729 lines
14 KiB
Text
729 lines
14 KiB
Text
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.TH FACTOTUM 4
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.SH NAME
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factotum, fgui \- authentication agent
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.SH SYNOPSIS
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.B auth/factotum
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[
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.B -DdknpuS
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] [
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.B -a asaddr
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] [
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.B -s
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.I srvname
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] [
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.B -m
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.I mtpt
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]
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.PP
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.B auth/factotum
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.B -g
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.IB attribute = value
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.B ...
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.IB attribute ?
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.B ...
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.PP
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.B auth/fgui
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.SH DESCRIPTION
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.I Factotum
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is a user-level file system that
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acts as the authentication agent for a user.
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It does so by managing a set of
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.IR keys .
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A key is a collection of information used to authenticate a particular action.
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Stored as a list of
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.IB attribute = value
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pairs, a key typically contains a user, an authentication domain, a protocol, and
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some secret data.
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.PP
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.I Factotum
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presents a two level directory. The first
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level contains a single directory
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.BR factotum ,
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which in turn contains:
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.TF needkey
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.TP
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.B rpc
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each open represents a new private channel to
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.I factotum
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.TP
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.B proto
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when read lists the protocols available
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.TP
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.B confirm
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for confiming the use of key
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.TP
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.B needkey
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allows external programs to control the addition of new keys
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.TP
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.B log
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a log of actions
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.TP
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.B ctl
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for maintaining keys; when read, it returns a list of keys.
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For secret attributes, only the attribute name follow by a
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.L ?
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is returned.
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.PD
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.PP
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In any authentication, the caller typically acts as a client
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and the callee as a server. The server determines
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the authentication domain, sometimes after a negotiation with
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the client. Authentication always requires the client to
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prove its identity to the server. Under some protocols, the
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authentication is mutual.
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Proof is accomplished using secret information kept by factotum
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in conjunction with a cryptographic protocol.
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.PP
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.I Factotum
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can act in the role of client for any process possessing the
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same user id as it. For select protocols such as
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.B p9sk1
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it can also act as a client for other processes provided
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its user id may speak for the other process' user id (see
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.IR authsrv (6)).
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.I Factotum
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can act in the role of server for any process.
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.PP
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.IR Factotum 's
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structure is independent of
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any particular authentication protocol.
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.I Factotum
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supports the following protocols:
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.TF mschap
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.TP
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.B p9any
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a metaprotocol used to negotiate which actual protocol to use.
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.TP
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.B p9sk1
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a Plan 9 shared key protocol described in
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.IR authsrv (6)'s
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``File Service'' section.
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.TP
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.B p9sk2
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a variant of
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.B p9sk1
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described in
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.IR authsrv (6)'s
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``Remote Execution'' section.
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.TP
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.B p9cr
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a Plan 9 protocol that can use either
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.B p9sk1
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keys or SecureID tokens.
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.TP
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.B apop
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the challenge/response protocol used by POP3 mail servers.
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.TP
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.B cram
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the challenge/response protocol also used by POP3 mail servers.
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.TP
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.B chap
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the challenge/response protocols used by PPP and PPTP.
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.TP
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.B mschap
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a proprietary Microsoft protocol also used by PPP and PPTP.
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.TP
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.B rsa
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RSA public key decryption, used by SSH and TLS.
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.TP
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.B pass
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passwords in the clear.
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.TP
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.B vnc
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.IR vnc (1)'s
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challenge/response.
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.TP
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.B wep
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WEP passwords for wireless ethernet cards.
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.PD
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.PP
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The options are:
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.TP
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.B \-a
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supplies the address of the authentication server to use.
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Without this option, it will attempt to find an authentication server by
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querying the connection server, the file
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.BR <mtpt>/ndb ,
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and finally the network database in
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.BR /lib/ndb .
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.TP
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.B \-m
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specifies the mount point to use, by default
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.BR /mnt .
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.TP
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.B \-s
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specifies the service name to use.
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Without this option,
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.I factotum
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does not create a service file in
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.BR /srv .
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.TP
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.B \-D
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turns on 9P tracing, written to standard error.
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.TP
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.B \-d
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turns on debugging, written to standard error.
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.TP
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.B \-g
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causes the agent to prompt for the key, write it
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to the
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.B ctl
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file, and exit.
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The agent will prompt for values for any of the
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attributes ending with a question mark
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.RB ( ? )
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and will append all the supplied
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.I attribute = value
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pairs. See the section on key templates below.
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.TP
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.B \-n
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don't look for a secstore.
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.TP
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.B \-S
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indicates that the agent is running on a
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CPU server. On starting, it will attempt to get a
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.B p9sk1
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key from NVRAM using
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.B readnvram
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(see
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.IR authsrv (2)),
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prompting for anything it needs.
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It will never subsequently prompt for a
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key that it doesn't have.
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This option is typically used by
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the kernel at boot time.
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.TP
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.B \-k
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causes the NVRAM to be written.
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It is only valid with the
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.B \-S
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option.
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This option is typically used by
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the kernel at boot time.
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.TP
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.B \-u
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causes the agent to prompt for user
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id and writes it to
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.BR /dev/hostowner .
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It is mutually exclusive with
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.B \-k
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and
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.BR \-S .
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This option is typically used by
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the kernel at boot time.
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.TP
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.B \-p
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causes the agent not to mark itself `private'
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via
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.IR proc (3),
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so that it can be debugged.
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It is implied by
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.BR \-d .
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.PD
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.PP
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.I Fgui
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is a graphic user interface for confirming key usage and
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entering new keys. It hides the window in which it starts
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and waits reading requests from
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.B confirm
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and
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.BR needkey .
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For each requests, it unhides itself and waits for
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user input.
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See the sections on key confirmation and key prompting below.
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.SS "Key Tuples
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.PP
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A
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.I "key tuple
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is a space delimited list of
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.IB attribute = value
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pairs. An attribute whose name begins with an exclamation point
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.RB ( ! )
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does not appear when reading the
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.B ctl
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file.
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The required attributes depend on the authentication protocol.
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.PP
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.BR P9sk1 ,
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.BR p9sk2 ,
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and
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.BR p9cr
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all require a key with
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.BR proto = p9sk1 ,
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a
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.B dom
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attribute identifying the authentication domain, a
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.B user
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name valid in that domain, and either a
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.B !password
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or
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.B !hex
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attribute specifying the password or hexadecimal secret
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to be used. Here is an example:
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.PP
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.EX
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proto=p9sk1 dom=avayalabs.com user=presotto !password=lucent
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.EE
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.PP
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.BR Apop ,
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.BR cram ,
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.BR chap ,
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and
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.BR mschap ,
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require a key with a
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.B proto
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attribute whose value matches the protocol,
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in addition to
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.BR server ,
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.BR user ,
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and
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.B !password
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attributes;
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e.g.
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.PP
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.EX
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proto=apop server=mit.edu user=rsc !password=nerdsRus
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.EE
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Vnc is similar but does not require a
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.B user
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attribute.
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.PP
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.B Pass
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requires a key with
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.B proto=pass
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in addition to
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.B user
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and
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.B !password
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attributes; e.g.
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.PP
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.EX
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proto=pass user=tb !password=does.it.matter
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.EE
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.PP
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.B Rsa
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requires a key with
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.B proto=rsa
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in addition to all the hex attributes defining an RSA key:
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.BR ek ,
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.BR n ,
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.BR !p ,
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.BR !q ,
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.BR !kp ,
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.BR !kq ,
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.BR !c2 ,
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and
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.BR !dk .
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By convention, programs using the RSA protocol also require a
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.B service
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attribute set to
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.BR ssh ,
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.BR sshserve ,
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or
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.BR tls .
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.PP
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.B Wep
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requires a
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.BR key1 ,
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.BR key2 ,
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or
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.BR key3
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set to the password to be used.
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Starting the protocol causes
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.I factotum
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to configure the wireless ethernet card
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.B #l/ether0
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for WEP encryption with the given password.
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.PP
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All keys can have additional attributes that act either as comments
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or as selectors to distinguish them in the
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.IR auth (2)
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library calls.
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.PP
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The factotum owner can use any key stored by factotum.
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Any key may have one or more
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.B owner
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attributes listing the users who can use the key
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as though they were the owner.
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For example, the TLS and SSH host keys on a server
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often have an attribute
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.B owner=*
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to allow any user (and in particular,
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.LR none )
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to run the TLS or SSH server-side protocol.
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.PP
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Any key may have a
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.B role
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attribute for restricting how it can be used.
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If this attribute is missing, the key can be used in any role.
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The possible values are:
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.TP
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.B client
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for authenticating outbound calls
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.TP
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.B server
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for authenticating inbound calls
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.TP
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.B speakfor
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for authenticating processes whose
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user id does not match
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.IR factotum 's.
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.PP
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If a key has a
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.B disabled
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attribute (with any value), the key is not used
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during any protocols. Factotum automatically marks
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keys with
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.B disabled=by.factotum
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when they fail during certain authentication
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protocols (in particular, the Plan 9 ones).
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.PD
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.PP
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Whenever
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.I factotum
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runs as a server, it must have a
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.B p9sk1
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key in order to communicate with the authentication
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server for validating passwords and challenge/responses of
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other users.
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.SS "Key Templates
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Key templates are used by routines that interface to
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.I factotum
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such as
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.B auth_proxy
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and
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.B auth_challenge
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(see
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.IR auth (2))
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to specify which key and protocol to use for an authentication.
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Like a key tuple, a key template is also a list of
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.IB attribute = value
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pairs.
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It must specify at least the protocol and enough
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other attributes to uniquely identify a key, or set of keys, to use.
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The keys chosen are those that match all the attributes specified
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in the template. The possible attribute/value formats are:
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.TP 1i
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.IB attr = val
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The attribute
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.I attr
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must exist in the key and its value must exactly
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match
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.I val
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.TP 1i
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.IB attr ?
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The attribute
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.I attr
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must exist in the key but its value doesn't matter.
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.TP 1i
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.I attr
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The attribute
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.I attr
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must exist in the key with a null value
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.PD
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.PP
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Key templates are also used by factotum to request a key either via
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an RPC error or via the
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.B needkey
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interface.
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The possible attribute/value formats are:
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.TP 1i
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.IB attr = val
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This pair must remain unchanged
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.TP 1i
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.IB attr ?
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This attribute needs a value
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.TP 1i
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.I attr
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The pair must remain unchanged
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.PD
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.SS "Control and Key Management
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.PP
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A number of messages can be written to the control file.
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The messages are:
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.TP
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.B "key \fIattribute-value-list\fP
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add a new key. This will replace any old key whose
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public, i.e. non ! attributes, match.
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.TP
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.B "delkey \fIattribute-value-list\fP
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delete a key whose attributes match those given.
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.TP
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.B debug
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toggle debugging on and off, i.e., the debugging also
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turned on by the
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.B \-d
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option.
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.PP
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By default when factotum starts it looks for a
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.IR secstore (1)
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account on $auth for the user and, if one exists,
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prompts for a secstore password in order to fetch
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the file
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.IR factotum ,
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which should contain control file commands.
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An example would be
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.EX
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key dom=x.com proto=p9sk1 user=boyd !hex=26E522ADE2BBB2A229
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key proto=rsa service=ssh size=1024 ek=3B !dk=...
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.EE
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where the first line sets a password for
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challenge/response authentication, strong against dictionary
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attack by being a long random string, and the second line
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sets a public/private keypair for ssh authentication,
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generated by
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.B ssh_genkey
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(see
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.IR ssh (1)).
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.PD
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.SS "Confirming key use
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.PP
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The
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.B confirm
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file provides a connection from
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.I factotum
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to a confirmation server, normally the program
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.IR auth/fgui .
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Whenever a key with the
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.B confirm
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attribute is used,
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.I factotum
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requires confirmation of its use. If no process has
|
||
|
.B confirm
|
||
|
opened, use of the key will be denied.
|
||
|
However, if the file is opened a request can be read from it
|
||
|
with the following format:
|
||
|
.PP
|
||
|
.B confirm
|
||
|
.BI tag= tagno
|
||
|
.I "<key template>
|
||
|
.PP
|
||
|
The reply, written back to
|
||
|
.BR confirm ,
|
||
|
consists of string:
|
||
|
.PP
|
||
|
.BI tag= tagno
|
||
|
.BI answer= xxx
|
||
|
.PP
|
||
|
If
|
||
|
.I xxx
|
||
|
is the string
|
||
|
.B yes
|
||
|
then the use is confirmed and the authentication will proceed.
|
||
|
Otherwise, it fails.
|
||
|
.PP
|
||
|
.B Confirm
|
||
|
is exclusive open and can only be opened by a process with
|
||
|
the same user id as
|
||
|
.IR factotum .
|
||
|
.SS "Prompting for keys
|
||
|
.PP
|
||
|
The
|
||
|
.B needkey
|
||
|
file provides a connection from
|
||
|
.I factotum
|
||
|
to a key server, normally the program
|
||
|
.IR auth/fgui .
|
||
|
Whenever
|
||
|
.I factotum
|
||
|
needs a new key, it first checks to see if
|
||
|
.B needkey
|
||
|
is opened. If it isn't, it returns a error to its client.
|
||
|
If the file is opened a request can be read from it
|
||
|
with the following format:
|
||
|
.PP
|
||
|
.B needkey
|
||
|
.BI tag= tagno
|
||
|
.I "<key template>
|
||
|
.PP
|
||
|
It is up to the reader to then query the user for any missing fields,
|
||
|
write the key tuple into the
|
||
|
.B ctl
|
||
|
file, and then reply by writing into the
|
||
|
.B needkey
|
||
|
file the string:
|
||
|
.PP
|
||
|
.BI tag= tagno
|
||
|
.PP
|
||
|
.B Needkey
|
||
|
is exclusive open and can only be opened by a process with
|
||
|
the same user id as
|
||
|
.IR factotum .
|
||
|
.SS "The RPC Protocol
|
||
|
Authentication is performed by
|
||
|
.IP 1)
|
||
|
opening
|
||
|
.BR rpc
|
||
|
.IP 2)
|
||
|
setting up the protocol and key to be used (see the
|
||
|
.B start
|
||
|
RPC below),
|
||
|
.IP 3)
|
||
|
shuttling messages back and forth between
|
||
|
.IR factotum
|
||
|
and the other party (see the
|
||
|
.B read
|
||
|
and
|
||
|
.B write
|
||
|
RPC's) until done
|
||
|
.IP 4)
|
||
|
if successful, reading back an
|
||
|
.I AuthInfo
|
||
|
structure (see
|
||
|
.IR authsrv (2)).
|
||
|
.PP
|
||
|
The RPC protocol is normally embodied by one of the
|
||
|
routines in
|
||
|
.IR auth (2).
|
||
|
We describe it here should anyone want to extend
|
||
|
the library.
|
||
|
.PP
|
||
|
An RPC consists of writing a request message to
|
||
|
.B rpc
|
||
|
followed by reading a reply message back.
|
||
|
RPC's are strictly ordered; requests and replies of
|
||
|
different RPC's cannot be interleaved.
|
||
|
Messages consist of a verb, a single space, and data.
|
||
|
The data format depends on the verb. The request verbs are:
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B "start \fIattribute-value-list\fP
|
||
|
start a new authentication.
|
||
|
.I Attribute-value-pair-list
|
||
|
must include a
|
||
|
.B proto
|
||
|
attribute, a
|
||
|
.B role
|
||
|
attribute with value
|
||
|
.B client
|
||
|
or
|
||
|
.BR server ,
|
||
|
and enough other attributes to uniquely identify a key to use.
|
||
|
A
|
||
|
.B start
|
||
|
RPC is required before any others. The possible replies are:
|
||
|
.RS
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B ok
|
||
|
start succeeded.
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B "error \fIstring\fP
|
||
|
where
|
||
|
.I string
|
||
|
is the reason.
|
||
|
.RE
|
||
|
.PD
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B read
|
||
|
get data from
|
||
|
.I factotum
|
||
|
to send to the other party. The possible replies are:
|
||
|
.RS
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B ok
|
||
|
read succeeded, this is zero length message.
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B "ok \fIdata\fP
|
||
|
read succeeded, the data follows the space and is
|
||
|
unformatted.
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B "done
|
||
|
authentication has succeeded, no further RPC's are
|
||
|
necessary
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B "done haveai
|
||
|
authentication has succeeded, an
|
||
|
.B AuthInfo
|
||
|
structure (see
|
||
|
.IR auth (2))
|
||
|
can be retrieved with an
|
||
|
.B authinfo
|
||
|
RPC
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B "phase \fIstring\fP
|
||
|
its not your turn to read, get some data from
|
||
|
the other party and return it with a write RPC.
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B "error \fIstring\fP
|
||
|
authentication failed,
|
||
|
.I string
|
||
|
is the reason.
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B "protocol not started
|
||
|
a
|
||
|
.B start
|
||
|
RPC needs to precede reads and writes
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B "needkey \fIattribute-value-list\fP
|
||
|
a key matching the argument is needed. This argument
|
||
|
may be passed as an argument to
|
||
|
.I factotum
|
||
|
.B -g
|
||
|
in order to prompt for a key. After that, the
|
||
|
authentication may proceed, i.e., the read restarted.
|
||
|
.PD
|
||
|
.RE
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B "write \fIdata\fP
|
||
|
send data from the other party to
|
||
|
.IR factotum .
|
||
|
The possible replies are:
|
||
|
.RS
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B "ok
|
||
|
the write succeeded
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B "needkey \fIattribute-value-list\fP
|
||
|
see above
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B "toosmall \fIn\fP
|
||
|
the write is too short, get more data from the
|
||
|
other party and retry the write.
|
||
|
.I n
|
||
|
specifies the maximun total number of bytes.
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B "phase \fIstring\fP
|
||
|
its not your turn to write, get some data from
|
||
|
.I factotum
|
||
|
first.
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B "done
|
||
|
see above
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B "done haveai
|
||
|
see above
|
||
|
.RE
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B authinfo
|
||
|
retrieve the AuthInfo structure.
|
||
|
The possible replies are:
|
||
|
.RS
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B "ok \fIdata\fP
|
||
|
.I data
|
||
|
is a marshaled form of the AuthInfo structure.
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B "error \fIstring\fP
|
||
|
where
|
||
|
.I string
|
||
|
is the reason for the error.
|
||
|
.PD
|
||
|
.RE
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B attr
|
||
|
retrieve the attributes used in the
|
||
|
.B start
|
||
|
RPC.
|
||
|
The possible replies are:
|
||
|
.RS
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B "ok \fIattribute-value-list\fP
|
||
|
.TP
|
||
|
.B "error \fIstring\fP
|
||
|
where
|
||
|
.I string
|
||
|
is the reason for the error.
|
||
|
.PD
|
||
|
.RE
|
||
|
.SH SOURCE
|
||
|
.B /sys/src/cmd/auth/factotum
|