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![George Bișoc](/assets/img/avatar_default.png)
Temporarily add the local group to the system token so that Virtualbox GA services can properly set up network drives for shared folders. What happens is that a security descriptor has a DACL with only one ACE that grants access to Local SID (presumably coming from Vbox?) but the client token is that of the service which is a SYSTEM token. Perhaps we are not impersonating the right user or whatever else. This is only a temporary placebo, until a proper solution is found. CORE-18250
2647 lines
77 KiB
C
2647 lines
77 KiB
C
/*
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* PROJECT: ReactOS Kernel
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* LICENSE: GPL-2.0-or-later (https://spdx.org/licenses/GPL-2.0-or-later)
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* PURPOSE: Security access token implementation base support routines
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* COPYRIGHT: Copyright David Welch <welch@cwcom.net>
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* Copyright 2021-2023 George Bișoc <george.bisoc@reactos.org>
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*/
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/* INCLUDES *******************************************************************/
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#include <ntoskrnl.h>
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#define NDEBUG
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#include <debug.h>
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/* GLOBALS ********************************************************************/
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POBJECT_TYPE SeTokenObjectType = NULL;
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TOKEN_SOURCE SeSystemTokenSource = {"*SYSTEM*", {0}};
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LUID SeSystemAuthenticationId = SYSTEM_LUID;
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LUID SeAnonymousAuthenticationId = ANONYMOUS_LOGON_LUID;
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static GENERIC_MAPPING SepTokenMapping = {
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TOKEN_READ,
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TOKEN_WRITE,
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TOKEN_EXECUTE,
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TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS
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};
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/* PRIVATE FUNCTIONS *****************************************************************/
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/**
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* @brief
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* Creates a lock for the token.
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*
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* @param[in,out] Token
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* A token which lock has to be created.
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*
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* @return
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* STATUS_SUCCESS if the pool allocation and resource initialisation have
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* completed successfully, otherwise STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES on a
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* pool allocation failure.
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*/
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NTSTATUS
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SepCreateTokenLock(
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_Inout_ PTOKEN Token)
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{
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PAGED_CODE();
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Token->TokenLock = ExAllocatePoolWithTag(NonPagedPool,
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sizeof(ERESOURCE),
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TAG_SE_TOKEN_LOCK);
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if (Token->TokenLock == NULL)
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{
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DPRINT1("SepCreateTokenLock(): Failed to allocate memory!\n");
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return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
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}
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ExInitializeResourceLite(Token->TokenLock);
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return STATUS_SUCCESS;
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}
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/**
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* @brief
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* Deletes a lock of a token.
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*
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* @param[in,out] Token
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* A token which contains the lock.
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*
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* @return
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* Nothing.
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*/
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VOID
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SepDeleteTokenLock(
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_Inout_ PTOKEN Token)
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{
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PAGED_CODE();
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ExDeleteResourceLite(Token->TokenLock);
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ExFreePoolWithTag(Token->TokenLock, TAG_SE_TOKEN_LOCK);
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}
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/**
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* @brief
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* Compares the elements of SID arrays provided by tokens.
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* The elements that are being compared for equality are
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* the SIDs and their attributes.
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*
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* @param[in] SidArrayToken1
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* SID array from the first token.
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*
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* @param[in] CountSidArray1
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* SID count array from the first token.
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*
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* @param[in] SidArrayToken2
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* SID array from the second token.
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*
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* @param[in] CountSidArray2
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* SID count array from the second token.
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*
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* @return
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* Returns TRUE if the elements match from either arrays,
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* FALSE otherwise.
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*/
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static
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BOOLEAN
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SepCompareSidAndAttributesFromTokens(
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_In_ PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES SidArrayToken1,
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_In_ ULONG CountSidArray1,
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_In_ PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES SidArrayToken2,
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_In_ ULONG CountSidArray2)
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{
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ULONG FirstCount, SecondCount;
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PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES FirstSidArray, SecondSidArray;
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PAGED_CODE();
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/* Bail out if index counters provided are not equal */
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if (CountSidArray1 != CountSidArray2)
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{
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DPRINT("SepCompareSidAndAttributesFromTokens(): Index counters are not the same!\n");
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return FALSE;
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}
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/* Loop over the SID arrays and compare them */
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for (FirstCount = 0; FirstCount < CountSidArray1; FirstCount++)
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{
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for (SecondCount = 0; SecondCount < CountSidArray2; SecondCount++)
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{
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FirstSidArray = &SidArrayToken1[FirstCount];
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SecondSidArray = &SidArrayToken2[SecondCount];
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if (RtlEqualSid(FirstSidArray->Sid, SecondSidArray->Sid) &&
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FirstSidArray->Attributes == SecondSidArray->Attributes)
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{
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break;
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}
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}
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/* We've exhausted the array of the second token without finding this one */
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if (SecondCount == CountSidArray2)
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{
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DPRINT("SepCompareSidAndAttributesFromTokens(): No matching elements could be found in either token!\n");
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return FALSE;
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}
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}
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return TRUE;
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}
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/**
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* @brief
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* Compares the elements of privilege arrays provided by tokens.
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* The elements that are being compared for equality are
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* the privileges and their attributes.
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*
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* @param[in] PrivArrayToken1
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* Privilege array from the first token.
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*
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* @param[in] CountPrivArray1
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* Privilege count array from the first token.
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*
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* @param[in] PrivArrayToken2
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* Privilege array from the second token.
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*
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* @param[in] CountPrivArray2
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* Privilege count array from the second token.
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*
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* @return
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* Returns TRUE if the elements match from either arrays,
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* FALSE otherwise.
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*/
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static
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BOOLEAN
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SepComparePrivilegeAndAttributesFromTokens(
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_In_ PLUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES PrivArrayToken1,
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_In_ ULONG CountPrivArray1,
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_In_ PLUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES PrivArrayToken2,
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_In_ ULONG CountPrivArray2)
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{
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ULONG FirstCount, SecondCount;
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PLUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES FirstPrivArray, SecondPrivArray;
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PAGED_CODE();
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/* Bail out if index counters provided are not equal */
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if (CountPrivArray1 != CountPrivArray2)
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{
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DPRINT("SepComparePrivilegeAndAttributesFromTokens(): Index counters are not the same!\n");
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return FALSE;
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}
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/* Loop over the privilege arrays and compare them */
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for (FirstCount = 0; FirstCount < CountPrivArray1; FirstCount++)
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{
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for (SecondCount = 0; SecondCount < CountPrivArray2; SecondCount++)
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{
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FirstPrivArray = &PrivArrayToken1[FirstCount];
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SecondPrivArray = &PrivArrayToken2[SecondCount];
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if (RtlEqualLuid(&FirstPrivArray->Luid, &SecondPrivArray->Luid) &&
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FirstPrivArray->Attributes == SecondPrivArray->Attributes)
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{
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break;
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}
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}
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/* We've exhausted the array of the second token without finding this one */
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if (SecondCount == CountPrivArray2)
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{
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DPRINT("SepComparePrivilegeAndAttributesFromTokens(): No matching elements could be found in either token!\n");
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return FALSE;
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}
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}
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return TRUE;
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}
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/**
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* @brief
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* Compares tokens if they're equal based on all the following properties. If all
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* of the said conditions are met then the tokens are deemed as equal.
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*
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* - Every SID that is present in either token is also present in the other one.
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* - Both or none of the tokens are restricted.
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* - If both tokens are restricted, every SID that is restricted in either token is
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* also restricted in the other one.
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* - Every privilege present in either token is also present in the other one.
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*
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* @param[in] FirstToken
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* The first token.
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*
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* @param[in] SecondToken
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* The second token.
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*
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* @param[out] Equal
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* The retrieved value which determines if the tokens are
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* equal or not.
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*
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* @return
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* Returns STATUS_SUCCESS.
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*/
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static
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NTSTATUS
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SepCompareTokens(
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_In_ PTOKEN FirstToken,
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_In_ PTOKEN SecondToken,
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_Out_ PBOOLEAN Equal)
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{
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BOOLEAN Restricted, IsEqual = FALSE;
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PAGED_CODE();
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ASSERT(FirstToken != SecondToken);
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/* Lock the tokens */
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SepAcquireTokenLockShared(FirstToken);
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SepAcquireTokenLockShared(SecondToken);
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/* Check if every SID that is present in either token is also present in the other one */
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if (!SepCompareSidAndAttributesFromTokens(FirstToken->UserAndGroups,
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FirstToken->UserAndGroupCount,
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SecondToken->UserAndGroups,
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SecondToken->UserAndGroupCount))
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{
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goto Quit;
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}
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/* Is one token restricted but the other isn't? */
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Restricted = SeTokenIsRestricted(FirstToken);
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if (Restricted != SeTokenIsRestricted(SecondToken))
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{
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/* If that's the case then bail out */
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goto Quit;
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}
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/*
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* If both tokens are restricted check if every SID
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* that is restricted in either token is also restricted
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* in the other one.
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*/
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if (Restricted)
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{
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if (!SepCompareSidAndAttributesFromTokens(FirstToken->RestrictedSids,
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FirstToken->RestrictedSidCount,
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SecondToken->RestrictedSids,
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SecondToken->RestrictedSidCount))
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{
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goto Quit;
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}
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}
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/* Check if every privilege present in either token is also present in the other one */
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if (!SepComparePrivilegeAndAttributesFromTokens(FirstToken->Privileges,
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FirstToken->PrivilegeCount,
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SecondToken->Privileges,
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SecondToken->PrivilegeCount))
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{
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goto Quit;
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}
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/* If we're here then the tokens are equal */
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IsEqual = TRUE;
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DPRINT("SepCompareTokens(): Tokens are equal!\n");
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Quit:
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/* Unlock the tokens */
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SepReleaseTokenLock(SecondToken);
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SepReleaseTokenLock(FirstToken);
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*Equal = IsEqual;
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return STATUS_SUCCESS;
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}
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/**
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* @brief
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* Private function that impersonates the system's anonymous logon token.
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* The major bulk of the impersonation procedure is done here.
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*
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* @param[in] Thread
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* The executive thread object that is to impersonate the client.
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*
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* @param[in] PreviousMode
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* The access processor mode, indicating if the call is executed
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* in kernel or user mode.
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*
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* @return
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* Returns STATUS_SUCCESS if the impersonation has succeeded.
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* STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL is returned if the primary token couldn't be
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* obtained from the current process to perform additional tasks.
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* STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED is returned if the process' primary token is
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* restricted, which for this matter we cannot impersonate onto a
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* restricted process. Otherwise a failure NTSTATUS code is returned.
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*/
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static
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NTSTATUS
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SepImpersonateAnonymousToken(
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_In_ PETHREAD Thread,
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_In_ KPROCESSOR_MODE PreviousMode)
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{
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NTSTATUS Status;
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PTOKEN TokenToImpersonate, ProcessToken;
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ULONG IncludeEveryoneValueData;
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PAGED_CODE();
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/*
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* We must check first which kind of token
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* shall we assign for the thread to impersonate,
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* the one with Everyone Group SID or the other
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* without. Invoke the registry helper to
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* return the data value for us.
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*/
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Status = SepRegQueryHelper(L"\\Registry\\Machine\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa",
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L"EveryoneIncludesAnonymous",
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REG_DWORD,
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sizeof(IncludeEveryoneValueData),
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&IncludeEveryoneValueData);
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if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
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{
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DPRINT1("SepRegQueryHelper(): Failed to query the registry value (Status 0x%lx)\n", Status);
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return Status;
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}
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if (IncludeEveryoneValueData == 0)
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{
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DPRINT("SepImpersonateAnonymousToken(): Assigning the token not including the Everyone Group SID...\n");
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TokenToImpersonate = SeAnonymousLogonTokenNoEveryone;
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}
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else
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{
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DPRINT("SepImpersonateAnonymousToken(): Assigning the token including the Everyone Group SID...\n");
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TokenToImpersonate = SeAnonymousLogonToken;
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}
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/*
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* Tell the object manager that we're going to use this token
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* object now by incrementing the reference count.
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*/
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Status = ObReferenceObjectByPointer(TokenToImpersonate,
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TOKEN_IMPERSONATE,
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SeTokenObjectType,
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PreviousMode);
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if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
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{
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DPRINT1("SepImpersonateAnonymousToken(): Couldn't be able to use the token, bail out...\n");
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return Status;
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}
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/*
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* Reference the primary token of the current process that the anonymous
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* logon token impersonation procedure is being performed. We'll be going
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* to use the process' token to figure out if the process is actually
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* restricted or not.
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*/
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ProcessToken = PsReferencePrimaryToken(PsGetCurrentProcess());
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if (!ProcessToken)
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{
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DPRINT1("SepImpersonateAnonymousToken(): Couldn't be able to get the process' primary token, bail out...\n");
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ObDereferenceObject(TokenToImpersonate);
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return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
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}
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/* Now, is the token from the current process restricted? */
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if (SeTokenIsRestricted(ProcessToken))
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{
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DPRINT1("SepImpersonateAnonymousToken(): The process is restricted, can't do anything. Bail out...\n");
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PsDereferencePrimaryToken(ProcessToken);
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ObDereferenceObject(TokenToImpersonate);
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return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
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}
|
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/*
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* Finally it's time to impersonate! But first, fast dereference the
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* process' primary token as we no longer need it.
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*/
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ObFastDereferenceObject(&PsGetCurrentProcess()->Token, ProcessToken);
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Status = PsImpersonateClient(Thread, TokenToImpersonate, TRUE, FALSE, SecurityImpersonation);
|
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if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
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{
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DPRINT1("SepImpersonateAnonymousToken(): Failed to impersonate, bail out...\n");
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ObDereferenceObject(TokenToImpersonate);
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return Status;
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}
|
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|
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return Status;
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}
|
|
|
|
/**
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* @brief
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* Updates the token's flags based upon the privilege that the token
|
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* has been granted. The flag can either be taken out or given to the token
|
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* if the attributes of the specified privilege is enabled or not.
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|
*
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* @param[in,out] Token
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* The token where the flags are to be changed.
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*
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* @param[in] Index
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* The index count which represents the total sum of privileges. The count in question
|
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* MUST NOT exceed the expected privileges count of the token.
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*
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* @return
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* Nothing.
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*/
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VOID
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SepUpdateSinglePrivilegeFlagToken(
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_Inout_ PTOKEN Token,
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_In_ ULONG Index)
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|
{
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ULONG TokenFlag;
|
|
ASSERT(Index < Token->PrivilegeCount);
|
|
|
|
/* The high part of all values we are interested in is 0 */
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|
if (Token->Privileges[Index].Luid.HighPart != 0)
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|
{
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|
return;
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|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check for certain privileges to update flags */
|
|
if (Token->Privileges[Index].Luid.LowPart == SE_CHANGE_NOTIFY_PRIVILEGE)
|
|
{
|
|
TokenFlag = TOKEN_HAS_TRAVERSE_PRIVILEGE;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (Token->Privileges[Index].Luid.LowPart == SE_BACKUP_PRIVILEGE)
|
|
{
|
|
TokenFlag = TOKEN_HAS_BACKUP_PRIVILEGE;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (Token->Privileges[Index].Luid.LowPart == SE_RESTORE_PRIVILEGE)
|
|
{
|
|
TokenFlag = TOKEN_HAS_RESTORE_PRIVILEGE;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (Token->Privileges[Index].Luid.LowPart == SE_IMPERSONATE_PRIVILEGE)
|
|
{
|
|
TokenFlag = TOKEN_HAS_IMPERSONATE_PRIVILEGE;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* Nothing to do */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check if the specified privilege is enabled */
|
|
if (Token->Privileges[Index].Attributes & SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED)
|
|
{
|
|
/* It is enabled, so set the flag */
|
|
Token->TokenFlags |= TokenFlag;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* Is is disabled, so remove the flag */
|
|
Token->TokenFlags &= ~TokenFlag;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Checks if a token belongs to the main user, being the owner.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] _Token
|
|
* A valid token object.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] SecurityDescriptor
|
|
* A security descriptor where the owner is to be found.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] TokenLocked
|
|
* If set to TRUE, the token has been already locked and there's
|
|
* no need to lock it again. Otherwise the function will acquire
|
|
* the lock.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns TRUE if the token belongs to a owner, FALSE otherwise.
|
|
*/
|
|
BOOLEAN
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SepTokenIsOwner(
|
|
_In_ PACCESS_TOKEN _Token,
|
|
_In_ PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecurityDescriptor,
|
|
_In_ BOOLEAN TokenLocked)
|
|
{
|
|
PSID Sid;
|
|
BOOLEAN Result;
|
|
PTOKEN Token = _Token;
|
|
|
|
/* Get the owner SID */
|
|
Sid = SepGetOwnerFromDescriptor(SecurityDescriptor);
|
|
ASSERT(Sid != NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* Lock the token if needed */
|
|
if (!TokenLocked) SepAcquireTokenLockShared(Token);
|
|
|
|
/* Check if the owner SID is found, handling restricted case as well */
|
|
Result = SepSidInToken(Token, Sid);
|
|
if ((Result) && (Token->TokenFlags & TOKEN_IS_RESTRICTED))
|
|
{
|
|
Result = SepSidInTokenEx(Token, NULL, Sid, FALSE, TRUE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Release the lock if we had acquired it */
|
|
if (!TokenLocked) SepReleaseTokenLock(Token);
|
|
|
|
/* Return the result */
|
|
return Result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Updates the token's flags based upon the privilege that the token
|
|
* has been granted. The function uses the private helper, SepUpdateSinglePrivilegeFlagToken,
|
|
* in order to update the flags of a token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in,out] Token
|
|
* The token where the flags are to be changed.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Nothing.
|
|
*/
|
|
VOID
|
|
SepUpdatePrivilegeFlagsToken(
|
|
_Inout_ PTOKEN Token)
|
|
{
|
|
ULONG i;
|
|
|
|
/* Loop all privileges */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < Token->PrivilegeCount; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Updates the flags for this privilege */
|
|
SepUpdateSinglePrivilegeFlagToken(Token, i);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Removes a privilege from the token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in,out] Token
|
|
* The token where the privilege is to be removed.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Index
|
|
* The index count which represents the number position of the privilege
|
|
* we want to remove.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Nothing.
|
|
*/
|
|
VOID
|
|
SepRemovePrivilegeToken(
|
|
_Inout_ PTOKEN Token,
|
|
_In_ ULONG Index)
|
|
{
|
|
ULONG MoveCount;
|
|
ASSERT(Index < Token->PrivilegeCount);
|
|
|
|
/* Calculate the number of trailing privileges */
|
|
MoveCount = Token->PrivilegeCount - Index - 1;
|
|
if (MoveCount != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Move them one location ahead */
|
|
RtlMoveMemory(&Token->Privileges[Index],
|
|
&Token->Privileges[Index + 1],
|
|
MoveCount * sizeof(LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Update privilege count */
|
|
Token->PrivilegeCount--;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Removes a group from the token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in,out] Token
|
|
* The token where the group is to be removed.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Index
|
|
* The index count which represents the number position of the group
|
|
* we want to remove.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Nothing.
|
|
*/
|
|
VOID
|
|
SepRemoveUserGroupToken(
|
|
_Inout_ PTOKEN Token,
|
|
_In_ ULONG Index)
|
|
{
|
|
ULONG MoveCount;
|
|
ASSERT(Index < Token->UserAndGroupCount);
|
|
|
|
/* Calculate the number of trailing groups */
|
|
MoveCount = Token->UserAndGroupCount - Index - 1;
|
|
if (MoveCount != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Time to remove the group by moving one location ahead */
|
|
RtlMoveMemory(&Token->UserAndGroups[Index],
|
|
&Token->UserAndGroups[Index + 1],
|
|
MoveCount * sizeof(SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Remove one group count */
|
|
Token->UserAndGroupCount--;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Computes the exact available dynamic area of an access
|
|
* token whilst querying token statistics.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] DynamicCharged
|
|
* The current charged dynamic area of an access token.
|
|
* This must not be 0!
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] PrimaryGroup
|
|
* A pointer to a primary group SID.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] DefaultDacl
|
|
* If provided, this pointer points to a default DACL of an
|
|
* access token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns the calculated available dynamic area.
|
|
*/
|
|
ULONG
|
|
SepComputeAvailableDynamicSpace(
|
|
_In_ ULONG DynamicCharged,
|
|
_In_ PSID PrimaryGroup,
|
|
_In_opt_ PACL DefaultDacl)
|
|
{
|
|
ULONG DynamicAvailable;
|
|
|
|
PAGED_CODE();
|
|
|
|
/* A token's dynamic area is always charged */
|
|
ASSERT(DynamicCharged != 0);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Take into account the default DACL if
|
|
* the token has one. Otherwise the occupied
|
|
* space is just the present primary group.
|
|
*/
|
|
DynamicAvailable = DynamicCharged - RtlLengthSid(PrimaryGroup);
|
|
if (DefaultDacl)
|
|
{
|
|
DynamicAvailable -= DefaultDacl->AclSize;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return DynamicAvailable;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Re-builds the dynamic part area of an access token
|
|
* during an a default DACL or primary group replacement
|
|
* within the said token if the said dynamic area can't
|
|
* hold the new security content.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] AccessToken
|
|
* A pointer to an access token where its dynamic part
|
|
* is to be re-built and expanded based upon the new
|
|
* dynamic part size provided by the caller. Dynamic
|
|
* part expansion is not always guaranteed. See Remarks
|
|
* for further information.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] NewDynamicPartSize
|
|
* The new dynamic part size.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns STATUS_SUCCESS if the function has completed its
|
|
* operations successfully. STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES
|
|
* is returned if the new dynamic part could not be allocated.
|
|
*
|
|
* @remarks
|
|
* STATUS_SUCCESS does not indicate if the function has re-built
|
|
* the dynamic part of a token. If the current dynamic area size
|
|
* suffices the new dynamic area length provided by the caller
|
|
* then the dynamic area can hold the new security content buffer
|
|
* so dynamic part expansion is not necessary.
|
|
*/
|
|
NTSTATUS
|
|
SepRebuildDynamicPartOfToken(
|
|
_Inout_ PTOKEN AccessToken,
|
|
_In_ ULONG NewDynamicPartSize)
|
|
{
|
|
PVOID NewDynamicPart;
|
|
PVOID PreviousDynamicPart;
|
|
ULONG CurrentDynamicLength;
|
|
|
|
PAGED_CODE();
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity checks */
|
|
ASSERT(AccessToken);
|
|
ASSERT(NewDynamicPartSize != 0);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Compute the exact length of the available
|
|
* dynamic part of the access token.
|
|
*/
|
|
CurrentDynamicLength = AccessToken->DynamicAvailable + RtlLengthSid(AccessToken->PrimaryGroup);
|
|
if (AccessToken->DefaultDacl)
|
|
{
|
|
CurrentDynamicLength += AccessToken->DefaultDacl->AclSize;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Figure out if the current dynamic part is too small
|
|
* to fit new contents inside the said dynamic part.
|
|
* Rebuild the dynamic area and expand it if necessary.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (CurrentDynamicLength < NewDynamicPartSize)
|
|
{
|
|
NewDynamicPart = ExAllocatePoolWithTag(PagedPool,
|
|
NewDynamicPartSize,
|
|
TAG_TOKEN_DYNAMIC);
|
|
if (NewDynamicPart == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT1("SepRebuildDynamicPartOfToken(): Insufficient resources to allocate new dynamic part!\n");
|
|
return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Copy the existing dynamic part */
|
|
PreviousDynamicPart = AccessToken->DynamicPart;
|
|
RtlCopyMemory(NewDynamicPart, PreviousDynamicPart, CurrentDynamicLength);
|
|
|
|
/* Update the available dynamic area and assign new dynamic */
|
|
AccessToken->DynamicAvailable += NewDynamicPartSize - CurrentDynamicLength;
|
|
AccessToken->DynamicPart = NewDynamicPart;
|
|
|
|
/* Move the contents (primary group and default DACL) addresses as well */
|
|
AccessToken->PrimaryGroup = (PSID)((ULONG_PTR)AccessToken->DynamicPart +
|
|
((ULONG_PTR)AccessToken->PrimaryGroup - (ULONG_PTR)PreviousDynamicPart));
|
|
if (AccessToken->DefaultDacl != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
AccessToken->DefaultDacl = (PACL)((ULONG_PTR)AccessToken->DynamicPart +
|
|
((ULONG_PTR)AccessToken->DefaultDacl - (ULONG_PTR)PreviousDynamicPart));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* And discard the previous dynamic part */
|
|
DPRINT("SepRebuildDynamicPartOfToken(): The dynamic part has been re-built with success!\n");
|
|
ExFreePoolWithTag(PreviousDynamicPart, TAG_TOKEN_DYNAMIC);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @unimplemented
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Frees (de-allocates) the proxy data memory block of a token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in,out] ProxyData
|
|
* The proxy data to be freed.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Nothing.
|
|
*/
|
|
VOID
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SepFreeProxyData(
|
|
_Inout_ PVOID ProxyData)
|
|
{
|
|
UNIMPLEMENTED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @unimplemented
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Copies the proxy data from the source into the destination of a token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[out] Dest
|
|
* The destination path where the proxy data is to be copied to.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Src
|
|
* The source path where the proxy data is be copied from.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* To be added...
|
|
*/
|
|
NTSTATUS
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SepCopyProxyData(
|
|
_Out_ PVOID* Dest,
|
|
_In_ PVOID Src)
|
|
{
|
|
UNIMPLEMENTED;
|
|
return STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Replaces the old access token of a process (pointed by the EPROCESS kernel structure) with a
|
|
* new access token. The new access token must be a primary token for use.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Process
|
|
* The process instance where its access token is about to be replaced.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] NewAccessToken
|
|
* The new token that it's going to replace the old one.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[out] OldAccessToken
|
|
* The returned old token that's been replaced, which the caller can do anything.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns STATUS_SUCCESS if the exchange operation between tokens has completed successfully.
|
|
* STATUS_BAD_TOKEN_TYPE is returned if the new token is not a primary one so that we cannot
|
|
* exchange it with the old one from the process. STATUS_TOKEN_ALREADY_IN_USE is returned if
|
|
* both tokens aren't equal which means one of them has different properties (groups, privileges, etc.)
|
|
* and as such one of them is currently in use. A failure NTSTATUS code is returned otherwise.
|
|
*/
|
|
NTSTATUS
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SeExchangePrimaryToken(
|
|
_In_ PEPROCESS Process,
|
|
_In_ PACCESS_TOKEN NewAccessToken,
|
|
_Out_ PACCESS_TOKEN* OldAccessToken)
|
|
{
|
|
PTOKEN OldToken;
|
|
PTOKEN NewToken = (PTOKEN)NewAccessToken;
|
|
|
|
PAGED_CODE();
|
|
|
|
if (NewToken->TokenType != TokenPrimary)
|
|
return STATUS_BAD_TOKEN_TYPE;
|
|
|
|
if (NewToken->TokenInUse)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOLEAN IsEqual;
|
|
NTSTATUS Status;
|
|
|
|
/* Maybe we're trying to set the same token */
|
|
OldToken = PsReferencePrimaryToken(Process);
|
|
if (OldToken == NewToken)
|
|
{
|
|
/* So it's a nop. */
|
|
*OldAccessToken = OldToken;
|
|
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Status = SepCompareTokens(OldToken, NewToken, &IsEqual);
|
|
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
|
|
{
|
|
PsDereferencePrimaryToken(OldToken);
|
|
*OldAccessToken = NULL;
|
|
return Status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!IsEqual)
|
|
{
|
|
PsDereferencePrimaryToken(OldToken);
|
|
*OldAccessToken = NULL;
|
|
return STATUS_TOKEN_ALREADY_IN_USE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Silently return STATUS_SUCCESS but do not set the new token,
|
|
* as it's already in use elsewhere. */
|
|
*OldAccessToken = OldToken;
|
|
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Lock the new token */
|
|
SepAcquireTokenLockExclusive(NewToken);
|
|
|
|
/* Mark new token in use */
|
|
NewToken->TokenInUse = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
/* Set the session ID for the new token */
|
|
NewToken->SessionId = MmGetSessionId(Process);
|
|
|
|
/* Unlock the new token */
|
|
SepReleaseTokenLock(NewToken);
|
|
|
|
/* Reference the new token */
|
|
ObReferenceObject(NewToken);
|
|
|
|
/* Replace the old with the new */
|
|
OldToken = ObFastReplaceObject(&Process->Token, NewToken);
|
|
|
|
/* Lock the old token */
|
|
SepAcquireTokenLockExclusive(OldToken);
|
|
|
|
/* Mark the old token as free */
|
|
OldToken->TokenInUse = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
/* Unlock the old token */
|
|
SepReleaseTokenLock(OldToken);
|
|
|
|
*OldAccessToken = (PACCESS_TOKEN)OldToken;
|
|
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Removes the primary token of a process.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in,out] Process
|
|
* The process instance with the access token to be removed.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Nothing.
|
|
*/
|
|
VOID
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SeDeassignPrimaryToken(
|
|
_Inout_ PEPROCESS Process)
|
|
{
|
|
PTOKEN OldToken;
|
|
|
|
/* Remove the Token */
|
|
OldToken = ObFastReplaceObject(&Process->Token, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* Mark the Old Token as free */
|
|
OldToken->TokenInUse = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
/* Dereference the Token */
|
|
ObDereferenceObject(OldToken);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Computes the length size of a SID.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Count
|
|
* Total count of entries that have SIDs in them (that being PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES in this context).
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Src
|
|
* Source that points to the attributes and SID entry structure.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns the total length of a SID size.
|
|
*/
|
|
ULONG
|
|
RtlLengthSidAndAttributes(
|
|
_In_ ULONG Count,
|
|
_In_ PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES Src)
|
|
{
|
|
ULONG i;
|
|
ULONG uLength;
|
|
|
|
PAGED_CODE();
|
|
|
|
uLength = Count * sizeof(SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < Count; i++)
|
|
uLength += RtlLengthSid(Src[i].Sid);
|
|
|
|
return uLength;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Finds the primary group and default owner entity based on the submitted primary group instance
|
|
* and an access token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Token
|
|
* Access token to begin the search query of primary group and default owner.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] PrimaryGroup
|
|
* A primary group SID to be used for search query, determining if user & groups of a token
|
|
* and the submitted primary group do match.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] DefaultOwner
|
|
* The default owner. If specified, it's used to determine if the token belongs to the actual user,
|
|
* that is, being the owner himself.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[out] PrimaryGroupIndex
|
|
* Returns the primary group index.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[out] DefaultOwnerIndex
|
|
* Returns the default owner index.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns STATUS_SUCCESS if the find query operation has completed successfully and that at least one
|
|
* search result is requested by the caller. STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER is returned if the caller hasn't requested
|
|
* any search result. STATUS_INVALID_OWNER is returned if the specified default user owner does not match with the other
|
|
* user from the token. STATUS_INVALID_PRIMARY_GROUP is returned if the specified default primary group does not match with the
|
|
* other group from the token.
|
|
*/
|
|
NTSTATUS
|
|
SepFindPrimaryGroupAndDefaultOwner(
|
|
_In_ PTOKEN Token,
|
|
_In_ PSID PrimaryGroup,
|
|
_In_opt_ PSID DefaultOwner,
|
|
_Out_opt_ PULONG PrimaryGroupIndex,
|
|
_Out_opt_ PULONG DefaultOwnerIndex)
|
|
{
|
|
ULONG i;
|
|
|
|
/* We should return at least a search result */
|
|
if (!PrimaryGroupIndex && !DefaultOwnerIndex)
|
|
return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
|
|
|
if (PrimaryGroupIndex)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Initialize with an invalid index */
|
|
// Token->PrimaryGroup = NULL;
|
|
*PrimaryGroupIndex = Token->UserAndGroupCount;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (DefaultOwnerIndex)
|
|
{
|
|
if (DefaultOwner)
|
|
{
|
|
/* An owner is specified: check whether this is actually the user */
|
|
if (RtlEqualSid(Token->UserAndGroups[0].Sid, DefaultOwner))
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* It's the user (first element in array): set it
|
|
* as the owner and stop the search for it.
|
|
*/
|
|
*DefaultOwnerIndex = 0;
|
|
DefaultOwnerIndex = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* An owner is specified: initialize with an invalid index */
|
|
*DefaultOwnerIndex = Token->UserAndGroupCount;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* No owner specified: set the user (first element in array)
|
|
* as the owner and stop the search for it.
|
|
*/
|
|
*DefaultOwnerIndex = 0;
|
|
DefaultOwnerIndex = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Validate and set the primary group and default owner indices */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < Token->UserAndGroupCount; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Stop the search if we have found what we searched for */
|
|
if (!PrimaryGroupIndex && !DefaultOwnerIndex)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (DefaultOwnerIndex && DefaultOwner &&
|
|
RtlEqualSid(Token->UserAndGroups[i].Sid, DefaultOwner) &&
|
|
(Token->UserAndGroups[i].Attributes & SE_GROUP_OWNER))
|
|
{
|
|
/* Owner is found, stop the search for it */
|
|
*DefaultOwnerIndex = i;
|
|
DefaultOwnerIndex = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (PrimaryGroupIndex &&
|
|
RtlEqualSid(Token->UserAndGroups[i].Sid, PrimaryGroup))
|
|
{
|
|
/* Primary group is found, stop the search for it */
|
|
// Token->PrimaryGroup = Token->UserAndGroups[i].Sid;
|
|
*PrimaryGroupIndex = i;
|
|
PrimaryGroupIndex = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (DefaultOwnerIndex)
|
|
{
|
|
if (*DefaultOwnerIndex == Token->UserAndGroupCount)
|
|
return STATUS_INVALID_OWNER;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (PrimaryGroupIndex)
|
|
{
|
|
if (*PrimaryGroupIndex == Token->UserAndGroupCount)
|
|
// if (Token->PrimaryGroup == NULL)
|
|
return STATUS_INVALID_PRIMARY_GROUP;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Internal private function that returns an opened handle
|
|
* of an access token associated with a thread.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Thread
|
|
* A pointer to a Executive thread. This parameter is used to
|
|
* validate that the newly obtained thread in this function
|
|
* hasn't diverged. This could potentially lead to a scenario
|
|
* that we might get an access token from a different token
|
|
* which is not what we want. The validation is performed
|
|
* if the token has to copied and can't be opened directly.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] ThreadHandle
|
|
* A handle to a thread, of which an access token is to be opened
|
|
* and given from that thread.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] ThreadToken
|
|
* A pointer to an access token associated with the specific thread.
|
|
* The function assumes that the token is an impersonation one
|
|
* prior the calling of this function.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] DesiredAccess
|
|
* The desired access rights for the access token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] HandleAttributes
|
|
* Handle attributes of which they are used for the newly creation
|
|
* of the opened thread token. The function assumes that they have
|
|
* been validated prior the calling of this function.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] EffectiveOnly
|
|
* If set to TRUE, the function will copy a new access token with
|
|
* privileges and groups that are effectively enabled. Any disabled
|
|
* privilege or group is removed from the copied token. Otherwise
|
|
* if set to FALSE, the function retains all the enabled and disabled
|
|
* privielges and groups.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] CopyOnOpen
|
|
* If set to TRUE, it tells the function that the access token cannot
|
|
* be directly opened due to the security impersonation info of the
|
|
* associated thread being enforced. In this case the function will
|
|
* make a copy of the said token by duplicating it. Otherwise if set
|
|
* to FALSE, the function will just open the access token directly.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] ImpersonationLevel
|
|
* The security impersonation level, at which it is allowed to
|
|
* access the token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] PreviousMode
|
|
* The processor request level mode.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[out] OpenedTokenHandle
|
|
* A pointer to an opened access token handle associated with the
|
|
* specific thread, returned to the caller. Initially this parameter
|
|
* is set to NULL and if the function fails to open the thread's token,
|
|
* it will stay NULL.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns STATUS_SUCCESS if the function has successfully opened the thread's
|
|
* token. STATUS_OBJECT_TYPE_MISMATCH is returned if the obtained thread object
|
|
* no longer matches with the other thread that has been obtained previously.
|
|
* STATUS_NO_TOKEN is returned if the associated thread's process has no
|
|
* primary access token. A failure NTSTATUS code is returned otherwise.
|
|
*/
|
|
static
|
|
NTSTATUS
|
|
SepOpenThreadToken(
|
|
_In_ PETHREAD Thread,
|
|
_In_ HANDLE ThreadHandle,
|
|
_In_ PTOKEN ThreadToken,
|
|
_In_ ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
|
|
_In_ ULONG HandleAttributes,
|
|
_In_ BOOLEAN EffectiveOnly,
|
|
_In_ BOOLEAN CopyOnOpen,
|
|
_In_ SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL ImpersonationLevel,
|
|
_In_ KPROCESSOR_MODE PreviousMode,
|
|
_Out_ PHANDLE OpenedTokenHandle)
|
|
{
|
|
NTSTATUS Status;
|
|
HANDLE TokenHandle;
|
|
PETHREAD Thread2;
|
|
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes;
|
|
PTOKEN NewToken, PrimaryToken;
|
|
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecurityDescriptor;
|
|
PACL Dacl;
|
|
|
|
PAGED_CODE();
|
|
|
|
/* Assume no opened token handle at first */
|
|
*OpenedTokenHandle = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Check if we have to do a copy of the token on open or not */
|
|
if (!CopyOnOpen)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Just open the thread's token directly */
|
|
Status = ObOpenObjectByPointer(ThreadToken,
|
|
HandleAttributes,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
DesiredAccess,
|
|
SeTokenObjectType,
|
|
PreviousMode,
|
|
&TokenHandle);
|
|
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT1("Failed to open the thread's token object (Status 0x%lx)\n", Status);
|
|
return Status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Give it to caller */
|
|
*OpenedTokenHandle = TokenHandle;
|
|
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The caller asks to do a copy of that token whilst it's opened.
|
|
* Obtain a thread object again but this time we have to obtain
|
|
* it in our side, kernel mode, and request all the access needed
|
|
* to do a copy of the token because the original thread only has
|
|
* query access needed for access token validation.
|
|
*/
|
|
Status = ObReferenceObjectByHandle(ThreadHandle,
|
|
THREAD_ALL_ACCESS,
|
|
PsThreadType,
|
|
KernelMode,
|
|
(PVOID*)&Thread2,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT1("Failed to reference the object thread (Status 0x%lx)\n", Status);
|
|
return Status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check that one of the threads hasn't diverged */
|
|
if (Thread != Thread2)
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT1("One of the threads aren't the same (original thread 0x%p, thread 0x%p)\n", Thread, Thread2);
|
|
ObDereferenceObject(Thread2);
|
|
return STATUS_OBJECT_TYPE_MISMATCH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Reference the primary token of the process' thread */
|
|
PrimaryToken = PsReferencePrimaryToken(Thread2->ThreadsProcess);
|
|
if (!PrimaryToken)
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT1("Failed to reference the primary token of thread\n");
|
|
ObDereferenceObject(Thread2);
|
|
return STATUS_NO_TOKEN;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Create an impersonation DACL from the tokens we got */
|
|
Status = SepCreateImpersonationTokenDacl(ThreadToken, PrimaryToken, &Dacl);
|
|
ObFastDereferenceObject(&Thread2->ThreadsProcess->Token, PrimaryToken);
|
|
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT1("Failed to create an impersonation token DACL (Status 0x%lx)\n", Status);
|
|
ObDereferenceObject(Thread2);
|
|
return Status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Create a security descriptor with the DACL we got */
|
|
Status = RtlCreateSecurityDescriptor(&SecurityDescriptor,
|
|
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION);
|
|
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT1("Failed to create a security descriptor (Status 0x%lx)\n", Status);
|
|
ExFreePoolWithTag(Dacl, TAG_ACL);
|
|
ObDereferenceObject(Thread2);
|
|
return Status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Attach the DACL to that security descriptor */
|
|
Status = RtlSetDaclSecurityDescriptor(&SecurityDescriptor,
|
|
TRUE,
|
|
Dacl,
|
|
FALSE);
|
|
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT1("Failed to set the DACL to the security descriptor (Status 0x%lx)\n", Status);
|
|
ExFreePoolWithTag(Dacl, TAG_ACL);
|
|
ObDereferenceObject(Thread2);
|
|
return Status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialize the object attributes for the token we
|
|
* are going to duplicate.
|
|
*/
|
|
InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjectAttributes,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
HandleAttributes,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
&SecurityDescriptor);
|
|
|
|
/* Duplicate (copy) it now */
|
|
Status = SepDuplicateToken(ThreadToken,
|
|
&ObjectAttributes,
|
|
EffectiveOnly,
|
|
TokenImpersonation,
|
|
ImpersonationLevel,
|
|
KernelMode,
|
|
&NewToken);
|
|
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT1("Failed to duplicate the token (Status 0x%lx)\n", Status);
|
|
ExFreePoolWithTag(Dacl, TAG_ACL);
|
|
ObDereferenceObject(Thread2);
|
|
return Status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Insert that copied token into the handle now */
|
|
ObReferenceObject(NewToken);
|
|
Status = ObInsertObject(NewToken,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
DesiredAccess,
|
|
0,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
&TokenHandle);
|
|
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT1("Failed to insert the token object (Status 0x%lx)\n", Status);
|
|
ExFreePoolWithTag(Dacl, TAG_ACL);
|
|
ObDereferenceObject(NewToken);
|
|
ObDereferenceObject(Thread2);
|
|
return Status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We're almost done, free the DACL if we got one */
|
|
ExFreePoolWithTag(Dacl, TAG_ACL);
|
|
|
|
/* Impersonate the client finally */
|
|
Status = PsImpersonateClient(Thread, NewToken, FALSE, EffectiveOnly, ImpersonationLevel);
|
|
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT1("Failed to impersonate the client (Status 0x%lx)\n", Status);
|
|
ObDereferenceObject(NewToken);
|
|
ObDereferenceObject(Thread2);
|
|
return Status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Give the newly opened token handle to caller */
|
|
*OpenedTokenHandle = TokenHandle;
|
|
ObDereferenceObject(NewToken);
|
|
ObDereferenceObject(Thread2);
|
|
return Status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Subtracts a token in exchange of duplicating a new one.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] ParentToken
|
|
* The parent access token for duplication.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[out] Token
|
|
* The new duplicated token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] InUse
|
|
* Set this to TRUE if the token is about to be used immediately after the call execution
|
|
* of this function, FALSE otherwise.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] SessionId
|
|
* Session ID for the token to be assigned.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns STATUS_SUCCESS if token subtracting and duplication have completed successfully.
|
|
* A failure NTSTATUS code is returned otherwise.
|
|
*/
|
|
NTSTATUS
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SeSubProcessToken(
|
|
_In_ PTOKEN ParentToken,
|
|
_Out_ PTOKEN *Token,
|
|
_In_ BOOLEAN InUse,
|
|
_In_ ULONG SessionId)
|
|
{
|
|
PTOKEN NewToken;
|
|
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes;
|
|
NTSTATUS Status;
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the attributes and duplicate it */
|
|
InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjectAttributes, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
|
|
Status = SepDuplicateToken(ParentToken,
|
|
&ObjectAttributes,
|
|
FALSE,
|
|
TokenPrimary,
|
|
ParentToken->ImpersonationLevel,
|
|
KernelMode,
|
|
&NewToken);
|
|
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status))
|
|
{
|
|
/* Insert it */
|
|
Status = ObInsertObject(NewToken,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
0,
|
|
0,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status))
|
|
{
|
|
/* Set the session ID */
|
|
NewToken->SessionId = SessionId;
|
|
NewToken->TokenInUse = InUse;
|
|
|
|
/* Return the token */
|
|
*Token = NewToken;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return status */
|
|
return Status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Checks if the token is a child of the other token
|
|
* of the current process that the calling thread is invoking this function.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Token
|
|
* An access token to determine if it's a child or not.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[out] IsChild
|
|
* The returned boolean result.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns STATUS_SUCCESS when the function finishes its operation. STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL is
|
|
* returned if primary token of the current calling process couldn't be referenced otherwise.
|
|
*/
|
|
NTSTATUS
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SeIsTokenChild(
|
|
_In_ PTOKEN Token,
|
|
_Out_ PBOOLEAN IsChild)
|
|
{
|
|
PTOKEN ProcessToken;
|
|
LUID ProcessTokenId, CallerParentId;
|
|
|
|
/* Assume failure */
|
|
*IsChild = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
/* Reference the process token */
|
|
ProcessToken = PsReferencePrimaryToken(PsGetCurrentProcess());
|
|
if (!ProcessToken)
|
|
return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
|
|
|
|
/* Get its token ID */
|
|
ProcessTokenId = ProcessToken->TokenId;
|
|
|
|
/* Dereference the token */
|
|
ObFastDereferenceObject(&PsGetCurrentProcess()->Token, ProcessToken);
|
|
|
|
/* Get our parent token ID */
|
|
CallerParentId = Token->ParentTokenId;
|
|
|
|
/* Compare the token IDs */
|
|
if (RtlEqualLuid(&CallerParentId, &ProcessTokenId))
|
|
*IsChild = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
/* Return success */
|
|
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Checks if the token is a sibling of the other token of
|
|
* the current process that the calling thread is invoking this function.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Token
|
|
* An access token to determine if it's a sibling or not.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[out] IsSibling
|
|
* The returned boolean result.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns STATUS_SUCCESS when the function finishes its operation. STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL is
|
|
* returned if primary token of the current calling process couldn't be referenced otherwise.
|
|
*/
|
|
NTSTATUS
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SeIsTokenSibling(
|
|
_In_ PTOKEN Token,
|
|
_Out_ PBOOLEAN IsSibling)
|
|
{
|
|
PTOKEN ProcessToken;
|
|
LUID ProcessParentId, ProcessAuthId;
|
|
LUID CallerParentId, CallerAuthId;
|
|
|
|
/* Assume failure */
|
|
*IsSibling = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
/* Reference the process token */
|
|
ProcessToken = PsReferencePrimaryToken(PsGetCurrentProcess());
|
|
if (!ProcessToken)
|
|
return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
|
|
|
|
/* Get its parent and authentication IDs */
|
|
ProcessParentId = ProcessToken->ParentTokenId;
|
|
ProcessAuthId = ProcessToken->AuthenticationId;
|
|
|
|
/* Dereference the token */
|
|
ObFastDereferenceObject(&PsGetCurrentProcess()->Token, ProcessToken);
|
|
|
|
/* Get our parent and authentication IDs */
|
|
CallerParentId = Token->ParentTokenId;
|
|
CallerAuthId = Token->AuthenticationId;
|
|
|
|
/* Compare the token IDs */
|
|
if (RtlEqualLuid(&CallerParentId, &ProcessParentId) &&
|
|
RtlEqualLuid(&CallerAuthId, &ProcessAuthId))
|
|
{
|
|
*IsSibling = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return success */
|
|
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Copies an existing access token (technically duplicating a new one).
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Token
|
|
* Token to copy.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Level
|
|
* Impersonation security level to assign to the newly copied token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] PreviousMode
|
|
* Processor request level mode.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[out] NewToken
|
|
* The newly copied token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns STATUS_SUCCESS when token copying has finished successfully. A failure
|
|
* NTSTATUS code is returned otherwise.
|
|
*/
|
|
NTSTATUS
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SeCopyClientToken(
|
|
_In_ PACCESS_TOKEN Token,
|
|
_In_ SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL Level,
|
|
_In_ KPROCESSOR_MODE PreviousMode,
|
|
_Out_ PACCESS_TOKEN* NewToken)
|
|
{
|
|
NTSTATUS Status;
|
|
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes;
|
|
|
|
PAGED_CODE();
|
|
|
|
InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjectAttributes,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
0,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
|
|
Status = SepDuplicateToken(Token,
|
|
&ObjectAttributes,
|
|
FALSE,
|
|
TokenImpersonation,
|
|
Level,
|
|
PreviousMode,
|
|
(PTOKEN*)NewToken);
|
|
|
|
return Status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Determines if a token is a sandbox inert token or not,
|
|
* based upon the token flags.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Token
|
|
* A valid access token to determine if such token is inert.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns TRUE if the token is inert, FALSE otherwise.
|
|
*/
|
|
BOOLEAN
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SeTokenIsInert(
|
|
_In_ PTOKEN Token)
|
|
{
|
|
PAGED_CODE();
|
|
|
|
return (((PTOKEN)Token)->TokenFlags & TOKEN_SANDBOX_INERT) != 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Internal function that deals with access token object destruction and deletion.
|
|
* The function is used solely by the object manager mechanism that handles the life
|
|
* management of a token object.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] ObjectBody
|
|
* The object body that represents an access token object.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Nothing.
|
|
*/
|
|
VOID
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SepDeleteToken(
|
|
_In_ PVOID ObjectBody)
|
|
{
|
|
NTSTATUS Status;
|
|
PTOKEN AccessToken = (PTOKEN)ObjectBody;
|
|
|
|
DPRINT("SepDeleteToken()\n");
|
|
|
|
/* Remove the referenced logon session from token */
|
|
if (AccessToken->LogonSession)
|
|
{
|
|
Status = SepRmRemoveLogonSessionFromToken(AccessToken);
|
|
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
|
|
{
|
|
/* Something seriously went wrong */
|
|
DPRINT1("SepDeleteToken(): Failed to remove the logon session from token (Status: 0x%lx)\n", Status);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Dereference the logon session */
|
|
if ((AccessToken->TokenFlags & TOKEN_SESSION_NOT_REFERENCED) == 0)
|
|
SepRmDereferenceLogonSession(&AccessToken->AuthenticationId);
|
|
|
|
/* Delete the token lock */
|
|
if (AccessToken->TokenLock)
|
|
SepDeleteTokenLock(AccessToken);
|
|
|
|
/* Delete the dynamic information area */
|
|
if (AccessToken->DynamicPart)
|
|
ExFreePoolWithTag(AccessToken->DynamicPart, TAG_TOKEN_DYNAMIC);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Internal function that initializes critical kernel data for access
|
|
* token implementation in SRM.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Nothing.
|
|
*/
|
|
CODE_SEG("INIT")
|
|
VOID
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SepInitializeTokenImplementation(VOID)
|
|
{
|
|
UNICODE_STRING Name;
|
|
OBJECT_TYPE_INITIALIZER ObjectTypeInitializer;
|
|
|
|
DPRINT("Creating Token Object Type\n");
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the Token type */
|
|
RtlZeroMemory(&ObjectTypeInitializer, sizeof(ObjectTypeInitializer));
|
|
RtlInitUnicodeString(&Name, L"Token");
|
|
ObjectTypeInitializer.Length = sizeof(ObjectTypeInitializer);
|
|
ObjectTypeInitializer.InvalidAttributes = OBJ_OPENLINK;
|
|
ObjectTypeInitializer.SecurityRequired = TRUE;
|
|
ObjectTypeInitializer.DefaultPagedPoolCharge = sizeof(TOKEN);
|
|
ObjectTypeInitializer.GenericMapping = SepTokenMapping;
|
|
ObjectTypeInitializer.PoolType = PagedPool;
|
|
ObjectTypeInitializer.ValidAccessMask = TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS;
|
|
ObjectTypeInitializer.UseDefaultObject = TRUE;
|
|
ObjectTypeInitializer.DeleteProcedure = SepDeleteToken;
|
|
ObCreateObjectType(&Name, &ObjectTypeInitializer, NULL, &SeTokenObjectType);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Assigns a primary access token to a given process.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Process
|
|
* Process where the token is about to be assigned.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Token
|
|
* The token to be assigned.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Nothing.
|
|
*/
|
|
VOID
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SeAssignPrimaryToken(
|
|
_In_ PEPROCESS Process,
|
|
_In_ PTOKEN Token)
|
|
{
|
|
PAGED_CODE();
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity checks */
|
|
ASSERT(Token->TokenType == TokenPrimary);
|
|
ASSERT(!Token->TokenInUse);
|
|
|
|
/* Clean any previous token */
|
|
if (Process->Token.Object) SeDeassignPrimaryToken(Process);
|
|
|
|
/* Set the new token */
|
|
ObReferenceObject(Token);
|
|
Token->TokenInUse = TRUE;
|
|
ObInitializeFastReference(&Process->Token, Token);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Retrieves token control information.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] _Token
|
|
* A valid token object.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[out] SecurityDescriptor
|
|
* The returned token control information.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Nothing.
|
|
*/
|
|
VOID
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SeGetTokenControlInformation(
|
|
_In_ PACCESS_TOKEN _Token,
|
|
_Out_ PTOKEN_CONTROL TokenControl)
|
|
{
|
|
PTOKEN Token = _Token;
|
|
PAGED_CODE();
|
|
|
|
/* Capture the main fields */
|
|
TokenControl->AuthenticationId = Token->AuthenticationId;
|
|
TokenControl->TokenId = Token->TokenId;
|
|
TokenControl->TokenSource = Token->TokenSource;
|
|
|
|
/* Lock the token */
|
|
SepAcquireTokenLockShared(Token);
|
|
|
|
/* Capture the modified ID */
|
|
TokenControl->ModifiedId = Token->ModifiedId;
|
|
|
|
/* Unlock it */
|
|
SepReleaseTokenLock(Token);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Creates the system process token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns the system process token if the operations have
|
|
* completed successfully.
|
|
*/
|
|
CODE_SEG("INIT")
|
|
PTOKEN
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SepCreateSystemProcessToken(VOID)
|
|
{
|
|
ULONG GroupAttributes, OwnerAttributes;
|
|
LARGE_INTEGER Expiration;
|
|
SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES UserSid;
|
|
ULONG GroupsLength;
|
|
PSID PrimaryGroup;
|
|
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes;
|
|
PSID Owner;
|
|
PTOKEN Token;
|
|
NTSTATUS Status;
|
|
|
|
/* Don't ever expire */
|
|
Expiration.QuadPart = -1;
|
|
|
|
/* All groups mandatory and enabled */
|
|
GroupAttributes = SE_GROUP_ENABLED | SE_GROUP_MANDATORY | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT;
|
|
OwnerAttributes = SE_GROUP_ENABLED | SE_GROUP_OWNER | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT;
|
|
|
|
/* User is Local System */
|
|
UserSid.Sid = SeLocalSystemSid;
|
|
UserSid.Attributes = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Primary group is Local System */
|
|
PrimaryGroup = SeLocalSystemSid;
|
|
|
|
/* Owner is Administrators */
|
|
Owner = SeAliasAdminsSid;
|
|
|
|
/* Groups are Administrators, World, and Authenticated Users */
|
|
SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES Groups[] =
|
|
{
|
|
{SeAliasAdminsSid, OwnerAttributes},
|
|
{SeWorldSid, GroupAttributes},
|
|
{SeAuthenticatedUsersSid, GroupAttributes},
|
|
{SeLocalSid, SE_GROUP_ENABLED} // HACK: Temporarily add the local group. See CORE-18250.
|
|
};
|
|
GroupsLength = sizeof(SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES) +
|
|
SeLengthSid(Groups[0].Sid) +
|
|
SeLengthSid(Groups[1].Sid) +
|
|
SeLengthSid(Groups[2].Sid) +
|
|
SeLengthSid(Groups[3].Sid); // HACK
|
|
ASSERT(GroupsLength <= (sizeof(Groups) * sizeof(ULONG)));
|
|
|
|
/* Setup the privileges */
|
|
LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES Privileges[] =
|
|
{
|
|
{SeTcbPrivilege, SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED},
|
|
{SeCreateTokenPrivilege, 0},
|
|
{SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege, 0},
|
|
{SeCreatePagefilePrivilege, SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED},
|
|
{SeLockMemoryPrivilege, SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED},
|
|
{SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege, 0},
|
|
{SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege, 0},
|
|
{SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege, SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED},
|
|
{SeCreatePermanentPrivilege, SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED},
|
|
{SeDebugPrivilege, SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED},
|
|
{SeAuditPrivilege, SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED},
|
|
{SeSecurityPrivilege, 0},
|
|
{SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege, 0},
|
|
{SeChangeNotifyPrivilege, SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED},
|
|
{SeBackupPrivilege, 0},
|
|
{SeRestorePrivilege, 0},
|
|
{SeShutdownPrivilege, 0},
|
|
{SeLoadDriverPrivilege, 0},
|
|
{SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege, SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED},
|
|
{SeSystemtimePrivilege, 0},
|
|
{SeUndockPrivilege, 0},
|
|
{SeManageVolumePrivilege, 0},
|
|
{SeImpersonatePrivilege, SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED},
|
|
{SeCreateGlobalPrivilege, SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* Setup the object attributes */
|
|
InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjectAttributes, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
|
|
ASSERT(SeSystemDefaultDacl != NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* Create the token */
|
|
Status = SepCreateToken((PHANDLE)&Token,
|
|
KernelMode,
|
|
0,
|
|
&ObjectAttributes,
|
|
TokenPrimary,
|
|
SecurityAnonymous,
|
|
&SeSystemAuthenticationId,
|
|
&Expiration,
|
|
&UserSid,
|
|
RTL_NUMBER_OF(Groups),
|
|
Groups,
|
|
GroupsLength,
|
|
RTL_NUMBER_OF(Privileges),
|
|
Privileges,
|
|
Owner,
|
|
PrimaryGroup,
|
|
SeSystemDefaultDacl,
|
|
&SeSystemTokenSource,
|
|
TRUE);
|
|
ASSERT(Status == STATUS_SUCCESS);
|
|
|
|
/* Return the token */
|
|
return Token;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Creates the anonymous logon token for the system. The difference between this
|
|
* token and the other one is the inclusion of everyone SID group (being SeWorldSid).
|
|
* The other token lacks such group.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns the system's anonymous logon token if the operations have
|
|
* completed successfully.
|
|
*/
|
|
CODE_SEG("INIT")
|
|
PTOKEN
|
|
SepCreateSystemAnonymousLogonToken(VOID)
|
|
{
|
|
SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES UserSid;
|
|
PSID PrimaryGroup;
|
|
PTOKEN Token;
|
|
ULONG GroupsLength;
|
|
LARGE_INTEGER Expiration;
|
|
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes;
|
|
NTSTATUS Status;
|
|
|
|
/* The token never expires */
|
|
Expiration.QuadPart = -1;
|
|
|
|
/* The user is the anonymous logon */
|
|
UserSid.Sid = SeAnonymousLogonSid;
|
|
UserSid.Attributes = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* The primary group is also the anonymous logon */
|
|
PrimaryGroup = SeAnonymousLogonSid;
|
|
|
|
/* The only group for the token is the World */
|
|
SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES Groups[] =
|
|
{
|
|
{SeWorldSid, SE_GROUP_ENABLED | SE_GROUP_MANDATORY | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT}
|
|
};
|
|
GroupsLength = sizeof(SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES) +
|
|
SeLengthSid(Groups[0].Sid);
|
|
ASSERT(GroupsLength <= (sizeof(Groups) * sizeof(ULONG)));
|
|
|
|
/* Initialise the object attributes for the token */
|
|
InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjectAttributes, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
|
|
ASSERT(SeSystemAnonymousLogonDacl != NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* Create token */
|
|
Status = SepCreateToken((PHANDLE)&Token,
|
|
KernelMode,
|
|
0,
|
|
&ObjectAttributes,
|
|
TokenPrimary,
|
|
SecurityAnonymous,
|
|
&SeAnonymousAuthenticationId,
|
|
&Expiration,
|
|
&UserSid,
|
|
RTL_NUMBER_OF(Groups),
|
|
Groups,
|
|
GroupsLength,
|
|
0,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
PrimaryGroup,
|
|
SeSystemAnonymousLogonDacl,
|
|
&SeSystemTokenSource,
|
|
TRUE);
|
|
ASSERT(Status == STATUS_SUCCESS);
|
|
|
|
/* Return the anonymous logon token */
|
|
return Token;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Creates the anonymous logon token for the system. This kind of token
|
|
* doesn't include the everyone SID group (being SeWorldSid).
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns the system's anonymous logon token if the operations have
|
|
* completed successfully.
|
|
*/
|
|
CODE_SEG("INIT")
|
|
PTOKEN
|
|
SepCreateSystemAnonymousLogonTokenNoEveryone(VOID)
|
|
{
|
|
SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES UserSid;
|
|
PSID PrimaryGroup;
|
|
PTOKEN Token;
|
|
LARGE_INTEGER Expiration;
|
|
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes;
|
|
NTSTATUS Status;
|
|
|
|
/* The token never expires */
|
|
Expiration.QuadPart = -1;
|
|
|
|
/* The user is the anonymous logon */
|
|
UserSid.Sid = SeAnonymousLogonSid;
|
|
UserSid.Attributes = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* The primary group is also the anonymous logon */
|
|
PrimaryGroup = SeAnonymousLogonSid;
|
|
|
|
/* Initialise the object attributes for the token */
|
|
InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjectAttributes, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
|
|
ASSERT(SeSystemAnonymousLogonDacl != NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* Create token */
|
|
Status = SepCreateToken((PHANDLE)&Token,
|
|
KernelMode,
|
|
0,
|
|
&ObjectAttributes,
|
|
TokenPrimary,
|
|
SecurityAnonymous,
|
|
&SeAnonymousAuthenticationId,
|
|
&Expiration,
|
|
&UserSid,
|
|
0,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
0,
|
|
0,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
PrimaryGroup,
|
|
SeSystemAnonymousLogonDacl,
|
|
&SeSystemTokenSource,
|
|
TRUE);
|
|
ASSERT(Status == STATUS_SUCCESS);
|
|
|
|
/* Return the anonymous (not including everyone) logon token */
|
|
return Token;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* PUBLIC FUNCTIONS ***********************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Queries the session ID of an access token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Token
|
|
* A valid access token where the session ID has to be gathered.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[out] pSessionId
|
|
* The returned pointer to a session ID to the caller.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns STATUS_SUCCESS.
|
|
*/
|
|
NTSTATUS
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SeQuerySessionIdToken(
|
|
_In_ PACCESS_TOKEN Token,
|
|
_Out_ PULONG pSessionId)
|
|
{
|
|
PAGED_CODE();
|
|
|
|
/* Lock the token */
|
|
SepAcquireTokenLockShared(Token);
|
|
|
|
*pSessionId = ((PTOKEN)Token)->SessionId;
|
|
|
|
/* Unlock the token */
|
|
SepReleaseTokenLock(Token);
|
|
|
|
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Queries the authentication ID of an access token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Token
|
|
* A valid access token where the authentication ID has to be gathered.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[out] pSessionId
|
|
* The returned pointer to an authentication ID to the caller.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns STATUS_SUCCESS.
|
|
*/
|
|
NTSTATUS
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SeQueryAuthenticationIdToken(
|
|
_In_ PACCESS_TOKEN Token,
|
|
_Out_ PLUID LogonId)
|
|
{
|
|
PAGED_CODE();
|
|
|
|
*LogonId = ((PTOKEN)Token)->AuthenticationId;
|
|
|
|
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Gathers the security impersonation level of an access token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Token
|
|
* A valid access token where the impersonation level has to be gathered.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns the security impersonation level from a valid token.
|
|
*/
|
|
SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SeTokenImpersonationLevel(
|
|
_In_ PACCESS_TOKEN Token)
|
|
{
|
|
PAGED_CODE();
|
|
|
|
return ((PTOKEN)Token)->ImpersonationLevel;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Gathers the token type of an access token. A token ca be either
|
|
* a primary token or impersonation token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Token
|
|
* A valid access token where the token type has to be gathered.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns the token type from a valid token.
|
|
*/
|
|
TOKEN_TYPE
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SeTokenType(
|
|
_In_ PACCESS_TOKEN Token)
|
|
{
|
|
PAGED_CODE();
|
|
|
|
return ((PTOKEN)Token)->TokenType;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Determines if a token is either an admin token or not. Such
|
|
* condition is checked based upon TOKEN_HAS_ADMIN_GROUP flag,
|
|
* which means if the respective access token belongs to an
|
|
* administrator group or not.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Token
|
|
* A valid access token to determine if such token is admin or not.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns TRUE if the token is an admin one, FALSE otherwise.
|
|
*/
|
|
BOOLEAN
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SeTokenIsAdmin(
|
|
_In_ PACCESS_TOKEN Token)
|
|
{
|
|
PAGED_CODE();
|
|
|
|
// NOTE: Win7+ instead really checks the list of groups in the token
|
|
// (since TOKEN_HAS_ADMIN_GROUP == TOKEN_WRITE_RESTRICTED ...)
|
|
return (((PTOKEN)Token)->TokenFlags & TOKEN_HAS_ADMIN_GROUP) != 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Determines if a token is restricted or not, based upon the token
|
|
* flags.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Token
|
|
* A valid access token to determine if such token is restricted.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns TRUE if the token is restricted, FALSE otherwise.
|
|
*/
|
|
BOOLEAN
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SeTokenIsRestricted(
|
|
_In_ PACCESS_TOKEN Token)
|
|
{
|
|
PAGED_CODE();
|
|
|
|
return (((PTOKEN)Token)->TokenFlags & TOKEN_IS_RESTRICTED) != 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Determines if a token is write restricted, that is, nobody can write anything
|
|
* to it.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] Token
|
|
* A valid access token to determine if such token is write restricted.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns TRUE if the token is write restricted, FALSE otherwise.
|
|
*
|
|
* @remarks
|
|
* First introduced in NT 5.1 SP2 x86 (5.1.2600.2622), absent in NT 5.2,
|
|
* then finally re-introduced in Vista+.
|
|
*/
|
|
BOOLEAN
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SeTokenIsWriteRestricted(
|
|
_In_ PACCESS_TOKEN Token)
|
|
{
|
|
PAGED_CODE();
|
|
|
|
// NOTE: NT 5.1 SP2 x86 checks the SE_BACKUP_PRIVILEGES_CHECKED flag
|
|
// while Vista+ checks the TOKEN_WRITE_RESTRICTED flag as one expects.
|
|
return (((PTOKEN)Token)->TokenFlags & SE_BACKUP_PRIVILEGES_CHECKED) != 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Determines whether the server is allowed to impersonate on behalf
|
|
* of a client or not. For further details, see Remarks.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] ProcessToken
|
|
* A pointer to the primary access token of the server process
|
|
* that requests impersonation of the client target.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] TokenToImpersonate
|
|
* A pointer to an access token that represents a client that is to
|
|
* be impersonated.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] ImpersonationLevel
|
|
* The requested impersonation level.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns TRUE if the conditions checked are met for token impersonation,
|
|
* FALSE otherwise.
|
|
*
|
|
* @remarks
|
|
* The server has to meet the following criteria in order to impersonate
|
|
* a client, that is:
|
|
*
|
|
* - The server must not impersonate a client beyond the level that
|
|
* the client imposed on itself.
|
|
*
|
|
* - The server must be authenticated on the same logon session of
|
|
* the target client.
|
|
*
|
|
* - IF NOT then the server's user ID has to match to that of the
|
|
* target client.
|
|
*
|
|
* - The server must not be restricted in order to impersonate a
|
|
* client that is not restricted.
|
|
*
|
|
* If the associated access token that represents the security properties
|
|
* of the server is granted the SeImpersonatePrivilege privilege the server
|
|
* is given immediate impersonation, regardless of the conditions above.
|
|
* If the client in question is associated with an anonymous token then
|
|
* the server is given immediate impersonation. Or if the server simply
|
|
* doesn't ask for impersonation but instead it wants to get the security
|
|
* identification of a client, the server is given immediate impersonation.
|
|
*/
|
|
BOOLEAN
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
SeTokenCanImpersonate(
|
|
_In_ PTOKEN ProcessToken,
|
|
_In_ PTOKEN TokenToImpersonate,
|
|
_In_ SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL ImpersonationLevel)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOLEAN CanImpersonate;
|
|
PAGED_CODE();
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The server may want to obtain identification details of a client
|
|
* instead of impersonating so just give the server a pass.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ImpersonationLevel < SecurityIdentification)
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT("The server doesn't ask for impersonation\n");
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Time to lock our tokens */
|
|
SepAcquireTokenLockShared(ProcessToken);
|
|
SepAcquireTokenLockShared(TokenToImpersonate);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* As the name implies, an anonymous token has invisible security
|
|
* identification details. By the general rule these tokens do not
|
|
* pose a danger in terms of power escalation so give the server a pass.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (RtlEqualLuid(&TokenToImpersonate->AuthenticationId,
|
|
&SeAnonymousAuthenticationId))
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT("The token to impersonate has an anonymous authentication ID, allow impersonation either way\n");
|
|
CanImpersonate = TRUE;
|
|
goto Quit;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Allow impersonation for the process server if it's granted the impersonation privilege */
|
|
if ((ProcessToken->TokenFlags & TOKEN_HAS_IMPERSONATE_PRIVILEGE) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT("The process is granted the impersonation privilege, allow impersonation\n");
|
|
CanImpersonate = TRUE;
|
|
goto Quit;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Deny impersonation for the server if it wants to impersonate a client
|
|
* beyond what the impersonation level originally permits.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ImpersonationLevel > TokenToImpersonate->ImpersonationLevel)
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT1("Cannot impersonate a client above the permitted impersonation level!\n");
|
|
CanImpersonate = FALSE;
|
|
goto Quit;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Is the server authenticated on the same client originating session? */
|
|
if (!RtlEqualLuid(&ProcessToken->AuthenticationId,
|
|
&TokenToImpersonate->OriginatingLogonSession))
|
|
{
|
|
/* It's not, check that at least both the server and client are the same user */
|
|
if (!RtlEqualSid(ProcessToken->UserAndGroups[0].Sid,
|
|
TokenToImpersonate->UserAndGroups[0].Sid))
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT1("Server and client aren't the same user!\n");
|
|
CanImpersonate = FALSE;
|
|
goto Quit;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Make sure the tokens haven't diverged in terms of restrictions
|
|
* that is one token is restricted but the other one isn't. If that
|
|
* would have been the case then the server would have impersonated
|
|
* a less restricted client thus potentially triggering an elevation,
|
|
* which is not what we want.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SeTokenIsRestricted(ProcessToken) !=
|
|
SeTokenIsRestricted(TokenToImpersonate))
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT1("Attempting to impersonate a less restricted client token, bail out!\n");
|
|
CanImpersonate = FALSE;
|
|
goto Quit;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we've reached that far then we can impersonate! */
|
|
DPRINT("We can impersonate\n");
|
|
CanImpersonate = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
Quit:
|
|
SepReleaseTokenLock(TokenToImpersonate);
|
|
SepReleaseTokenLock(ProcessToken);
|
|
return CanImpersonate;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SYSTEM CALLS ***************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Opens a token that is tied to a thread handle.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[out] ThreadHandle
|
|
* Thread handle where the token is about to be opened.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] DesiredAccess
|
|
* The request access right for the token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] OpenAsSelf
|
|
* If set to TRUE, the access check will be made with the security context
|
|
* of the process of the calling thread (opening as self). Otherwise the access
|
|
* check will be made with the security context of the calling thread instead.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] HandleAttributes
|
|
* Handle attributes for the opened thread token handle.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[out] TokenHandle
|
|
* The opened token handle returned to the caller for use.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns STATUS_SUCCESS if the function has successfully opened the thread
|
|
* token. STATUS_CANT_OPEN_ANONYMOUS is returned if a token has SecurityAnonymous
|
|
* as impersonation level and we cannot open it. A failure NTSTATUS code is returned
|
|
* otherwise.
|
|
*/
|
|
NTSTATUS
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
NtOpenThreadTokenEx(
|
|
_In_ HANDLE ThreadHandle,
|
|
_In_ ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
|
|
_In_ BOOLEAN OpenAsSelf,
|
|
_In_ ULONG HandleAttributes,
|
|
_Out_ PHANDLE TokenHandle)
|
|
{
|
|
PETHREAD Thread;
|
|
HANDLE hToken;
|
|
PTOKEN Token;
|
|
BOOLEAN CopyOnOpen, EffectiveOnly;
|
|
SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL ImpersonationLevel;
|
|
SE_IMPERSONATION_STATE ImpersonationState;
|
|
KPROCESSOR_MODE PreviousMode;
|
|
NTSTATUS Status;
|
|
BOOLEAN RestoreImpersonation = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
PAGED_CODE();
|
|
|
|
PreviousMode = ExGetPreviousMode();
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure that we can give the handle to the caller */
|
|
if (PreviousMode != KernelMode)
|
|
{
|
|
_SEH2_TRY
|
|
{
|
|
ProbeForWriteHandle(TokenHandle);
|
|
}
|
|
_SEH2_EXCEPT(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Return the exception code */
|
|
_SEH2_YIELD(return _SEH2_GetExceptionCode());
|
|
}
|
|
_SEH2_END;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Validate object attributes */
|
|
HandleAttributes = ObpValidateAttributes(HandleAttributes, PreviousMode);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* At first open the thread token for information access and verify
|
|
* that the token associated with the thread is valid.
|
|
*/
|
|
Status = ObReferenceObjectByHandle(ThreadHandle, THREAD_QUERY_INFORMATION,
|
|
PsThreadType, PreviousMode, (PVOID*)&Thread,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT1("Failed to reference the object thread (Status 0x%lx)\n", Status);
|
|
return Status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Reference the token from the thread */
|
|
Token = PsReferenceImpersonationToken(Thread, &CopyOnOpen, &EffectiveOnly,
|
|
&ImpersonationLevel);
|
|
if (Token == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT("Failed to reference the thread's impersonation token, thread has no token\n");
|
|
ObDereferenceObject(Thread);
|
|
return STATUS_NO_TOKEN;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure the token has no anonymous security */
|
|
if (ImpersonationLevel == SecurityAnonymous)
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT1("The thread token has anonymous security, can't open it\n");
|
|
PsDereferenceImpersonationToken(Token);
|
|
ObDereferenceObject(Thread);
|
|
return STATUS_CANT_OPEN_ANONYMOUS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Revert to self if OpenAsSelf is specified */
|
|
if (OpenAsSelf)
|
|
{
|
|
RestoreImpersonation = PsDisableImpersonation(PsGetCurrentThread(),
|
|
&ImpersonationState);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Call the private function to do the job */
|
|
Status = SepOpenThreadToken(Thread,
|
|
ThreadHandle,
|
|
Token,
|
|
DesiredAccess,
|
|
HandleAttributes,
|
|
EffectiveOnly,
|
|
CopyOnOpen,
|
|
ImpersonationLevel,
|
|
PreviousMode,
|
|
&hToken);
|
|
|
|
/* Restore the impersonation back if needed */
|
|
if (RestoreImpersonation)
|
|
{
|
|
PsRestoreImpersonation(PsGetCurrentThread(), &ImpersonationState);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Dereference the access token and the associated thread */
|
|
ObDereferenceObject(Token);
|
|
ObDereferenceObject(Thread);
|
|
|
|
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT1("Failed to open the thread's token (Status 0x%lx)\n", Status);
|
|
return Status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Give the opened token handle to the caller */
|
|
_SEH2_TRY
|
|
{
|
|
*TokenHandle = hToken;
|
|
}
|
|
_SEH2_EXCEPT(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER)
|
|
{
|
|
Status = _SEH2_GetExceptionCode();
|
|
}
|
|
_SEH2_END;
|
|
|
|
return Status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Opens a token that is tied to a thread handle.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[out] ThreadHandle
|
|
* Thread handle where the token is about to be opened.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] DesiredAccess
|
|
* The request access right for the token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] OpenAsSelf
|
|
* If set to TRUE, the access check will be made with the security context
|
|
* of the process of the calling thread (opening as self). Otherwise the access
|
|
* check will be made with the security context of the calling thread instead.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[out] TokenHandle
|
|
* The opened token handle returned to the caller for use.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* See NtOpenThreadTokenEx.
|
|
*/
|
|
NTSTATUS
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
NtOpenThreadToken(
|
|
_In_ HANDLE ThreadHandle,
|
|
_In_ ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
|
|
_In_ BOOLEAN OpenAsSelf,
|
|
_Out_ PHANDLE TokenHandle)
|
|
{
|
|
return NtOpenThreadTokenEx(ThreadHandle, DesiredAccess, OpenAsSelf, 0,
|
|
TokenHandle);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Compares tokens if they're equal or not.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] FirstToken
|
|
* The first token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] SecondToken
|
|
* The second token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[out] Equal
|
|
* The retrieved value which determines if the tokens are
|
|
* equal or not.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns STATUS_SUCCESS, otherwise it returns a failure NTSTATUS code.
|
|
*/
|
|
NTSTATUS
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
NtCompareTokens(
|
|
_In_ HANDLE FirstTokenHandle,
|
|
_In_ HANDLE SecondTokenHandle,
|
|
_Out_ PBOOLEAN Equal)
|
|
{
|
|
KPROCESSOR_MODE PreviousMode;
|
|
PTOKEN FirstToken, SecondToken;
|
|
BOOLEAN IsEqual;
|
|
NTSTATUS Status;
|
|
|
|
PAGED_CODE();
|
|
|
|
PreviousMode = ExGetPreviousMode();
|
|
|
|
if (PreviousMode != KernelMode)
|
|
{
|
|
_SEH2_TRY
|
|
{
|
|
ProbeForWriteBoolean(Equal);
|
|
}
|
|
_SEH2_EXCEPT(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Return the exception code */
|
|
_SEH2_YIELD(return _SEH2_GetExceptionCode());
|
|
}
|
|
_SEH2_END;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Status = ObReferenceObjectByHandle(FirstTokenHandle,
|
|
TOKEN_QUERY,
|
|
SeTokenObjectType,
|
|
PreviousMode,
|
|
(PVOID*)&FirstToken,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT1("ObReferenceObjectByHandle() failed (Status 0x%lx)\n", Status);
|
|
return Status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Status = ObReferenceObjectByHandle(SecondTokenHandle,
|
|
TOKEN_QUERY,
|
|
SeTokenObjectType,
|
|
PreviousMode,
|
|
(PVOID*)&SecondToken,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT1("ObReferenceObjectByHandle() failed (Status 0x%lx)\n", Status);
|
|
ObDereferenceObject(FirstToken);
|
|
return Status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (FirstToken != SecondToken)
|
|
{
|
|
Status = SepCompareTokens(FirstToken,
|
|
SecondToken,
|
|
&IsEqual);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
IsEqual = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ObDereferenceObject(SecondToken);
|
|
ObDereferenceObject(FirstToken);
|
|
|
|
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status))
|
|
{
|
|
_SEH2_TRY
|
|
{
|
|
*Equal = IsEqual;
|
|
}
|
|
_SEH2_EXCEPT(ExSystemExceptionFilter())
|
|
{
|
|
Status = _SEH2_GetExceptionCode();
|
|
}
|
|
_SEH2_END;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return Status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief
|
|
* Allows the calling thread to impersonate the system's anonymous
|
|
* logon token.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in] ThreadHandle
|
|
* A handle to the thread to start the procedure of logon token
|
|
* impersonation. The thread must have the THREAD_IMPERSONATE
|
|
* access right.
|
|
*
|
|
* @return
|
|
* Returns STATUS_SUCCESS if the thread has successfully impersonated the
|
|
* anonymous logon token, otherwise a failure NTSTATUS code is returned.
|
|
*
|
|
* @remarks
|
|
* By default the system gives the opportunity to the caller to impersonate
|
|
* the anonymous logon token without including the Everyone Group SID.
|
|
* In cases where the caller wants to impersonate the token including such
|
|
* group, the EveryoneIncludesAnonymous registry value setting has to be set
|
|
* to 1, from HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa registry
|
|
* path. The calling thread must invoke PsRevertToSelf when impersonation
|
|
* is no longer needed or RevertToSelf if the calling execution is done
|
|
* in user mode.
|
|
*/
|
|
NTSTATUS
|
|
NTAPI
|
|
NtImpersonateAnonymousToken(
|
|
_In_ HANDLE ThreadHandle)
|
|
{
|
|
PETHREAD Thread;
|
|
KPROCESSOR_MODE PreviousMode;
|
|
NTSTATUS Status;
|
|
PAGED_CODE();
|
|
|
|
PreviousMode = ExGetPreviousMode();
|
|
|
|
/* Obtain the thread object from the handle */
|
|
Status = ObReferenceObjectByHandle(ThreadHandle,
|
|
THREAD_IMPERSONATE,
|
|
PsThreadType,
|
|
PreviousMode,
|
|
(PVOID*)&Thread,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT1("NtImpersonateAnonymousToken(): Failed to reference the object (Status 0x%lx)\n", Status);
|
|
return Status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Call the private routine to impersonate the token */
|
|
Status = SepImpersonateAnonymousToken(Thread, PreviousMode);
|
|
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
|
|
{
|
|
DPRINT1("NtImpersonateAnonymousToken(): Failed to impersonate the token (Status 0x%lx)\n", Status);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ObDereferenceObject(Thread);
|
|
return Status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* EOF */
|