof(*omcr))
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return failure(fss, "MSchapreply too long");
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mcr = (MSchapreply*)va;
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nreply = n+sizeof(*omcr)-sizeof(*mcr);
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memset(reply, 0, nreply);
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omcr = (OMSchapreply*)reply;
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strecpy(omcr->uid, omcr->uid+sizeof(omcr->uid), s->user);
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memmove(omcr->LMresp, mcr->LMresp, sizeof(omcr->LMresp));
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memmove(omcr->NTresp, mcr->NTresp, n+sizeof(mcr->NTresp)-sizeof(*mcr));
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break;
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}
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if(doreply(s, reply, nreply) < 0)
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@ -99,22 +99,25 @@ smbsessionsetupandx(Req *r, uchar *h, uchar *p, uchar *e)
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logit("ignoring bad session key");
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while(!remoteuser){
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if(needauth){
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MSchapreply mcr;
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MSchapreply *mcr;
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if(smbcs == nil || strlen(user) == 0)
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break;
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memset(&mcr, 0, sizeof(mcr));
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if((lme - lm) == sizeof(mcr.LMresp))
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memmove(mcr.LMresp, lm, lme - lm);
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if((nte - nt) == sizeof(mcr.NTresp))
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memmove(mcr.NTresp, nt, nte - nt);
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smbcs->user = user;
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smbcs->resp = &mcr;
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smbcs->nresp = sizeof(mcr);
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smbcs->nresp = (nte - nt)+sizeof(*mcr)-sizeof(mcr->NTresp);
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if(smbcs->nresp < sizeof(*mcr))
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smbcs->nresp = sizeof(*mcr);
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smbcs->resp = mallocz(smbcs->nresp, 1);
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mcr = (MSchapreply*)smbcs->resp;
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if((lme - lm) <= sizeof(mcr->LMresp))
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memmove(mcr->LMresp, lm, lme - lm);
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if((nte - nt) > 0)
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memmove(mcr->NTresp, nt, nte - nt);
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if((ai = auth_response(smbcs)) == nil)
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logit("auth_response: %r");
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auth_freechal(smbcs);
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smbcs = nil;
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free(mcr);
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if(ai == nil)
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break;
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if(auth_chuid(ai, nil) < 0)
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