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3769 lines
138 KiB
C
3769 lines
138 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2006 Juan Lang
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*
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* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
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* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
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* version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
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* Lesser General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
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* License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
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*
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*/
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#define NONAMELESSUNION
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#include "windef.h"
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#include "winbase.h"
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#define CERT_CHAIN_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
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#define CERT_REVOCATION_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
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#include "wincrypt.h"
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#include "wininet.h"
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#include "wine/debug.h"
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#include "wine/unicode.h"
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#include "crypt32_private.h"
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WINE_DEFAULT_DEBUG_CHANNEL(crypt);
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WINE_DECLARE_DEBUG_CHANNEL(chain);
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#define DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS 7
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/* This represents a subset of a certificate chain engine: it doesn't include
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* the "hOther" store described by MSDN, because I'm not sure how that's used.
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* It also doesn't include the "hTrust" store, because I don't yet implement
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* CTLs or complex certificate chains.
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*/
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typedef struct _CertificateChainEngine
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{
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LONG ref;
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HCERTSTORE hRoot;
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HCERTSTORE hWorld;
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DWORD dwFlags;
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DWORD dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
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DWORD MaximumCachedCertificates;
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DWORD CycleDetectionModulus;
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} CertificateChainEngine;
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static inline void CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(HCERTSTORE collection,
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DWORD cStores, HCERTSTORE *stores)
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{
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DWORD i;
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for (i = 0; i < cStores; i++)
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CertAddStoreToCollection(collection, stores[i], 0, 0);
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}
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static inline void CRYPT_CloseStores(DWORD cStores, HCERTSTORE *stores)
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{
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DWORD i;
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for (i = 0; i < cStores; i++)
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CertCloseStore(stores[i], 0);
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}
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static const WCHAR rootW[] = { 'R','o','o','t',0 };
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/* Finds cert in store by comparing the cert's hashes. */
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static PCCERT_CONTEXT CRYPT_FindCertInStore(HCERTSTORE store,
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PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
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{
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PCCERT_CONTEXT matching = NULL;
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BYTE hash[20];
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DWORD size = sizeof(hash);
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if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID, hash, &size))
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{
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CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob = { sizeof(hash), hash };
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matching = CertFindCertificateInStore(store, cert->dwCertEncodingType,
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0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH, &blob, NULL);
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}
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return matching;
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}
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static BOOL CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(HCERTSTORE store)
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{
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BOOL ret = TRUE;
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if (store)
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{
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HCERTSTORE rootStore = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW);
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PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = NULL, check;
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do {
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cert = CertEnumCertificatesInStore(store, cert);
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if (cert)
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{
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if (!(check = CRYPT_FindCertInStore(rootStore, cert)))
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ret = FALSE;
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else
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CertFreeCertificateContext(check);
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}
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} while (ret && cert);
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if (cert)
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CertFreeCertificateContext(cert);
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CertCloseStore(rootStore, 0);
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}
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return ret;
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}
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HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(HCERTSTORE root, DWORD system_store, const CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG *config)
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{
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CertificateChainEngine *engine;
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HCERTSTORE worldStores[4];
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static const WCHAR caW[] = { 'C','A',0 };
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static const WCHAR myW[] = { 'M','y',0 };
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static const WCHAR trustW[] = { 'T','r','u','s','t',0 };
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if(!root) {
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if(config->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG) && config->hExclusiveRoot)
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root = CertDuplicateStore(config->hExclusiveRoot);
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else if (config->hRestrictedRoot)
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root = CertDuplicateStore(config->hRestrictedRoot);
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else
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root = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, 0, 0, system_store, rootW);
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if(!root)
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return NULL;
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}
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engine = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChainEngine));
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if(!engine) {
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CertCloseStore(root, 0);
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return NULL;
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}
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engine->ref = 1;
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engine->hRoot = root;
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engine->hWorld = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION, 0, 0, CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG, NULL);
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worldStores[0] = CertDuplicateStore(engine->hRoot);
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worldStores[1] = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, 0, 0, system_store, caW);
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worldStores[2] = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, 0, 0, system_store, myW);
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worldStores[3] = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, 0, 0, system_store, trustW);
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CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine->hWorld, ARRAY_SIZE(worldStores), worldStores);
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CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine->hWorld, config->cAdditionalStore, config->rghAdditionalStore);
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CRYPT_CloseStores(ARRAY_SIZE(worldStores), worldStores);
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engine->dwFlags = config->dwFlags;
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engine->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout = config->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
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engine->MaximumCachedCertificates = config->MaximumCachedCertificates;
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if(config->CycleDetectionModulus)
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engine->CycleDetectionModulus = config->CycleDetectionModulus;
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else
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engine->CycleDetectionModulus = DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS;
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return engine;
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}
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static CertificateChainEngine *default_cu_engine, *default_lm_engine;
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static CertificateChainEngine *get_chain_engine(HCERTCHAINENGINE handle, BOOL allow_default)
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{
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const CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG config = { sizeof(config) };
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if(handle == HCCE_CURRENT_USER) {
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if(!allow_default)
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return NULL;
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if(!default_cu_engine) {
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handle = CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(NULL, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER, &config);
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InterlockedCompareExchangePointer((void**)&default_cu_engine, handle, NULL);
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if(default_cu_engine != handle)
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CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(handle);
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}
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return default_cu_engine;
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}
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if(handle == HCCE_LOCAL_MACHINE) {
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if(!allow_default)
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return NULL;
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if(!default_lm_engine) {
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handle = CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(NULL, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE, &config);
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InterlockedCompareExchangePointer((void**)&default_lm_engine, handle, NULL);
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if(default_lm_engine != handle)
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CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(handle);
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}
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return default_lm_engine;
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}
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return (CertificateChainEngine*)handle;
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}
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static void free_chain_engine(CertificateChainEngine *engine)
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{
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if(!engine || InterlockedDecrement(&engine->ref))
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return;
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CertCloseStore(engine->hWorld, 0);
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CertCloseStore(engine->hRoot, 0);
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CryptMemFree(engine);
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}
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typedef struct _CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG_NO_EXCLUSIVE_ROOT
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{
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DWORD cbSize;
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HCERTSTORE hRestrictedRoot;
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HCERTSTORE hRestrictedTrust;
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HCERTSTORE hRestrictedOther;
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DWORD cAdditionalStore;
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HCERTSTORE *rghAdditionalStore;
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DWORD dwFlags;
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DWORD dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
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DWORD MaximumCachedCertificates;
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DWORD CycleDetectionModulus;
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} CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG_NO_EXCLUSIVE_ROOT;
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BOOL WINAPI CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig,
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HCERTCHAINENGINE *phChainEngine)
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{
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BOOL ret;
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TRACE("(%p, %p)\n", pConfig, phChainEngine);
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if (pConfig->cbSize != sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG_NO_EXCLUSIVE_ROOT)
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&& pConfig->cbSize != sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG))
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{
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SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG);
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return FALSE;
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}
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ret = CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(pConfig->hRestrictedRoot);
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if (!ret)
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{
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*phChainEngine = NULL;
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return FALSE;
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}
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*phChainEngine = CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(NULL, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER, pConfig);
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return *phChainEngine != NULL;
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}
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void WINAPI CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine)
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{
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TRACE("(%p)\n", hChainEngine);
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free_chain_engine(get_chain_engine(hChainEngine, FALSE));
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}
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void default_chain_engine_free(void)
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{
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free_chain_engine(default_cu_engine);
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free_chain_engine(default_lm_engine);
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}
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typedef struct _CertificateChain
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{
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CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT context;
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HCERTSTORE world;
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LONG ref;
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} CertificateChain;
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DWORD CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(const CERT_CONTEXT *cert)
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{
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DWORD size, status = 0;
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PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
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BOOL ret;
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if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER2,
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cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
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{
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CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2_INFO *info;
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ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
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X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
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CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
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&info, &size);
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if (ret)
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{
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if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry &&
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info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber.cbData)
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{
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PCERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY directoryName = NULL;
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DWORD i;
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for (i = 0; !directoryName &&
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i < info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry; i++)
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if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice
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== CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME)
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directoryName =
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&info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i];
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if (directoryName)
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{
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if (CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType, &directoryName->u.DirectoryName, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer)
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&& CertCompareIntegerBlob(&info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber, &cert->pCertInfo->SerialNumber))
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status = CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER;
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}
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else
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{
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FIXME("no supported name type in authority key id2\n");
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ret = FALSE;
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}
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}
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else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
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{
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ret = CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
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CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, NULL, &size);
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if (ret && size == info->KeyId.cbData)
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{
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LPBYTE buf = CryptMemAlloc(size);
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if (buf)
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{
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CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, buf, &size);
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if (!memcmp(buf, info->KeyId.pbData, size))
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status = CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER;
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CryptMemFree(buf);
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}
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}
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}
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LocalFree(info);
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}
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}
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else if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
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cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
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{
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CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID_INFO *info;
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ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
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X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
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CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
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&info, &size);
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if (ret)
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{
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if (info->CertIssuer.cbData && info->CertSerialNumber.cbData)
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{
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if (CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType, &info->CertIssuer, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer)
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&& CertCompareIntegerBlob(&info->CertSerialNumber, &cert->pCertInfo->SerialNumber))
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status = CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER;
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}
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else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
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{
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ret = CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
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CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, NULL, &size);
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if (ret && size == info->KeyId.cbData)
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{
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LPBYTE buf = CryptMemAlloc(size);
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if (buf)
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{
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CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
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CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, buf, &size);
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if (!memcmp(buf, info->KeyId.pbData, size))
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status = CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER;
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CryptMemFree(buf);
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}
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}
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}
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LocalFree(info);
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}
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}
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else
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if (CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType, &cert->pCertInfo->Subject, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer))
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status = CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER;
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if (status)
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status |= CERT_TRUST_IS_SELF_SIGNED;
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return status;
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}
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static void CRYPT_FreeChainElement(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element)
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{
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CertFreeCertificateContext(element->pCertContext);
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CryptMemFree(element);
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}
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static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
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{
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DWORD i, j, cyclicCertIndex = 0;
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/* O(n^2) - I don't think there's a faster way */
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for (i = 0; !cyclicCertIndex && i < chain->cElement; i++)
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for (j = i + 1; !cyclicCertIndex && j < chain->cElement; j++)
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if (CertCompareCertificate(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
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chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo,
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chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo))
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cyclicCertIndex = j;
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if (cyclicCertIndex)
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{
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chain->rgpElement[cyclicCertIndex]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus
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|= CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
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/* Release remaining certs */
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for (i = cyclicCertIndex + 1; i < chain->cElement; i++)
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CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain->rgpElement[i]);
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/* Truncate chain */
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chain->cElement = cyclicCertIndex + 1;
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}
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}
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/* Checks whether the chain is cyclic by examining the last element's status */
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static inline BOOL CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *chain)
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{
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if (chain->cElement)
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return chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus
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& CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC;
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else
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return FALSE;
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}
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static inline void CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(CERT_TRUST_STATUS *chainStatus,
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const CERT_TRUST_STATUS *elementStatus)
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{
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/* Any error that applies to an element also applies to a chain.. */
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chainStatus->dwErrorStatus |= elementStatus->dwErrorStatus;
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/* but the bottom nibble of an element's info status doesn't apply to the
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* chain.
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*/
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chainStatus->dwInfoStatus |= (elementStatus->dwInfoStatus & 0xfffffff0);
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}
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static BOOL CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine *engine,
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PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, DWORD subjectInfoStatus)
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{
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BOOL ret = FALSE;
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PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
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if (element)
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{
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if (!chain->cElement)
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chain->rgpElement = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
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else
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chain->rgpElement = CryptMemRealloc(chain->rgpElement,
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(chain->cElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
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if (chain->rgpElement)
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{
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chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement++] = element;
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memset(element, 0, sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
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element->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT);
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element->pCertContext = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(cert);
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if (chain->cElement > 1)
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chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 2]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus
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= subjectInfoStatus;
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/* FIXME: initialize the rest of element */
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if (!(chain->cElement % engine->CycleDetectionModulus))
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{
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CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(chain);
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/* Reinitialize the element pointer in case the chain is
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* cyclic, in which case the chain is truncated.
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*/
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element = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1];
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}
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CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
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&element->TrustStatus);
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ret = TRUE;
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}
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else
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CryptMemFree(element);
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}
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return ret;
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}
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static void CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
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{
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DWORD i;
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for (i = 0; i < chain->cElement; i++)
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CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain->rgpElement[i]);
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CryptMemFree(chain->rgpElement);
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CryptMemFree(chain);
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}
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static void CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(HCERTSTORE hRoot,
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PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement)
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{
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PCCERT_CONTEXT trustedRoot = CRYPT_FindCertInStore(hRoot,
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rootElement->pCertContext);
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|
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if (!trustedRoot)
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rootElement->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
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CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT;
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else
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CertFreeCertificateContext(trustedRoot);
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}
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|
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static void CRYPT_CheckRootCert(HCERTSTORE hRoot,
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PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement)
|
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{
|
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PCCERT_CONTEXT root = rootElement->pCertContext;
|
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|
|
if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, root->dwCertEncodingType,
|
|
CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT, (void *)root,
|
|
CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT, (void *)root, 0, NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("Last certificate's signature is invalid\n");
|
|
rootElement->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID;
|
|
}
|
|
CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(hRoot, rootElement);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Decodes a cert's basic constraints extension (either szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
|
|
* or szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, whichever is present) into a
|
|
* CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO. If it neither extension is present, sets
|
|
* constraints->fCA to defaultIfNotSpecified.
|
|
* Returns FALSE if the extension is present but couldn't be decoded.
|
|
*/
|
|
static BOOL CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert,
|
|
CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO *constraints, BOOL defaultIfNotSpecified)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL ret = TRUE;
|
|
PCERT_EXTENSION ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
|
|
cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
|
|
|
|
constraints->fPathLenConstraint = FALSE;
|
|
if (ext)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info;
|
|
DWORD size = 0;
|
|
|
|
ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
|
|
ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG,
|
|
NULL, &info, &size);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
{
|
|
if (info->SubjectType.cbData == 1)
|
|
constraints->fCA =
|
|
info->SubjectType.pbData[0] & CERT_CA_SUBJECT_FLAG;
|
|
LocalFree(info);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2,
|
|
cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
|
|
if (ext)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD size = sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO);
|
|
|
|
ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
|
|
szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
|
|
0, NULL, constraints, &size);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
constraints->fCA = defaultIfNotSpecified;
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Checks element's basic constraints to see if it can act as a CA, with
|
|
* remainingCAs CAs left in this chain. In general, a cert must include the
|
|
* basic constraints extension, with the CA flag asserted, in order to be
|
|
* allowed to be a CA. A V1 or V2 cert, which has no extensions, is also
|
|
* allowed to be a CA if it's installed locally (in the engine's world store.)
|
|
* This matches the expected usage in RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.9: a conforming
|
|
* CA MUST include the basic constraints extension in all certificates that are
|
|
* used to validate digital signatures on certificates. It also matches
|
|
* section 6.1.4(k): "If a certificate is a v1 or v2 certificate, then the
|
|
* application MUST either verify that the certificate is a CA certificate
|
|
* through out-of-band means or reject the certificate." Rejecting the
|
|
* certificate prohibits a large number of commonly used certificates, so
|
|
* accepting locally installed ones is a compromise.
|
|
* Root certificates are also allowed to be CAs even without a basic
|
|
* constraints extension. This is implied by RFC 5280, section 6.1: the
|
|
* root of a certificate chain's only requirement is that it was used to issue
|
|
* the next certificate in the chain.
|
|
* Updates chainConstraints with the element's constraints, if:
|
|
* 1. chainConstraints doesn't have a path length constraint, or
|
|
* 2. element's path length constraint is smaller than chainConstraints's
|
|
* Sets *pathLengthConstraintViolated to TRUE if a path length violation
|
|
* occurs.
|
|
* Returns TRUE if the element can be a CA, and the length of the remaining
|
|
* chain is valid.
|
|
*/
|
|
static BOOL CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(CertificateChainEngine *engine,
|
|
PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO *chainConstraints,
|
|
DWORD remainingCAs, BOOL isRoot, BOOL *pathLengthConstraintViolated)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL validBasicConstraints, implicitCA = FALSE;
|
|
CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints;
|
|
|
|
if (isRoot)
|
|
implicitCA = TRUE;
|
|
else if (cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V1 ||
|
|
cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V2)
|
|
{
|
|
BYTE hash[20];
|
|
DWORD size = sizeof(hash);
|
|
|
|
if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID,
|
|
hash, &size))
|
|
{
|
|
CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob = { sizeof(hash), hash };
|
|
PCCERT_CONTEXT localCert = CertFindCertificateInStore(
|
|
engine->hWorld, cert->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH,
|
|
&blob, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (localCert)
|
|
{
|
|
CertFreeCertificateContext(localCert);
|
|
implicitCA = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if ((validBasicConstraints = CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(cert,
|
|
&constraints, implicitCA)))
|
|
{
|
|
chainConstraints->fCA = constraints.fCA;
|
|
if (!constraints.fCA)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("chain element %d can't be a CA\n", remainingCAs + 1);
|
|
validBasicConstraints = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (constraints.fPathLenConstraint)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If the element has path length constraints, they apply to the
|
|
* entire remaining chain.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint ||
|
|
constraints.dwPathLenConstraint <
|
|
chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("setting path length constraint to %d\n",
|
|
chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint);
|
|
chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint = TRUE;
|
|
chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint =
|
|
constraints.dwPathLenConstraint;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint &&
|
|
remainingCAs > chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("remaining CAs %d exceed max path length %d\n",
|
|
remainingCAs, chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint);
|
|
validBasicConstraints = FALSE;
|
|
*pathLengthConstraintViolated = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
return validBasicConstraints;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL domain_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL match;
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
|
|
* "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name...
|
|
* When the constraint begins with a period, it MAY be expanded with one
|
|
* or more labels. That is, the constraint ".example.com" is satisfied by
|
|
* both host.example.com and my.host.example.com. However, the constraint
|
|
* ".example.com" is not satisfied by "example.com". When the constraint
|
|
* does not begin with a period, it specifies a host."
|
|
* and for email addresses,
|
|
* "To indicate all Internet mail addresses on a particular host, the
|
|
* constraint is specified as the host name. For example, the constraint
|
|
* "example.com" is satisfied by any mail address at the host
|
|
* "example.com". To specify any address within a domain, the constraint
|
|
* is specified with a leading period (as with URIs)."
|
|
*/
|
|
if (constraint[0] == '.')
|
|
{
|
|
/* Must be strictly greater than, a name can't begin with '.' */
|
|
if (lstrlenW(name) > lstrlenW(constraint))
|
|
match = !lstrcmpiW(name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint),
|
|
constraint);
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* name is too short, no match */
|
|
match = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
match = !lstrcmpiW(name, constraint);
|
|
return match;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL url_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name,
|
|
DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL match = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name));
|
|
|
|
if (!constraint)
|
|
*trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
|
|
else if (!name)
|
|
; /* no match */
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
LPCWSTR colon, authority_end, at, hostname = NULL;
|
|
/* The maximum length for a hostname is 254 in the DNS, see RFC 1034 */
|
|
WCHAR hostname_buf[255];
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 5280: only the hostname portion of the URL is compared. From
|
|
* section 4.2.1.10:
|
|
* "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name.
|
|
* The constraint MUST be specified as a fully qualified domain name
|
|
* and MAY specify a host or a domain."
|
|
* The format for URIs is in RFC 2396.
|
|
*
|
|
* First, remove any scheme that's present. */
|
|
colon = strchrW(name, ':');
|
|
if (colon && *(colon + 1) == '/' && *(colon + 2) == '/')
|
|
name = colon + 3;
|
|
/* Next, find the end of the authority component. (The authority is
|
|
* generally just the hostname, but it may contain a username or a port.
|
|
* Those are removed next.)
|
|
*/
|
|
authority_end = strchrW(name, '/');
|
|
if (!authority_end)
|
|
authority_end = strchrW(name, '?');
|
|
if (!authority_end)
|
|
authority_end = name + strlenW(name);
|
|
/* Remove any port number from the authority. The userinfo portion
|
|
* of an authority may contain a colon, so stop if a userinfo portion
|
|
* is found (indicated by '@').
|
|
*/
|
|
for (colon = authority_end; colon >= name && *colon != ':' &&
|
|
*colon != '@'; colon--)
|
|
;
|
|
if (*colon == ':')
|
|
authority_end = colon;
|
|
/* Remove any username from the authority */
|
|
if ((at = strchrW(name, '@')))
|
|
name = at;
|
|
/* Ignore any path or query portion of the URL. */
|
|
if (*authority_end)
|
|
{
|
|
if (authority_end - name < ARRAY_SIZE(hostname_buf))
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy(hostname_buf, name,
|
|
(authority_end - name) * sizeof(WCHAR));
|
|
hostname_buf[authority_end - name] = 0;
|
|
hostname = hostname_buf;
|
|
}
|
|
/* else: Hostname is too long, not a match */
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
hostname = name;
|
|
if (hostname)
|
|
match = domain_name_matches(constraint, hostname);
|
|
}
|
|
return match;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL rfc822_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name,
|
|
DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL match = FALSE;
|
|
LPCWSTR at;
|
|
|
|
TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name));
|
|
|
|
if (!constraint)
|
|
*trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
|
|
else if (!name)
|
|
; /* no match */
|
|
else if (strchrW(constraint, '@'))
|
|
match = !lstrcmpiW(constraint, name);
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if ((at = strchrW(name, '@')))
|
|
match = domain_name_matches(constraint, at + 1);
|
|
else
|
|
match = !lstrcmpiW(constraint, name);
|
|
}
|
|
return match;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL dns_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name,
|
|
DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL match = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name));
|
|
|
|
if (!constraint)
|
|
*trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
|
|
else if (!name)
|
|
; /* no match */
|
|
/* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
|
|
* "DNS name restrictions are expressed as host.example.com. Any DNS name
|
|
* that can be constructed by simply adding zero or more labels to the
|
|
* left-hand side of the name satisfies the name constraint. For example,
|
|
* www.host.example.com would satisfy the constraint but host1.example.com
|
|
* would not."
|
|
*/
|
|
else if (lstrlenW(name) == lstrlenW(constraint))
|
|
match = !lstrcmpiW(name, constraint);
|
|
else if (lstrlenW(name) > lstrlenW(constraint))
|
|
{
|
|
match = !lstrcmpiW(name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint),
|
|
constraint);
|
|
if (match)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL dot = FALSE;
|
|
LPCWSTR ptr;
|
|
|
|
/* This only matches if name is a subdomain of constraint, i.e.
|
|
* there's a '.' between the beginning of the name and the
|
|
* matching portion of the name.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (ptr = name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint);
|
|
!dot && ptr >= name; ptr--)
|
|
if (*ptr == '.')
|
|
dot = TRUE;
|
|
match = dot;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* else: name is too short, no match */
|
|
|
|
return match;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL ip_address_matches(const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB *constraint,
|
|
const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB *name, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL match = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
TRACE("(%d, %p), (%d, %p)\n", constraint->cbData, constraint->pbData,
|
|
name->cbData, name->pbData);
|
|
|
|
/* RFC5280, section 4.2.1.10, iPAddress syntax: either 8 or 32 bytes, for
|
|
* IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, respectively.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (constraint->cbData != sizeof(DWORD) * 2 && constraint->cbData != 32)
|
|
*trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
|
|
else if (name->cbData == sizeof(DWORD) &&
|
|
constraint->cbData == sizeof(DWORD) * 2)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD subnet, mask, addr;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&subnet, constraint->pbData, sizeof(subnet));
|
|
memcpy(&mask, constraint->pbData + sizeof(subnet), sizeof(mask));
|
|
memcpy(&addr, name->pbData, sizeof(addr));
|
|
/* These are really in big-endian order, but for equality matching we
|
|
* don't need to swap to host order
|
|
*/
|
|
match = (subnet & mask) == (addr & mask);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (name->cbData == 16 && constraint->cbData == 32)
|
|
{
|
|
const BYTE *subnet, *mask, *addr;
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
|
|
subnet = constraint->pbData;
|
|
mask = constraint->pbData + 16;
|
|
addr = name->pbData;
|
|
match = TRUE;
|
|
for (i = 0; match && i < 16; i++)
|
|
if ((subnet[i] & mask[i]) != (addr[i] & mask[i]))
|
|
match = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* else: name is wrong size, no match */
|
|
|
|
return match;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL directory_name_matches(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *constraint,
|
|
const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_NAME_INFO *constraintName;
|
|
DWORD size;
|
|
BOOL match = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME, constraint->pbData,
|
|
constraint->cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &constraintName, &size))
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
|
|
match = TRUE;
|
|
for (i = 0; match && i < constraintName->cRDN; i++)
|
|
match = CertIsRDNAttrsInCertificateName(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
|
|
CERT_CASE_INSENSITIVE_IS_RDN_ATTRS_FLAG,
|
|
(CERT_NAME_BLOB *)name, &constraintName->rgRDN[i]);
|
|
LocalFree(constraintName);
|
|
}
|
|
return match;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL alt_name_matches(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name,
|
|
const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint, DWORD *trustErrorStatus, BOOL *present)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL match = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
if (name->dwAltNameChoice == constraint->dwAltNameChoice)
|
|
{
|
|
if (present)
|
|
*present = TRUE;
|
|
switch (constraint->dwAltNameChoice)
|
|
{
|
|
case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME:
|
|
match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL,
|
|
name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus);
|
|
break;
|
|
case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME:
|
|
match = dns_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL,
|
|
name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus);
|
|
break;
|
|
case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL:
|
|
match = url_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL,
|
|
name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus);
|
|
break;
|
|
case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS:
|
|
match = ip_address_matches(&constraint->u.IPAddress,
|
|
&name->u.IPAddress, trustErrorStatus);
|
|
break;
|
|
case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME:
|
|
match = directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName,
|
|
&name->u.DirectoryName);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
ERR("name choice %d unsupported in this context\n",
|
|
constraint->dwAltNameChoice);
|
|
*trustErrorStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (present)
|
|
*present = FALSE;
|
|
return match;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL alt_name_matches_excluded_name(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name,
|
|
const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
BOOL match = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
|
|
match = alt_name_matches(name,
|
|
&nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base, trustErrorStatus, NULL);
|
|
return match;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL alt_name_matches_permitted_name(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name,
|
|
const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus,
|
|
BOOL *present)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
BOOL match = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
|
|
match = alt_name_matches(name,
|
|
&nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base, trustErrorStatus,
|
|
present);
|
|
return match;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline PCERT_EXTENSION get_subject_alt_name_ext(const CERT_INFO *cert)
|
|
{
|
|
PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
|
|
|
|
ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2,
|
|
cert->cExtension, cert->rgExtension);
|
|
if (!ext)
|
|
ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
|
|
cert->cExtension, cert->rgExtension);
|
|
return ext;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void compare_alt_name_with_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *altNameExt,
|
|
const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *subjectAltName;
|
|
DWORD size;
|
|
|
|
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME,
|
|
altNameExt->Value.pbData, altNameExt->Value.cbData,
|
|
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
|
|
&subjectAltName, &size))
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < subjectAltName->cAltEntry; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL nameFormPresent;
|
|
|
|
/* A name constraint only applies if the name form is present.
|
|
* From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
|
|
* "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is
|
|
* present. If no name of the type is in the certificate,
|
|
* the certificate is acceptable."
|
|
*/
|
|
if (alt_name_matches_excluded_name(
|
|
&subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i], nameConstraints,
|
|
trustErrorStatus))
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("subject alternate name form %d excluded\n",
|
|
subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice);
|
|
*trustErrorStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
|
|
}
|
|
nameFormPresent = FALSE;
|
|
if (!alt_name_matches_permitted_name(
|
|
&subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i], nameConstraints,
|
|
trustErrorStatus, &nameFormPresent) && nameFormPresent)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("subject alternate name form %d not permitted\n",
|
|
subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice);
|
|
*trustErrorStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
LocalFree(subjectAltName);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
*trustErrorStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL rfc822_attr_matches_excluded_name(const CERT_RDN_ATTR *attr,
|
|
const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
BOOL match = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
|
|
&nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base;
|
|
|
|
if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
|
|
match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszRfc822Name,
|
|
(LPCWSTR)attr->Value.pbData, trustErrorStatus);
|
|
}
|
|
return match;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL rfc822_attr_matches_permitted_name(const CERT_RDN_ATTR *attr,
|
|
const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus,
|
|
BOOL *present)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
BOOL match = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
|
|
&nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base;
|
|
|
|
if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
|
|
{
|
|
*present = TRUE;
|
|
match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszRfc822Name,
|
|
(LPCWSTR)attr->Value.pbData, trustErrorStatus);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return match;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void compare_subject_with_email_constraints(
|
|
const CERT_NAME_BLOB *subjectName,
|
|
const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_NAME_INFO *name;
|
|
DWORD size;
|
|
|
|
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_UNICODE_NAME,
|
|
subjectName->pbData, subjectName->cbData,
|
|
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &name, &size))
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i, j;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < name->cRDN; i++)
|
|
for (j = 0; j < name->rgRDN[i].cRDNAttr; j++)
|
|
if (!strcmp(name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j].pszObjId,
|
|
szOID_RSA_emailAddr))
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL nameFormPresent;
|
|
|
|
/* A name constraint only applies if the name form is
|
|
* present. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
|
|
* "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is
|
|
* present. If no name of the type is in the certificate,
|
|
* the certificate is acceptable."
|
|
*/
|
|
if (rfc822_attr_matches_excluded_name(
|
|
&name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j], nameConstraints,
|
|
trustErrorStatus))
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)(
|
|
"email address in subject name is excluded\n");
|
|
*trustErrorStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
|
|
}
|
|
nameFormPresent = FALSE;
|
|
if (!rfc822_attr_matches_permitted_name(
|
|
&name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j], nameConstraints,
|
|
trustErrorStatus, &nameFormPresent) && nameFormPresent)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)(
|
|
"email address in subject name is not permitted\n");
|
|
*trustErrorStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
LocalFree(name);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
*trustErrorStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL CRYPT_IsEmptyName(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL empty;
|
|
|
|
if (!name->cbData)
|
|
empty = TRUE;
|
|
else if (name->cbData == 2 && name->pbData[1] == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/* An empty sequence is also empty */
|
|
empty = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
empty = FALSE;
|
|
return empty;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void compare_subject_with_constraints(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *subjectName,
|
|
const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL hasEmailConstraint = FALSE;
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
|
|
/* In general, a subject distinguished name only matches a directory name
|
|
* constraint. However, an exception exists for email addresses.
|
|
* From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.6:
|
|
* "Legacy implementations exist where an electronic mail address is
|
|
* embedded in the subject distinguished name as an emailAddress
|
|
* attribute [RFC2985]."
|
|
* If an email address constraint exists, check that constraint separately.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; !hasEmailConstraint && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree;
|
|
i++)
|
|
if (nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base.dwAltNameChoice ==
|
|
CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
|
|
hasEmailConstraint = TRUE;
|
|
for (i = 0; !hasEmailConstraint && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree;
|
|
i++)
|
|
if (nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base.dwAltNameChoice ==
|
|
CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
|
|
hasEmailConstraint = TRUE;
|
|
if (hasEmailConstraint)
|
|
compare_subject_with_email_constraints(subjectName, nameConstraints,
|
|
trustErrorStatus);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
|
|
&nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base;
|
|
|
|
if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME &&
|
|
directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName, subjectName))
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("subject name is excluded\n");
|
|
*trustErrorStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
|
|
* "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is present.
|
|
* If no name of the type is in the certificate, the certificate is
|
|
* acceptable."
|
|
* An empty name can't have the name form present, so don't check it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree && !CRYPT_IsEmptyName(subjectName))
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL match = FALSE, hasDirectoryConstraint = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
|
|
&nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base;
|
|
|
|
if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME)
|
|
{
|
|
hasDirectoryConstraint = TRUE;
|
|
match = directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName,
|
|
subjectName);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (hasDirectoryConstraint && !match)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("subject name is not permitted\n");
|
|
*trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(
|
|
const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, const CERT_INFO *cert,
|
|
DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_EXTENSION *ext = get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert);
|
|
|
|
if (ext)
|
|
compare_alt_name_with_constraints(ext, nameConstraints,
|
|
trustErrorStatus);
|
|
/* Name constraints apply to the subject alternative name as well as the
|
|
* subject name. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
|
|
* "Restrictions apply to the subject distinguished name and apply to
|
|
* subject alternative names."
|
|
*/
|
|
compare_subject_with_constraints(&cert->Subject, nameConstraints,
|
|
trustErrorStatus);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Gets cert's name constraints, if any. Free with LocalFree. */
|
|
static CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(CERT_INFO *cert)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info = NULL;
|
|
|
|
CERT_EXTENSION *ext;
|
|
|
|
if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, cert->cExtension,
|
|
cert->rgExtension)))
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD size;
|
|
|
|
CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS,
|
|
ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
|
|
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &info,
|
|
&size);
|
|
}
|
|
return info;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
BOOL ret = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure at least one permitted or excluded subtree is present. From
|
|
* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
|
|
* "Conforming CAs MUST NOT issue certificates where name constraints is an
|
|
* empty sequence. That is, either the permittedSubtrees field or the
|
|
* excludedSubtrees MUST be present."
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!info->cPermittedSubtree && !info->cExcludedSubtree)
|
|
{
|
|
WARN_(chain)("constraints contain no permitted nor excluded subtree\n");
|
|
ret = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check that none of the constraints specifies a minimum or a maximum.
|
|
* See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
|
|
* "Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with
|
|
* any name forms, thus, the minimum MUST be zero, and maximum MUST be
|
|
* absent. However, if an application encounters a critical name
|
|
* constraints extension that specifies other values for minimum or
|
|
* maximum for a name form that appears in a subsequent certificate, the
|
|
* application MUST either process these fields or reject the
|
|
* certificate."
|
|
* Since it gives no guidance as to how to process these fields, we
|
|
* reject any name constraint that contains them.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; ret && i < info->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
|
|
if (info->rgPermittedSubtree[i].dwMinimum ||
|
|
info->rgPermittedSubtree[i].fMaximum)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("found a minimum or maximum in permitted subtrees\n");
|
|
ret = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0; ret && i < info->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
|
|
if (info->rgExcludedSubtree[i].dwMinimum ||
|
|
info->rgExcludedSubtree[i].fMaximum)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("found a minimum or maximum in excluded subtrees\n");
|
|
ret = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, j;
|
|
|
|
/* Microsoft's implementation appears to violate RFC 3280: according to
|
|
* MSDN, the various CERT_TRUST_*_NAME_CONSTRAINT errors are set if a CA's
|
|
* name constraint is violated in the end cert. According to RFC 3280,
|
|
* the constraints should be checked against every subsequent certificate
|
|
* in the chain, not just the end cert.
|
|
* Microsoft's implementation also sets the name constraint errors on the
|
|
* certs whose constraints were violated, not on the certs that violated
|
|
* them.
|
|
* In order to be error-compatible with Microsoft's implementation, while
|
|
* still adhering to RFC 3280, I use a O(n ^ 2) algorithm to check name
|
|
* constraints.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i > 0; i--)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints;
|
|
|
|
if ((nameConstraints = CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(
|
|
chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo)))
|
|
{
|
|
if (!CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(nameConstraints))
|
|
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD errorStatus = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* According to RFC 3280, self-signed certs don't have name
|
|
* constraints checked unless they're the end cert.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (j == 0 || !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
|
|
chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext))
|
|
{
|
|
CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(nameConstraints,
|
|
chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo,
|
|
&errorStatus);
|
|
if (errorStatus)
|
|
{
|
|
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
|
|
errorStatus;
|
|
CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
|
|
&chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_HAS_VALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
LocalFree(nameConstraints);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Gets cert's policies info, if any. Free with LocalFree. */
|
|
static CERT_POLICIES_INFO *CRYPT_GetPolicies(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
|
|
{
|
|
PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
|
|
CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_KEY_USAGE, cert->pCertInfo->cExtension,
|
|
cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
|
|
if (ext)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD size;
|
|
|
|
CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_CERT_POLICIES,
|
|
ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL,
|
|
&policies, &size);
|
|
}
|
|
return policies;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void CRYPT_CheckPolicies(const CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies, CERT_INFO *cert,
|
|
DWORD *errorStatus)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < policies->cPolicyInfo; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
/* For now, the only accepted policy identifier is the anyPolicy
|
|
* identifier.
|
|
* FIXME: the policy identifiers should be compared against the
|
|
* cert's certificate policies extension, subject to the policy
|
|
* mappings extension, and the policy constraints extension.
|
|
* See RFC 5280, sections 4.2.1.4, 4.2.1.5, and 4.2.1.11.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (strcmp(policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier,
|
|
szOID_ANY_CERT_POLICY))
|
|
{
|
|
FIXME("unsupported policy %s\n",
|
|
policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier);
|
|
*errorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void CRYPT_CheckChainPolicies(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, j;
|
|
|
|
for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i > 0; i--)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies;
|
|
|
|
if ((policies = CRYPT_GetPolicies(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext)))
|
|
{
|
|
for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD errorStatus = 0;
|
|
|
|
CRYPT_CheckPolicies(policies,
|
|
chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo, &errorStatus);
|
|
if (errorStatus)
|
|
{
|
|
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
|
|
errorStatus;
|
|
CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
|
|
&chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
LocalFree(policies);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static LPWSTR name_value_to_str(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD len = cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING, 0, name,
|
|
CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR, NULL, 0);
|
|
LPWSTR str = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (len)
|
|
{
|
|
str = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
|
|
if (str)
|
|
cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING, 0, name,
|
|
CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR, str, len);
|
|
}
|
|
return str;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void dump_alt_name_entry(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *entry)
|
|
{
|
|
LPWSTR str;
|
|
|
|
switch (entry->dwAltNameChoice)
|
|
{
|
|
case CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME:
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME, oid = %s\n",
|
|
debugstr_a(entry->u.pOtherName->pszObjId));
|
|
break;
|
|
case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME:
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME: %s\n",
|
|
debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszRfc822Name));
|
|
break;
|
|
case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME:
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME: %s\n",
|
|
debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszDNSName));
|
|
break;
|
|
case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME:
|
|
str = name_value_to_str(&entry->u.DirectoryName);
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME: %s\n", debugstr_w(str));
|
|
CryptMemFree(str);
|
|
break;
|
|
case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL:
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_URL: %s\n", debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszURL));
|
|
break;
|
|
case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS:
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS: %d bytes\n",
|
|
entry->u.IPAddress.cbData);
|
|
break;
|
|
case CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID:
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID: %s\n",
|
|
debugstr_a(entry->u.pszRegisteredID));
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("dwAltNameChoice = %d\n", entry->dwAltNameChoice);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void dump_alt_name(LPCSTR type, const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *name;
|
|
DWORD size;
|
|
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%s:\n", type);
|
|
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME,
|
|
ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
|
|
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &name, &size))
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%d alt name entries:\n", name->cAltEntry);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < name->cAltEntry; i++)
|
|
dump_alt_name_entry(&name->rgAltEntry[i]);
|
|
LocalFree(name);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void dump_basic_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info;
|
|
DWORD size = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
|
|
ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG,
|
|
NULL, &info, &size))
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("SubjectType: %02x\n", info->SubjectType.pbData[0]);
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%s path length constraint\n",
|
|
info->fPathLenConstraint ? "has" : "doesn't have");
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("path length=%d\n", info->dwPathLenConstraint);
|
|
LocalFree(info);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void dump_basic_constraints2(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints;
|
|
DWORD size = sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO);
|
|
|
|
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
|
|
szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
|
|
0, NULL, &constraints, &size))
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("basic constraints:\n");
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("can%s be a CA\n", constraints.fCA ? "" : "not");
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%s path length constraint\n",
|
|
constraints.fPathLenConstraint ? "has" : "doesn't have");
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("path length=%d\n", constraints.dwPathLenConstraint);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void dump_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
|
|
{
|
|
CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage;
|
|
DWORD size = sizeof(usage);
|
|
|
|
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_BITS, ext->Value.pbData,
|
|
ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size))
|
|
{
|
|
#define trace_usage_bit(bits, bit) \
|
|
if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
|
|
if (usage.cbData)
|
|
{
|
|
trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE_KEY_USAGE);
|
|
trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_NON_REPUDIATION_KEY_USAGE);
|
|
trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE);
|
|
trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE);
|
|
trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_AGREEMENT_KEY_USAGE);
|
|
trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE);
|
|
trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_CRL_SIGN_KEY_USAGE);
|
|
trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_ENCIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE);
|
|
}
|
|
#undef trace_usage_bit
|
|
if (usage.cbData > 1 && usage.pbData[1] & CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE)
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE\n");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void dump_general_subtree(const CERT_GENERAL_SUBTREE *subtree)
|
|
{
|
|
dump_alt_name_entry(&subtree->Base);
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("dwMinimum = %d, fMaximum = %d, dwMaximum = %d\n",
|
|
subtree->dwMinimum, subtree->fMaximum, subtree->dwMaximum);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void dump_name_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints;
|
|
DWORD size;
|
|
|
|
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS,
|
|
ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
|
|
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &nameConstraints,
|
|
&size))
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%d permitted subtrees:\n",
|
|
nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
|
|
dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i]);
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%d excluded subtrees:\n",
|
|
nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
|
|
dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i]);
|
|
LocalFree(nameConstraints);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void dump_cert_policies(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies;
|
|
DWORD size;
|
|
|
|
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_CERT_POLICIES,
|
|
ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL,
|
|
&policies, &size))
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i, j;
|
|
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%d policies:\n", policies->cPolicyInfo);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < policies->cPolicyInfo; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("policy identifier: %s\n",
|
|
debugstr_a(policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier));
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%d policy qualifiers:\n",
|
|
policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].cPolicyQualifier);
|
|
for (j = 0; j < policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].cPolicyQualifier; j++)
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_a(
|
|
policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].rgPolicyQualifier[j].
|
|
pszPolicyQualifierId));
|
|
}
|
|
LocalFree(policies);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void dump_enhanced_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *usage;
|
|
DWORD size;
|
|
|
|
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE,
|
|
ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL,
|
|
&usage, &size))
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%d usages:\n", usage->cUsageIdentifier);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < usage->cUsageIdentifier; i++)
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
|
|
LocalFree(usage);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void dump_netscape_cert_type(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
|
|
{
|
|
CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage;
|
|
DWORD size = sizeof(usage);
|
|
|
|
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_BITS, ext->Value.pbData,
|
|
ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size))
|
|
{
|
|
#define trace_cert_type_bit(bits, bit) \
|
|
if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
|
|
if (usage.cbData)
|
|
{
|
|
trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0],
|
|
NETSCAPE_SSL_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT_TYPE);
|
|
trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0],
|
|
NETSCAPE_SSL_SERVER_AUTH_CERT_TYPE);
|
|
trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CERT_TYPE);
|
|
trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CERT_TYPE);
|
|
trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SSL_CA_CERT_TYPE);
|
|
trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CA_CERT_TYPE);
|
|
trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CA_CERT_TYPE);
|
|
}
|
|
#undef trace_cert_type_bit
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void dump_extension(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%s (%scritical)\n", debugstr_a(ext->pszObjId),
|
|
ext->fCritical ? "" : "not ");
|
|
if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME))
|
|
dump_alt_name("subject alt name", ext);
|
|
else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME))
|
|
dump_alt_name("issuer alt name", ext);
|
|
else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS))
|
|
dump_basic_constraints(ext);
|
|
else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_KEY_USAGE))
|
|
dump_key_usage(ext);
|
|
else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2))
|
|
dump_alt_name("subject alt name 2", ext);
|
|
else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME2))
|
|
dump_alt_name("issuer alt name 2", ext);
|
|
else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2))
|
|
dump_basic_constraints2(ext);
|
|
else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS))
|
|
dump_name_constraints(ext);
|
|
else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_CERT_POLICIES))
|
|
dump_cert_policies(ext);
|
|
else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE))
|
|
dump_enhanced_key_usage(ext);
|
|
else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_NETSCAPE_CERT_TYPE))
|
|
dump_netscape_cert_type(ext);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static LPCSTR filetime_to_str(const FILETIME *time)
|
|
{
|
|
char date[80];
|
|
char dateFmt[80]; /* sufficient for all versions of LOCALE_SSHORTDATE */
|
|
SYSTEMTIME sysTime;
|
|
|
|
if (!time) return "(null)";
|
|
|
|
GetLocaleInfoA(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT, LOCALE_SSHORTDATE, dateFmt, ARRAY_SIZE(dateFmt));
|
|
FileTimeToSystemTime(time, &sysTime);
|
|
GetDateFormatA(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT, 0, &sysTime, dateFmt, date, ARRAY_SIZE(date));
|
|
return wine_dbg_sprintf("%s", date);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void dump_element(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
|
|
{
|
|
LPWSTR name = NULL;
|
|
DWORD len, i;
|
|
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%p: version %d\n", cert, cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion);
|
|
len = CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE,
|
|
CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG, NULL, NULL, 0);
|
|
name = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
|
|
if (name)
|
|
{
|
|
CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE,
|
|
CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG, NULL, name, len);
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("issued by %s\n", debugstr_w(name));
|
|
CryptMemFree(name);
|
|
}
|
|
len = CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, 0, NULL,
|
|
NULL, 0);
|
|
name = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
|
|
if (name)
|
|
{
|
|
CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, 0, NULL,
|
|
name, len);
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("issued to %s\n", debugstr_w(name));
|
|
CryptMemFree(name);
|
|
}
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("valid from %s to %s\n",
|
|
filetime_to_str(&cert->pCertInfo->NotBefore),
|
|
filetime_to_str(&cert->pCertInfo->NotAfter));
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%d extensions\n", cert->pCertInfo->cExtension);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < cert->pCertInfo->cExtension; i++)
|
|
dump_extension(&cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(CertificateChainEngine *engine,
|
|
PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, BOOL isRoot, BOOL isCA, DWORD index)
|
|
{
|
|
PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
|
|
BOOL ret;
|
|
BYTE usageBits = 0;
|
|
|
|
ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_KEY_USAGE, cert->pCertInfo->cExtension,
|
|
cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
|
|
if (ext)
|
|
{
|
|
CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage;
|
|
DWORD size = sizeof(usage);
|
|
|
|
ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType, X509_BITS,
|
|
ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
|
|
&usage, &size);
|
|
if (!ret)
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
else if (usage.cbData > 2)
|
|
{
|
|
/* The key usage extension only defines 9 bits => no more than 2
|
|
* bytes are needed to encode all known usages.
|
|
*/
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* The only bit relevant to chain validation is the keyCertSign
|
|
* bit, which is always in the least significant byte of the
|
|
* key usage bits.
|
|
*/
|
|
usageBits = usage.pbData[usage.cbData - 1];
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (isCA)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ext)
|
|
{
|
|
/* MS appears to violate RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.3 (Key Usage)
|
|
* here. Quoting the RFC:
|
|
* "This [key usage] extension MUST appear in certificates that
|
|
* contain public keys that are used to validate digital signatures
|
|
* on other public key certificates or CRLs."
|
|
* MS appears to accept certs that do not contain key usage
|
|
* extensions as CA certs. V1 and V2 certificates did not have
|
|
* extensions, and many root certificates are V1 certificates, so
|
|
* perhaps this is prudent. On the other hand, MS also accepts V3
|
|
* certs without key usage extensions. Because some CAs, e.g.
|
|
* Certum, also do not include key usage extensions in their
|
|
* intermediate certificates, we are forced to accept V3
|
|
* certificates without key usage extensions as well.
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (!(usageBits & CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE))
|
|
{
|
|
WARN_(chain)("keyCertSign not asserted on a CA cert\n");
|
|
ret = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
ret = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (ext && (usageBits & CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE))
|
|
{
|
|
WARN_(chain)("keyCertSign asserted on a non-CA cert\n");
|
|
ret = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
ret = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL ret = TRUE;
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; ret && i < cert->pCertInfo->cExtension; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
if (cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i].fCritical)
|
|
{
|
|
LPCSTR oid = cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i].pszObjId;
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS))
|
|
ret = TRUE;
|
|
else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2))
|
|
ret = TRUE;
|
|
else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS))
|
|
ret = TRUE;
|
|
else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_KEY_USAGE))
|
|
ret = TRUE;
|
|
else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME))
|
|
ret = TRUE;
|
|
else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2))
|
|
ret = TRUE;
|
|
else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_CERT_POLICIES))
|
|
ret = TRUE;
|
|
else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE))
|
|
ret = TRUE;
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
FIXME("unsupported critical extension %s\n",
|
|
debugstr_a(oid));
|
|
ret = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL ret = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
/* Checks whether the contents of the cert match the cert's version. */
|
|
switch (cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion)
|
|
{
|
|
case CERT_V1:
|
|
/* A V1 cert may not contain unique identifiers. See RFC 5280,
|
|
* section 4.1.2.8:
|
|
* "These fields MUST only appear if the version is 2 or 3 (Section
|
|
* 4.1.2.1). These fields MUST NOT appear if the version is 1."
|
|
*/
|
|
if (cert->pCertInfo->IssuerUniqueId.cbData ||
|
|
cert->pCertInfo->SubjectUniqueId.cbData)
|
|
ret = FALSE;
|
|
/* A V1 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
|
|
* "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
|
|
*/
|
|
if (cert->pCertInfo->cExtension)
|
|
ret = FALSE;
|
|
break;
|
|
case CERT_V2:
|
|
/* A V2 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
|
|
* "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
|
|
*/
|
|
if (cert->pCertInfo->cExtension)
|
|
ret = FALSE;
|
|
break;
|
|
case CERT_V3:
|
|
/* Do nothing, all fields are allowed for V3 certs */
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
WARN_(chain)("invalid cert version %d\n", cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion);
|
|
ret = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(CertificateChainEngine *engine,
|
|
PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain, LPFILETIME time)
|
|
{
|
|
PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1];
|
|
int i;
|
|
BOOL pathLengthConstraintViolated = FALSE;
|
|
CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints = { FALSE, FALSE, 0 };
|
|
DWORD status;
|
|
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("checking chain with %d elements for time %s\n",
|
|
chain->cElement, filetime_to_str(time));
|
|
for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i >= 0; i--)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL isRoot;
|
|
|
|
if (TRACE_ON(chain))
|
|
dump_element(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext);
|
|
if (i == chain->cElement - 1)
|
|
isRoot = CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
|
|
chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext);
|
|
else
|
|
isRoot = FALSE;
|
|
if (!CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext))
|
|
{
|
|
/* MS appears to accept certs whose versions don't match their
|
|
* contents, so there isn't an appropriate error code.
|
|
*/
|
|
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION;
|
|
}
|
|
if (CertVerifyTimeValidity(time,
|
|
chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo) != 0)
|
|
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID;
|
|
if (i != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Check the signature of the cert this issued */
|
|
if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, X509_ASN_ENCODING,
|
|
CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT,
|
|
(void *)chain->rgpElement[i - 1]->pCertContext,
|
|
CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT,
|
|
(void *)chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, 0, NULL))
|
|
chain->rgpElement[i - 1]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID;
|
|
/* Once a path length constraint has been violated, every remaining
|
|
* CA cert's basic constraints is considered invalid.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (pathLengthConstraintViolated)
|
|
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
|
|
else if (!CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(engine,
|
|
chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, &constraints, i - 1, isRoot,
|
|
&pathLengthConstraintViolated))
|
|
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
|
|
else if (constraints.fPathLenConstraint &&
|
|
constraints.dwPathLenConstraint)
|
|
{
|
|
/* This one's valid - decrement max length */
|
|
constraints.dwPathLenConstraint--;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* Check whether end cert has a basic constraints extension */
|
|
if (!CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(
|
|
chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, &constraints, FALSE))
|
|
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(engine, chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext,
|
|
isRoot, constraints.fCA, i))
|
|
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
|
|
if (CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain))
|
|
{
|
|
/* If the chain is cyclic, then the path length constraints
|
|
* are violated, because the chain is infinitely long.
|
|
*/
|
|
pathLengthConstraintViolated = TRUE;
|
|
chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN |
|
|
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check whether every critical extension is supported */
|
|
if (!CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(
|
|
chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext))
|
|
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION |
|
|
CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT;
|
|
CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
|
|
&chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus);
|
|
}
|
|
CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(chain);
|
|
CRYPT_CheckChainPolicies(chain);
|
|
if ((status = CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(rootElement->pCertContext)))
|
|
{
|
|
rootElement->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus |= status;
|
|
CRYPT_CheckRootCert(engine->hRoot, rootElement);
|
|
}
|
|
CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus, &rootElement->TrustStatus);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static PCCERT_CONTEXT CRYPT_FindIssuer(const CertificateChainEngine *engine, const CERT_CONTEXT *cert,
|
|
HCERTSTORE store, DWORD type, void *para, DWORD flags, PCCERT_CONTEXT prev_issuer)
|
|
{
|
|
CRYPT_URL_ARRAY *urls;
|
|
PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer;
|
|
DWORD size;
|
|
BOOL res;
|
|
|
|
issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store, cert->dwCertEncodingType, 0, type, para, prev_issuer);
|
|
if(issuer) {
|
|
TRACE("Found in store %p\n", issuer);
|
|
return issuer;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* FIXME: For alternate issuers, we don't search world store nor try to retrieve issuer from URL.
|
|
* This needs more tests.
|
|
*/
|
|
if(prev_issuer)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if(engine->hWorld) {
|
|
issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(engine->hWorld, cert->dwCertEncodingType, 0, type, para, NULL);
|
|
if(issuer) {
|
|
TRACE("Found in world %p\n", issuer);
|
|
return issuer;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
res = CryptGetObjectUrl(URL_OID_CERTIFICATE_ISSUER, (void*)cert, 0, NULL, &size, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
if(!res)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
urls = HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), 0, size);
|
|
if(!urls)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
res = CryptGetObjectUrl(URL_OID_CERTIFICATE_ISSUER, (void*)cert, 0, urls, &size, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
if(res)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_CONTEXT *new_cert;
|
|
HCERTSTORE new_store;
|
|
unsigned i;
|
|
|
|
for(i=0; i < urls->cUrl; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE("Trying URL %s\n", debugstr_w(urls->rgwszUrl[i]));
|
|
|
|
res = CryptRetrieveObjectByUrlW(urls->rgwszUrl[i], CONTEXT_OID_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
(flags & CERT_CHAIN_CACHE_ONLY_URL_RETRIEVAL) ? CRYPT_CACHE_ONLY_RETRIEVAL : CRYPT_AIA_RETRIEVAL,
|
|
0, (void**)&new_cert, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
if(!res)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE("CryptRetrieveObjectByUrlW failed: %u\n", GetLastError());
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* FIXME: Use new_cert->hCertStore once cert ref count bug is fixed. */
|
|
new_store = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_MEMORY, 0, 0, CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG, NULL);
|
|
CertAddCertificateContextToStore(new_store, new_cert, CERT_STORE_ADD_NEW, NULL);
|
|
issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(new_store, cert->dwCertEncodingType, 0, type, para, NULL);
|
|
CertFreeCertificateContext(new_cert);
|
|
CertCloseStore(new_store, 0);
|
|
if(issuer)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE("Found downloaded issuer %p\n", issuer);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, urls);
|
|
return issuer;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static PCCERT_CONTEXT CRYPT_GetIssuer(const CertificateChainEngine *engine,
|
|
HCERTSTORE store, PCCERT_CONTEXT subject, PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer,
|
|
DWORD flags, DWORD *infoStatus)
|
|
{
|
|
PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer = NULL;
|
|
PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
|
|
DWORD size;
|
|
|
|
*infoStatus = 0;
|
|
if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
|
|
subject->pCertInfo->cExtension, subject->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID_INFO *info;
|
|
BOOL ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject->dwCertEncodingType,
|
|
X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
|
|
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
|
|
&info, &size);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_ID id;
|
|
|
|
if (info->CertIssuer.cbData && info->CertSerialNumber.cbData)
|
|
{
|
|
id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER;
|
|
memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.Issuer, &info->CertIssuer,
|
|
sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB));
|
|
memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.SerialNumber,
|
|
&info->CertSerialNumber, sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB));
|
|
|
|
issuer = CRYPT_FindIssuer(engine, subject, store, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id, flags, prevIssuer);
|
|
if (issuer)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by issuer/serial number\n");
|
|
*infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
|
|
{
|
|
id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&id.u.KeyId, &info->KeyId, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB));
|
|
issuer = CRYPT_FindIssuer(engine, subject, store, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id, flags, prevIssuer);
|
|
if (issuer)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by key id\n");
|
|
*infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
LocalFree(info);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER2,
|
|
subject->pCertInfo->cExtension, subject->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2_INFO *info;
|
|
BOOL ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject->dwCertEncodingType,
|
|
X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
|
|
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
|
|
&info, &size);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_ID id;
|
|
|
|
if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry &&
|
|
info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber.cbData)
|
|
{
|
|
PCERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY directoryName = NULL;
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; !directoryName &&
|
|
i < info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry; i++)
|
|
if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice
|
|
== CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME)
|
|
directoryName =
|
|
&info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i];
|
|
if (directoryName)
|
|
{
|
|
id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER;
|
|
memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.Issuer,
|
|
&directoryName->u.DirectoryName, sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB));
|
|
memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.SerialNumber,
|
|
&info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber,
|
|
sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB));
|
|
|
|
issuer = CRYPT_FindIssuer(engine, subject, store, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id, flags, prevIssuer);
|
|
if (issuer)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by directory name\n");
|
|
*infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
FIXME("no supported name type in authority key id2\n");
|
|
}
|
|
else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
|
|
{
|
|
id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER;
|
|
memcpy(&id.u.KeyId, &info->KeyId, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB));
|
|
issuer = CRYPT_FindIssuer(engine, subject, store, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id, flags, prevIssuer);
|
|
if (issuer)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by key id\n");
|
|
*infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
LocalFree(info);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
issuer = CRYPT_FindIssuer(engine, subject, store, CERT_FIND_SUBJECT_NAME,
|
|
&subject->pCertInfo->Issuer, flags, prevIssuer);
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by name\n");
|
|
*infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER;
|
|
}
|
|
return issuer;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Builds a simple chain by finding an issuer for the last cert in the chain,
|
|
* until reaching a self-signed cert, or until no issuer can be found.
|
|
*/
|
|
static BOOL CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine *engine,
|
|
HCERTSTORE world, DWORD flags, PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL ret = TRUE;
|
|
PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->pCertContext;
|
|
|
|
while (ret && !CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain) &&
|
|
!CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(cert))
|
|
{
|
|
PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer = CRYPT_GetIssuer(engine, world, cert, NULL, flags,
|
|
&chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus);
|
|
|
|
if (issuer)
|
|
{
|
|
ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine, chain, issuer,
|
|
chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus);
|
|
/* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it to
|
|
* close the enumeration that found it
|
|
*/
|
|
CertFreeCertificateContext(issuer);
|
|
cert = issuer;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("Couldn't find issuer, halting chain creation\n");
|
|
chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static LPCSTR debugstr_filetime(LPFILETIME pTime)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!pTime)
|
|
return "(nil)";
|
|
return wine_dbg_sprintf("%p (%s)", pTime, filetime_to_str(pTime));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(CertificateChainEngine *engine,
|
|
HCERTSTORE world, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPFILETIME pTime, DWORD flags,
|
|
PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *ppChain)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL ret = FALSE;
|
|
PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain;
|
|
|
|
TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %s)\n", engine, world, cert, debugstr_filetime(pTime));
|
|
|
|
chain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
|
|
if (chain)
|
|
{
|
|
memset(chain, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
|
|
chain->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN);
|
|
ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine, chain, cert, 0);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
{
|
|
ret = CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine, world, flags, chain);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine, chain, pTime);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ret)
|
|
{
|
|
CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain);
|
|
chain = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
*ppChain = chain;
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(CertificateChainEngine *engine,
|
|
PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore, DWORD flags,
|
|
CertificateChain **ppChain)
|
|
{
|
|
PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN simpleChain = NULL;
|
|
HCERTSTORE world;
|
|
BOOL ret;
|
|
|
|
world = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION, 0, 0,
|
|
CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG, NULL);
|
|
CertAddStoreToCollection(world, engine->hWorld, 0, 0);
|
|
if (hAdditionalStore)
|
|
CertAddStoreToCollection(world, hAdditionalStore, 0, 0);
|
|
/* FIXME: only simple chains are supported for now, as CTLs aren't
|
|
* supported yet.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((ret = CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(engine, world, cert, pTime, flags, &simpleChain)))
|
|
{
|
|
CertificateChain *chain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain));
|
|
|
|
if (chain)
|
|
{
|
|
chain->ref = 1;
|
|
chain->world = world;
|
|
chain->context.cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT);
|
|
chain->context.TrustStatus = simpleChain->TrustStatus;
|
|
chain->context.cChain = 1;
|
|
chain->context.rgpChain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
|
|
chain->context.rgpChain[0] = simpleChain;
|
|
chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
|
|
chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
|
|
chain->context.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime = FALSE;
|
|
chain->context.dwRevocationFreshnessTime = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(simpleChain);
|
|
ret = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
*ppChain = chain;
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement. */
|
|
static PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(
|
|
const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *chain, DWORD iElement)
|
|
{
|
|
PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN copy = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
|
|
|
|
if (copy)
|
|
{
|
|
memset(copy, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
|
|
copy->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN);
|
|
copy->rgpElement =
|
|
CryptMemAlloc((iElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
|
|
if (copy->rgpElement)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
BOOL ret = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
memset(copy->rgpElement, 0,
|
|
(iElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
|
|
for (i = 0; ret && i <= iElement; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element =
|
|
CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
|
|
|
|
if (element)
|
|
{
|
|
*element = *chain->rgpElement[i];
|
|
element->pCertContext = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
|
|
chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext);
|
|
/* Reset the trust status of the copied element, it'll get
|
|
* rechecked after the new chain is done.
|
|
*/
|
|
memset(&element->TrustStatus, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS));
|
|
copy->rgpElement[copy->cElement++] = element;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
ret = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ret)
|
|
{
|
|
for (i = 0; i <= iElement; i++)
|
|
CryptMemFree(copy->rgpElement[i]);
|
|
CryptMemFree(copy->rgpElement);
|
|
CryptMemFree(copy);
|
|
copy = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
CryptMemFree(copy);
|
|
copy = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return copy;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(CertificateChain *chain)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext; i++)
|
|
CertFreeCertificateChain(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i]);
|
|
CryptMemFree(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext);
|
|
chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
|
|
chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void CRYPT_FreeChainContext(CertificateChain *chain)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
|
|
CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cChain; i++)
|
|
CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain->context.rgpChain[i]);
|
|
CryptMemFree(chain->context.rgpChain);
|
|
CertCloseStore(chain->world, 0);
|
|
CryptMemFree(chain);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement of
|
|
* simple chain iChain.
|
|
*/
|
|
static CertificateChain *CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(CertificateChain *chain,
|
|
DWORD iChain, DWORD iElement)
|
|
{
|
|
CertificateChain *copy = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain));
|
|
|
|
if (copy)
|
|
{
|
|
copy->ref = 1;
|
|
copy->world = CertDuplicateStore(chain->world);
|
|
copy->context.cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT);
|
|
/* Leave the trust status of the copied chain unset, it'll get
|
|
* rechecked after the new chain is done.
|
|
*/
|
|
memset(©->context.TrustStatus, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS));
|
|
copy->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
|
|
copy->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
|
|
copy->context.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime = FALSE;
|
|
copy->context.dwRevocationFreshnessTime = 0;
|
|
copy->context.rgpChain = CryptMemAlloc(
|
|
(iChain + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
|
|
if (copy->context.rgpChain)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL ret = TRUE;
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
|
|
memset(copy->context.rgpChain, 0,
|
|
(iChain + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
|
|
if (iChain)
|
|
{
|
|
for (i = 0; ret && iChain && i < iChain - 1; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
copy->context.rgpChain[i] =
|
|
CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain->context.rgpChain[i],
|
|
chain->context.rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1);
|
|
if (!copy->context.rgpChain[i])
|
|
ret = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
i = 0;
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
{
|
|
copy->context.rgpChain[i] =
|
|
CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain->context.rgpChain[i],
|
|
iElement);
|
|
if (!copy->context.rgpChain[i])
|
|
ret = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ret)
|
|
{
|
|
CRYPT_FreeChainContext(copy);
|
|
copy = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
copy->context.cChain = iChain + 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
CryptMemFree(copy);
|
|
copy = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return copy;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static CertificateChain *CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(
|
|
CertificateChainEngine *engine, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
|
|
DWORD flags, CertificateChain *chain)
|
|
{
|
|
CertificateChain *alternate;
|
|
|
|
TRACE("(%p, %s, %p, %p)\n", engine, debugstr_filetime(pTime),
|
|
hAdditionalStore, chain);
|
|
|
|
/* Always start with the last "lower quality" chain to ensure a consistent
|
|
* order of alternate creation:
|
|
*/
|
|
if (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext)
|
|
chain = (CertificateChain*)chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[
|
|
chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext - 1];
|
|
/* A chain with only one element can't have any alternates */
|
|
if (chain->context.cChain <= 1 && chain->context.rgpChain[0]->cElement <= 1)
|
|
alternate = NULL;
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i, j, infoStatus;
|
|
PCCERT_CONTEXT alternateIssuer = NULL;
|
|
|
|
alternate = NULL;
|
|
for (i = 0; !alternateIssuer && i < chain->context.cChain; i++)
|
|
for (j = 0; !alternateIssuer &&
|
|
j < chain->context.rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1; j++)
|
|
{
|
|
PCCERT_CONTEXT subject =
|
|
chain->context.rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext;
|
|
PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
|
|
chain->context.rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j + 1]->pCertContext);
|
|
|
|
alternateIssuer = CRYPT_GetIssuer(engine, prevIssuer->hCertStore,
|
|
subject, prevIssuer, flags, &infoStatus);
|
|
}
|
|
if (alternateIssuer)
|
|
{
|
|
i--;
|
|
j--;
|
|
alternate = CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(chain, i, j);
|
|
if (alternate)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine,
|
|
alternate->context.rgpChain[i], alternateIssuer, infoStatus);
|
|
|
|
/* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it
|
|
* to close the enumeration that found it
|
|
*/
|
|
CertFreeCertificateContext(alternateIssuer);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
{
|
|
ret = CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine, alternate->world,
|
|
flags, alternate->context.rgpChain[i]);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine,
|
|
alternate->context.rgpChain[i], pTime);
|
|
CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&alternate->context.TrustStatus,
|
|
&alternate->context.rgpChain[i]->TrustStatus);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ret)
|
|
{
|
|
CRYPT_FreeChainContext(alternate);
|
|
alternate = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
TRACE("%p\n", alternate);
|
|
return alternate;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID 0x16
|
|
#define CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID 8
|
|
#define CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN 4
|
|
#define CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS 2
|
|
#define CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT 1
|
|
|
|
#define CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST \
|
|
CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID | CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID | \
|
|
CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN | CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS | \
|
|
CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT
|
|
|
|
#define IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(TrustStatus, bits) \
|
|
(TrustStatus)->dwErrorStatus & (bits)
|
|
|
|
static DWORD CRYPT_ChainQuality(const CertificateChain *chain)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD quality = CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST;
|
|
|
|
if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT))
|
|
quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT;
|
|
if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
|
|
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS))
|
|
quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
|
|
if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN))
|
|
quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN;
|
|
if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID | CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_NESTED))
|
|
quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID;
|
|
if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID))
|
|
quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID;
|
|
return quality;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Chooses the highest quality chain among chain and its "lower quality"
|
|
* alternate chains. Returns the highest quality chain, with all other
|
|
* chains as lower quality chains of it.
|
|
*/
|
|
static CertificateChain *CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(
|
|
CertificateChain *chain)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
|
|
/* There are always only two chains being considered: chain, and an
|
|
* alternate at chain->rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i]. If the alternate
|
|
* has a higher quality than chain, the alternate gets assigned the lower
|
|
* quality contexts, with chain taking the alternate's place among the
|
|
* lower quality contexts.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
CertificateChain *alternate =
|
|
(CertificateChain*)chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i];
|
|
|
|
if (CRYPT_ChainQuality(alternate) > CRYPT_ChainQuality(chain))
|
|
{
|
|
alternate->context.cLowerQualityChainContext =
|
|
chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext;
|
|
alternate->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext =
|
|
chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext;
|
|
alternate->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i] =
|
|
(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)chain;
|
|
chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
|
|
chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
|
|
chain = alternate;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return chain;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(CertificateChain *chain,
|
|
const CertificateChain *alternate)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL ret;
|
|
|
|
if (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext)
|
|
chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext =
|
|
CryptMemRealloc(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext,
|
|
(chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext + 1) *
|
|
sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT));
|
|
else
|
|
chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext =
|
|
CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT));
|
|
if (chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext)
|
|
{
|
|
chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[
|
|
chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext++] =
|
|
(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)alternate;
|
|
ret = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
ret = FALSE;
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(
|
|
const CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT *chain, DWORD i)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD j, iElement;
|
|
PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = NULL;
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0, iElement = 0; !element && j < chain->cChain; j++)
|
|
{
|
|
if (iElement + chain->rgpChain[j]->cElement < i)
|
|
iElement += chain->rgpChain[j]->cElement;
|
|
else
|
|
element = chain->rgpChain[j]->rgpElement[i - iElement];
|
|
}
|
|
return element;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
typedef struct _CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS {
|
|
DWORD cbSize;
|
|
CERT_USAGE_MATCH RequestedUsage;
|
|
} CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS;
|
|
|
|
static void CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain,
|
|
LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
|
|
const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara, DWORD chainFlags)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD cContext;
|
|
|
|
if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_END_CERT)
|
|
cContext = 1;
|
|
else if ((chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN) ||
|
|
(chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT))
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0, cContext = 0; i < chain->cChain; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
if (i < chain->cChain - 1 ||
|
|
chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN)
|
|
cContext += chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement;
|
|
else
|
|
cContext += chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
cContext = 0;
|
|
if (cContext)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i, j, iContext, revocationFlags;
|
|
CERT_REVOCATION_PARA revocationPara = { sizeof(revocationPara), 0 };
|
|
CERT_REVOCATION_STATUS revocationStatus =
|
|
{ sizeof(revocationStatus), 0 };
|
|
BOOL ret;
|
|
|
|
revocationFlags = CERT_VERIFY_REV_CHAIN_FLAG;
|
|
if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY)
|
|
revocationFlags |= CERT_VERIFY_CACHE_ONLY_BASED_REVOCATION;
|
|
if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT)
|
|
revocationFlags |= CERT_VERIFY_REV_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT_FLAG;
|
|
revocationPara.pftTimeToUse = pTime;
|
|
if (hAdditionalStore)
|
|
{
|
|
revocationPara.cCertStore = 1;
|
|
revocationPara.rgCertStore = &hAdditionalStore;
|
|
revocationPara.hCrlStore = hAdditionalStore;
|
|
}
|
|
if (pChainPara->cbSize == sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA))
|
|
{
|
|
revocationPara.dwUrlRetrievalTimeout =
|
|
pChainPara->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
|
|
revocationPara.fCheckFreshnessTime =
|
|
pChainPara->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime;
|
|
revocationPara.dwFreshnessTime =
|
|
pChainPara->dwRevocationFreshnessTime;
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0, iContext = 0; iContext < cContext && i < chain->cChain; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
for (j = 0; iContext < cContext &&
|
|
j < chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement; j++, iContext++)
|
|
{
|
|
PCCERT_CONTEXT certToCheck =
|
|
chain->rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext;
|
|
|
|
if (j < chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1)
|
|
revocationPara.pIssuerCert =
|
|
chain->rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j + 1]->pCertContext;
|
|
else
|
|
revocationPara.pIssuerCert = NULL;
|
|
ret = CertVerifyRevocation(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
|
|
CERT_CONTEXT_REVOCATION_TYPE, 1, (void **)&certToCheck,
|
|
revocationFlags, &revocationPara, &revocationStatus);
|
|
|
|
if (!ret && chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN
|
|
&& revocationStatus.dwError == CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK && revocationPara.pIssuerCert == NULL)
|
|
ret = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
if (!ret)
|
|
{
|
|
PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(
|
|
chain, iContext);
|
|
DWORD error;
|
|
|
|
switch (revocationStatus.dwError)
|
|
{
|
|
case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK:
|
|
case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_DLL:
|
|
case CRYPT_E_NOT_IN_REVOCATION_DATABASE:
|
|
/* If the revocation status is unknown, it's assumed
|
|
* to be offline too.
|
|
*/
|
|
error = CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN |
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION;
|
|
break;
|
|
case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE:
|
|
error = CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION;
|
|
break;
|
|
case CRYPT_E_REVOKED:
|
|
error = CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
WARN("unmapped error %08x\n", revocationStatus.dwError);
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (element)
|
|
{
|
|
/* FIXME: set element's pRevocationInfo member */
|
|
element->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= error;
|
|
}
|
|
chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void CRYPT_CheckUsages(PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain,
|
|
const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara)
|
|
{
|
|
if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS) &&
|
|
pChainPara->RequestedUsage.Usage.cUsageIdentifier)
|
|
{
|
|
PCCERT_CONTEXT endCert;
|
|
PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
|
|
BOOL validForUsage;
|
|
|
|
/* A chain, if created, always includes the end certificate */
|
|
endCert = chain->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->pCertContext;
|
|
/* The extended key usage extension specifies how a certificate's
|
|
* public key may be used. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.12:
|
|
* "This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the
|
|
* certified public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the
|
|
* basic purposes indicated in the key usage extension."
|
|
* If the extension is present, it only satisfies the requested usage
|
|
* if that usage is included in the extension:
|
|
* "If the extension is present, then the certificate MUST only be used
|
|
* for one of the purposes indicated."
|
|
* There is also the special anyExtendedKeyUsage OID, but it doesn't
|
|
* have to be respected:
|
|
* "Applications that require the presence of a particular purpose
|
|
* MAY reject certificates that include the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID
|
|
* but not the particular OID expected for the application."
|
|
* For now, I'm being more conservative and ignoring the presence of
|
|
* the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE,
|
|
endCert->pCertInfo->cExtension, endCert->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
|
|
{
|
|
const CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *requestedUsage =
|
|
&pChainPara->RequestedUsage.Usage;
|
|
CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *usage;
|
|
DWORD size;
|
|
|
|
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
|
|
X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
|
|
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size))
|
|
{
|
|
if (pChainPara->RequestedUsage.dwType == USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i, j;
|
|
|
|
/* For AND matches, all usages must be present */
|
|
validForUsage = TRUE;
|
|
for (i = 0; validForUsage &&
|
|
i < requestedUsage->cUsageIdentifier; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL match = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; !match && j < usage->cUsageIdentifier; j++)
|
|
match = !strcmp(usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[j],
|
|
requestedUsage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
|
|
if (!match)
|
|
validForUsage = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i, j;
|
|
|
|
/* For OR matches, any matching usage suffices */
|
|
validForUsage = FALSE;
|
|
for (i = 0; !validForUsage &&
|
|
i < requestedUsage->cUsageIdentifier; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
for (j = 0; !validForUsage &&
|
|
j < usage->cUsageIdentifier; j++)
|
|
validForUsage =
|
|
!strcmp(usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[j],
|
|
requestedUsage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
LocalFree(usage);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
validForUsage = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* If the extension isn't present, any interpretation is valid:
|
|
* "Certificate using applications MAY require that the extended
|
|
* key usage extension be present and that a particular purpose
|
|
* be indicated in order for the certificate to be acceptable to
|
|
* that application."
|
|
* Not all web sites include the extended key usage extension, so
|
|
* accept chains without it.
|
|
*/
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("requested usage from certificate with no usages\n");
|
|
validForUsage = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!validForUsage)
|
|
{
|
|
chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
|
|
chain->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA) &&
|
|
pChainPara->RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.cUsageIdentifier)
|
|
FIXME("unimplemented for RequestedIssuancePolicy\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void dump_usage_match(LPCSTR name, const CERT_USAGE_MATCH *usageMatch)
|
|
{
|
|
if (usageMatch->Usage.cUsageIdentifier)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%s: %s\n", name,
|
|
usageMatch->dwType == USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND ? "AND" : "OR");
|
|
for (i = 0; i < usageMatch->Usage.cUsageIdentifier; i++)
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", usageMatch->Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void dump_chain_para(const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->cbSize);
|
|
if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS))
|
|
dump_usage_match("RequestedUsage", &pChainPara->RequestedUsage);
|
|
if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA))
|
|
{
|
|
dump_usage_match("RequestedIssuancePolicy",
|
|
&pChainPara->RequestedIssuancePolicy);
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout);
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime);
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->dwRevocationFreshnessTime);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BOOL WINAPI CertGetCertificateChain(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine,
|
|
PCCERT_CONTEXT pCertContext, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
|
|
PCERT_CHAIN_PARA pChainPara, DWORD dwFlags, LPVOID pvReserved,
|
|
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT* ppChainContext)
|
|
{
|
|
CertificateChainEngine *engine;
|
|
BOOL ret;
|
|
CertificateChain *chain = NULL;
|
|
|
|
TRACE("(%p, %p, %s, %p, %p, %08x, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine, pCertContext,
|
|
debugstr_filetime(pTime), hAdditionalStore, pChainPara, dwFlags,
|
|
pvReserved, ppChainContext);
|
|
|
|
engine = get_chain_engine(hChainEngine, TRUE);
|
|
if (!engine)
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
|
|
if (ppChainContext)
|
|
*ppChainContext = NULL;
|
|
if (!pChainPara)
|
|
{
|
|
SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!pCertContext->pCertInfo->SignatureAlgorithm.pszObjId)
|
|
{
|
|
SetLastError(ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (TRACE_ON(chain))
|
|
dump_chain_para(pChainPara);
|
|
/* FIXME: what about HCCE_LOCAL_MACHINE? */
|
|
ret = CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(engine, pCertContext, pTime,
|
|
hAdditionalStore, dwFlags, &chain);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
{
|
|
CertificateChain *alternate = NULL;
|
|
PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChain;
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
alternate = CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(engine,
|
|
pTime, hAdditionalStore, dwFlags, chain);
|
|
|
|
/* Alternate contexts are added as "lower quality" contexts of
|
|
* chain, to avoid loops in alternate chain creation.
|
|
* The highest-quality chain is chosen at the end.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (alternate)
|
|
ret = CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(chain, alternate);
|
|
} while (ret && alternate);
|
|
chain = CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(chain);
|
|
if (!(dwFlags & CERT_CHAIN_RETURN_LOWER_QUALITY_CONTEXTS))
|
|
CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain);
|
|
pChain = (PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)chain;
|
|
CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(pChain, pTime, hAdditionalStore,
|
|
pChainPara, dwFlags);
|
|
CRYPT_CheckUsages(pChain, pChainPara);
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("error status: %08x\n",
|
|
pChain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus);
|
|
if (ppChainContext)
|
|
*ppChainContext = pChain;
|
|
else
|
|
CertFreeCertificateChain(pChain);
|
|
}
|
|
TRACE("returning %d\n", ret);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT WINAPI CertDuplicateCertificateChain(
|
|
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext)
|
|
{
|
|
CertificateChain *chain = (CertificateChain*)pChainContext;
|
|
|
|
TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext);
|
|
|
|
if (chain)
|
|
InterlockedIncrement(&chain->ref);
|
|
return pChainContext;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
VOID WINAPI CertFreeCertificateChain(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext)
|
|
{
|
|
CertificateChain *chain = (CertificateChain*)pChainContext;
|
|
|
|
TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext);
|
|
|
|
if (chain)
|
|
{
|
|
if (InterlockedDecrement(&chain->ref) == 0)
|
|
CRYPT_FreeChainContext(chain);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT WINAPI CertFindChainInStore(HCERTSTORE store,
|
|
DWORD certEncodingType, DWORD findFlags, DWORD findType,
|
|
const void *findPara, PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT prevChainContext)
|
|
{
|
|
FIXME("(%p, %08x, %08x, %d, %p, %p): stub\n", store, certEncodingType,
|
|
findFlags, findType, findPara, prevChainContext);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void find_element_with_error(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain, DWORD error,
|
|
LONG *iChain, LONG *iElement)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i, j;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < chain->cChain; i++)
|
|
for (j = 0; j < chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement; j++)
|
|
if (chain->rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
|
|
error)
|
|
{
|
|
*iChain = i;
|
|
*iElement = j;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL WINAPI verify_base_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
|
|
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
|
|
PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD checks = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (pPolicyPara)
|
|
checks = pPolicyPara->dwFlags;
|
|
pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
|
|
pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR;
|
|
if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID)
|
|
{
|
|
pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE;
|
|
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
|
|
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC)
|
|
{
|
|
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CHAINING;
|
|
find_element_with_error(pChainContext, CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC,
|
|
&pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex, &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
|
|
/* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
|
|
pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError &&
|
|
pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT &&
|
|
!(checks & CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_ALLOW_UNKNOWN_CA_FLAG))
|
|
{
|
|
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT;
|
|
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
|
|
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError &&
|
|
pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID)
|
|
{
|
|
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_EXPIRED;
|
|
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
|
|
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError &&
|
|
pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE &&
|
|
!(checks & CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_WRONG_USAGE_FLAG))
|
|
{
|
|
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_WRONG_USAGE;
|
|
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
|
|
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError &&
|
|
pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
|
|
CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT &&
|
|
!(checks & CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT_FLAG))
|
|
{
|
|
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CRITICAL;
|
|
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
|
|
CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
|
|
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
|
|
}
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BYTE msTestPubKey1[] = {
|
|
0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x81,0x55,0x22,0xb9,0x8a,0xa4,0x6f,0xed,0xd6,0xe7,0xd9,
|
|
0x66,0x0f,0x55,0xbc,0xd7,0xcd,0xd5,0xbc,0x4e,0x40,0x02,0x21,0xa2,0xb1,0xf7,
|
|
0x87,0x30,0x85,0x5e,0xd2,0xf2,0x44,0xb9,0xdc,0x9b,0x75,0xb6,0xfb,0x46,0x5f,
|
|
0x42,0xb6,0x9d,0x23,0x36,0x0b,0xde,0x54,0x0f,0xcd,0xbd,0x1f,0x99,0x2a,0x10,
|
|
0x58,0x11,0xcb,0x40,0xcb,0xb5,0xa7,0x41,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
|
|
static BYTE msTestPubKey2[] = {
|
|
0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x9c,0x50,0x05,0x1d,0xe2,0x0e,0x4c,0x53,0xd8,0xd9,0xb5,
|
|
0xe5,0xfd,0xe9,0xe3,0xad,0x83,0x4b,0x80,0x08,0xd9,0xdc,0xe8,0xe8,0x35,0xf8,
|
|
0x11,0xf1,0xe9,0x9b,0x03,0x7a,0x65,0x64,0x76,0x35,0xce,0x38,0x2c,0xf2,0xb6,
|
|
0x71,0x9e,0x06,0xd9,0xbf,0xbb,0x31,0x69,0xa3,0xf6,0x30,0xa0,0x78,0x7b,0x18,
|
|
0xdd,0x50,0x4d,0x79,0x1e,0xeb,0x61,0xc1,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
|
|
|
|
static void dump_authenticode_extra_chain_policy_para(
|
|
AUTHENTICODE_EXTRA_CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA *extraPara)
|
|
{
|
|
if (extraPara)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("cbSize = %d\n", extraPara->cbSize);
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("dwRegPolicySettings = %08x\n",
|
|
extraPara->dwRegPolicySettings);
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("pSignerInfo = %p\n", extraPara->pSignerInfo);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL WINAPI verify_authenticode_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
|
|
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
|
|
PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL ret = verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara,
|
|
pPolicyStatus);
|
|
AUTHENTICODE_EXTRA_CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA *extraPara = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (pPolicyPara)
|
|
extraPara = pPolicyPara->pvExtraPolicyPara;
|
|
if (TRACE_ON(chain))
|
|
dump_authenticode_extra_chain_policy_para(extraPara);
|
|
if (ret && pPolicyStatus->dwError == CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey = { { 0 } };
|
|
BOOL isMSTestRoot = FALSE;
|
|
PCCERT_CONTEXT failingCert =
|
|
pChainContext->rgpChain[pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex]->
|
|
rgpElement[pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex]->pCertContext;
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs[] = {
|
|
{ sizeof(msTestPubKey1), msTestPubKey1 },
|
|
{ sizeof(msTestPubKey2), msTestPubKey2 },
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* Check whether the root is an MS test root */
|
|
for (i = 0; !isMSTestRoot && i < ARRAY_SIZE(keyBlobs); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
msPubKey.PublicKey.cbData = keyBlobs[i].cbData;
|
|
msPubKey.PublicKey.pbData = keyBlobs[i].pbData;
|
|
if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
|
|
X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING,
|
|
&failingCert->pCertInfo->SubjectPublicKeyInfo, &msPubKey))
|
|
isMSTestRoot = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (isMSTestRoot)
|
|
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDTESTROOT;
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL WINAPI verify_basic_constraints_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
|
|
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
|
|
PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
|
|
{
|
|
pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
|
|
if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
|
|
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS)
|
|
{
|
|
pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
|
|
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
|
|
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
|
|
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR;
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext,
|
|
LPCWSTR server_name)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL matches = FALSE;
|
|
CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *subjectName;
|
|
DWORD size;
|
|
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name));
|
|
/* This could be spoofed by the embedded NULL vulnerability, since the
|
|
* returned CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO doesn't have a way to indicate the
|
|
* encoded length of a name. Fortunately CryptDecodeObjectEx fails if
|
|
* the encoded form of the name contains a NULL.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME,
|
|
ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
|
|
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
|
|
&subjectName, &size))
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 5280 states that multiple instances of each name type may exist,
|
|
* in section 4.2.1.6:
|
|
* "Multiple name forms, and multiple instances of each name form,
|
|
* MAY be included."
|
|
* It doesn't specify the behavior in such cases, but both RFC 2818
|
|
* and RFC 2595 explicitly accept a certificate if any name matches.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; !matches && i < subjectName->cAltEntry; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
if (subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice ==
|
|
CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("dNSName: %s\n", debugstr_w(
|
|
subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName));
|
|
if (subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName[0] == '*')
|
|
{
|
|
LPCWSTR server_name_dot;
|
|
|
|
/* Matching a wildcard: a wildcard matches a single name
|
|
* component, which is terminated by a dot. RFC 1034
|
|
* doesn't define whether multiple wildcards are allowed,
|
|
* but I will assume that they are not until proven
|
|
* otherwise. RFC 1034 also states that 'the "*" label
|
|
* always matches at least one whole label and sometimes
|
|
* more, but always whole labels.' Native crypt32 does not
|
|
* match more than one label with a wildcard, so I do the
|
|
* same here. Thus, a wildcard only accepts the first
|
|
* label, then requires an exact match of the remaining
|
|
* string.
|
|
*/
|
|
server_name_dot = strchrW(server_name, '.');
|
|
if (server_name_dot)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!strcmpiW(server_name_dot,
|
|
subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName + 1))
|
|
matches = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (!strcmpiW(server_name,
|
|
subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName))
|
|
matches = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
LocalFree(subjectName);
|
|
}
|
|
return matches;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL find_matching_domain_component(const CERT_NAME_INFO *name,
|
|
LPCWSTR component)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL matches = FALSE;
|
|
DWORD i, j;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; !matches && i < name->cRDN; i++)
|
|
for (j = 0; j < name->rgRDN[i].cRDNAttr; j++)
|
|
if (!strcmp(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT,
|
|
name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j].pszObjId))
|
|
{
|
|
const CERT_RDN_ATTR *attr;
|
|
|
|
attr = &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j];
|
|
/* Compare with memicmpW rather than strcmpiW in order to avoid
|
|
* a match with a string with an embedded NULL. The component
|
|
* must match one domain component attribute's entire string
|
|
* value with a case-insensitive match.
|
|
*/
|
|
matches = !memicmpW(component, (LPCWSTR)attr->Value.pbData,
|
|
attr->Value.cbData / sizeof(WCHAR));
|
|
}
|
|
return matches;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL match_domain_component(LPCWSTR allowed_component, DWORD allowed_len,
|
|
LPCWSTR server_component, DWORD server_len, BOOL allow_wildcards,
|
|
BOOL *see_wildcard)
|
|
{
|
|
LPCWSTR allowed_ptr, server_ptr;
|
|
BOOL matches = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
*see_wildcard = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
if (server_len < allowed_len)
|
|
{
|
|
WARN_(chain)("domain component %s too short for %s\n",
|
|
debugstr_wn(server_component, server_len),
|
|
debugstr_wn(allowed_component, allowed_len));
|
|
/* A domain component can't contain a wildcard character, so a domain
|
|
* component shorter than the allowed string can't produce a match.
|
|
*/
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
for (allowed_ptr = allowed_component, server_ptr = server_component;
|
|
matches && allowed_ptr - allowed_component < allowed_len;
|
|
allowed_ptr++, server_ptr++)
|
|
{
|
|
if (*allowed_ptr == '*')
|
|
{
|
|
if (allowed_ptr - allowed_component < allowed_len - 1)
|
|
{
|
|
WARN_(chain)("non-wildcard characters after wildcard not supported\n");
|
|
matches = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (!allow_wildcards)
|
|
{
|
|
WARN_(chain)("wildcard after non-wildcard component\n");
|
|
matches = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* the preceding characters must have matched, so the rest of
|
|
* the component also matches.
|
|
*/
|
|
*see_wildcard = TRUE;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (matches)
|
|
matches = tolowerW(*allowed_ptr) == tolowerW(*server_ptr);
|
|
}
|
|
if (matches && server_ptr - server_component < server_len)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If there are unmatched characters in the server domain component,
|
|
* the server domain only matches if the allowed string ended in a '*'.
|
|
*/
|
|
matches = *allowed_ptr == '*';
|
|
}
|
|
return matches;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL match_common_name(LPCWSTR server_name, const CERT_RDN_ATTR *nameAttr)
|
|
{
|
|
LPCWSTR allowed = (LPCWSTR)nameAttr->Value.pbData;
|
|
LPCWSTR allowed_component = allowed;
|
|
DWORD allowed_len = nameAttr->Value.cbData / sizeof(WCHAR);
|
|
LPCWSTR server_component = server_name;
|
|
DWORD server_len = strlenW(server_name);
|
|
BOOL matches = TRUE, allow_wildcards = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("CN = %s\n", debugstr_wn(allowed_component, allowed_len));
|
|
|
|
/* Remove trailing NULLs from the allowed name; while they shouldn't appear
|
|
* in a certificate in the first place, they sometimes do, and they should
|
|
* be ignored.
|
|
*/
|
|
while (allowed_len && allowed_component[allowed_len - 1] == 0)
|
|
allowed_len--;
|
|
|
|
/* From RFC 2818 (HTTP over TLS), section 3.1:
|
|
* "Names may contain the wildcard character * which is considered to match
|
|
* any single domain name component or component fragment. E.g.,
|
|
* *.a.com matches foo.a.com but not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com
|
|
* but not bar.com."
|
|
*
|
|
* And from RFC 2595 (Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP), section 2.4:
|
|
* "A "*" wildcard character MAY be used as the left-most name component in
|
|
* the certificate. For example, *.example.com would match a.example.com,
|
|
* foo.example.com, etc. but would not match example.com."
|
|
*
|
|
* There are other protocols which use TLS, and none of them is
|
|
* authoritative. This accepts certificates in common usage, e.g.
|
|
* *.domain.com matches www.domain.com but not domain.com, and
|
|
* www*.domain.com matches www1.domain.com but not mail.domain.com.
|
|
*/
|
|
do {
|
|
LPCWSTR allowed_dot, server_dot;
|
|
|
|
allowed_dot = memchrW(allowed_component, '.',
|
|
allowed_len - (allowed_component - allowed));
|
|
server_dot = memchrW(server_component, '.',
|
|
server_len - (server_component - server_name));
|
|
/* The number of components must match */
|
|
if ((!allowed_dot && server_dot) || (allowed_dot && !server_dot))
|
|
{
|
|
if (!allowed_dot)
|
|
WARN_(chain)("%s: too many components for CN=%s\n",
|
|
debugstr_w(server_name), debugstr_wn(allowed, allowed_len));
|
|
else
|
|
WARN_(chain)("%s: not enough components for CN=%s\n",
|
|
debugstr_w(server_name), debugstr_wn(allowed, allowed_len));
|
|
matches = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
LPCWSTR allowed_end, server_end;
|
|
BOOL has_wildcard;
|
|
|
|
allowed_end = allowed_dot ? allowed_dot : allowed + allowed_len;
|
|
server_end = server_dot ? server_dot : server_name + server_len;
|
|
matches = match_domain_component(allowed_component,
|
|
allowed_end - allowed_component, server_component,
|
|
server_end - server_component, allow_wildcards, &has_wildcard);
|
|
/* Once a non-wildcard component is seen, no wildcard components
|
|
* may follow
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!has_wildcard)
|
|
allow_wildcards = FALSE;
|
|
if (matches)
|
|
{
|
|
allowed_component = allowed_dot ? allowed_dot + 1 : allowed_end;
|
|
server_component = server_dot ? server_dot + 1 : server_end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} while (matches && allowed_component &&
|
|
allowed_component - allowed < allowed_len &&
|
|
server_component && server_component - server_name < server_len);
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("returning %d\n", matches);
|
|
return matches;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL match_dns_to_subject_dn(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPCWSTR server_name)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL matches = FALSE;
|
|
CERT_NAME_INFO *name;
|
|
DWORD size;
|
|
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name));
|
|
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_UNICODE_NAME,
|
|
cert->pCertInfo->Subject.pbData, cert->pCertInfo->Subject.cbData,
|
|
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
|
|
&name, &size))
|
|
{
|
|
/* If the subject distinguished name contains any name components,
|
|
* make sure all of them are present.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (CertFindRDNAttr(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, name))
|
|
{
|
|
LPCWSTR ptr = server_name;
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
LPCWSTR dot = strchrW(ptr, '.'), end;
|
|
/* 254 is the maximum DNS label length, see RFC 1035 */
|
|
WCHAR component[255];
|
|
DWORD len;
|
|
|
|
end = dot ? dot : ptr + strlenW(ptr);
|
|
len = end - ptr;
|
|
if (len >= ARRAY_SIZE(component))
|
|
{
|
|
WARN_(chain)("domain component %s too long\n",
|
|
debugstr_wn(ptr, len));
|
|
matches = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy(component, ptr, len * sizeof(WCHAR));
|
|
component[len] = 0;
|
|
matches = find_matching_domain_component(name, component);
|
|
}
|
|
ptr = dot ? dot + 1 : end;
|
|
} while (matches && ptr && *ptr);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD i, j;
|
|
|
|
/* If the certificate isn't using a DN attribute in the name, make
|
|
* make sure at least one common name matches. From RFC 2818,
|
|
* section 3.1:
|
|
* "If more than one identity of a given type is present in the
|
|
* certificate (e.g., more than one dNSName name, a match in any
|
|
* one of the set is considered acceptable.)"
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; !matches && i < name->cRDN; i++)
|
|
for (j = 0; !matches && j < name->rgRDN[i].cRDNAttr; j++)
|
|
{
|
|
PCERT_RDN_ATTR attr = &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j];
|
|
|
|
if (attr->pszObjId && !strcmp(szOID_COMMON_NAME,
|
|
attr->pszObjId))
|
|
matches = match_common_name(server_name, attr);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
LocalFree(name);
|
|
}
|
|
return matches;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void dump_ssl_extra_chain_policy_para(HTTPSPolicyCallbackData *sslPara)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sslPara)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("cbSize = %d\n", sslPara->u.cbSize);
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("dwAuthType = %d\n", sslPara->dwAuthType);
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("fdwChecks = %08x\n", sslPara->fdwChecks);
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("pwszServerName = %s\n",
|
|
debugstr_w(sslPara->pwszServerName));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BOOL WINAPI verify_ssl_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
|
|
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
|
|
PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
|
|
{
|
|
HTTPSPolicyCallbackData *sslPara = NULL;
|
|
DWORD checks = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (pPolicyPara)
|
|
sslPara = pPolicyPara->pvExtraPolicyPara;
|
|
if (TRACE_ON(chain))
|
|
dump_ssl_extra_chain_policy_para(sslPara);
|
|
if (sslPara && sslPara->u.cbSize >= sizeof(HTTPSPolicyCallbackData))
|
|
checks = sslPara->fdwChecks;
|
|
pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
|
|
if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID)
|
|
{
|
|
pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE;
|
|
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
|
|
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT &&
|
|
!(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_UNKNOWN_CA))
|
|
{
|
|
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT;
|
|
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
|
|
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC)
|
|
{
|
|
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT;
|
|
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
|
|
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
|
|
/* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
|
|
pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID &&
|
|
!(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_CERT_DATE_INVALID))
|
|
{
|
|
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_EXPIRED;
|
|
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
|
|
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE &&
|
|
!(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_WRONG_USAGE))
|
|
{
|
|
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_WRONG_USAGE;
|
|
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
|
|
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED && !(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_REVOCATION))
|
|
{
|
|
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_REVOKED;
|
|
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
|
|
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION &&
|
|
!(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_REVOCATION))
|
|
{
|
|
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_REVOCATION_FAILURE;
|
|
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
|
|
CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
|
|
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
|
|
CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT)
|
|
{
|
|
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CRITICAL;
|
|
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
|
|
CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
|
|
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR;
|
|
/* We only need bother checking whether the name in the end certificate
|
|
* matches if the chain is otherwise okay.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError && pPolicyPara &&
|
|
pPolicyPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA))
|
|
{
|
|
if (sslPara && sslPara->u.cbSize >= sizeof(HTTPSPolicyCallbackData))
|
|
{
|
|
if (sslPara->dwAuthType == AUTHTYPE_SERVER &&
|
|
sslPara->pwszServerName &&
|
|
!(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_CERT_CN_INVALID))
|
|
{
|
|
PCCERT_CONTEXT cert;
|
|
PCERT_EXTENSION altNameExt;
|
|
BOOL matches;
|
|
|
|
cert = pChainContext->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->pCertContext;
|
|
altNameExt = get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert->pCertInfo);
|
|
/* If the alternate name extension exists, the name it contains
|
|
* is bound to the certificate, so make sure the name matches
|
|
* it. Otherwise, look for the server name in the subject
|
|
* distinguished name. RFC5280, section 4.2.1.6:
|
|
* "Whenever such identities are to be bound into a
|
|
* certificate, the subject alternative name (or issuer
|
|
* alternative name) extension MUST be used; however, a DNS
|
|
* name MAY also be represented in the subject field using the
|
|
* domainComponent attribute."
|
|
*/
|
|
if (altNameExt)
|
|
matches = match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(altNameExt,
|
|
sslPara->pwszServerName);
|
|
else
|
|
matches = match_dns_to_subject_dn(cert,
|
|
sslPara->pwszServerName);
|
|
if (!matches)
|
|
{
|
|
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH;
|
|
pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = 0;
|
|
pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static BYTE msPubKey1[] = {
|
|
0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xdf,0x08,0xba,0xe3,0x3f,0x6e,
|
|
0x64,0x9b,0xf5,0x89,0xaf,0x28,0x96,0x4a,0x07,0x8f,0x1b,0x2e,0x8b,0x3e,0x1d,
|
|
0xfc,0xb8,0x80,0x69,0xa3,0xa1,0xce,0xdb,0xdf,0xb0,0x8e,0x6c,0x89,0x76,0x29,
|
|
0x4f,0xca,0x60,0x35,0x39,0xad,0x72,0x32,0xe0,0x0b,0xae,0x29,0x3d,0x4c,0x16,
|
|
0xd9,0x4b,0x3c,0x9d,0xda,0xc5,0xd3,0xd1,0x09,0xc9,0x2c,0x6f,0xa6,0xc2,0x60,
|
|
0x53,0x45,0xdd,0x4b,0xd1,0x55,0xcd,0x03,0x1c,0xd2,0x59,0x56,0x24,0xf3,0xe5,
|
|
0x78,0xd8,0x07,0xcc,0xd8,0xb3,0x1f,0x90,0x3f,0xc0,0x1a,0x71,0x50,0x1d,0x2d,
|
|
0xa7,0x12,0x08,0x6d,0x7c,0xb0,0x86,0x6c,0xc7,0xba,0x85,0x32,0x07,0xe1,0x61,
|
|
0x6f,0xaf,0x03,0xc5,0x6d,0xe5,0xd6,0xa1,0x8f,0x36,0xf6,0xc1,0x0b,0xd1,0x3e,
|
|
0x69,0x97,0x48,0x72,0xc9,0x7f,0xa4,0xc8,0xc2,0x4a,0x4c,0x7e,0xa1,0xd1,0x94,
|
|
0xa6,0xd7,0xdc,0xeb,0x05,0x46,0x2e,0xb8,0x18,0xb4,0x57,0x1d,0x86,0x49,0xdb,
|
|
0x69,0x4a,0x2c,0x21,0xf5,0x5e,0x0f,0x54,0x2d,0x5a,0x43,0xa9,0x7a,0x7e,0x6a,
|
|
0x8e,0x50,0x4d,0x25,0x57,0xa1,0xbf,0x1b,0x15,0x05,0x43,0x7b,0x2c,0x05,0x8d,
|
|
0xbd,0x3d,0x03,0x8c,0x93,0x22,0x7d,0x63,0xea,0x0a,0x57,0x05,0x06,0x0a,0xdb,
|
|
0x61,0x98,0x65,0x2d,0x47,0x49,0xa8,0xe7,0xe6,0x56,0x75,0x5c,0xb8,0x64,0x08,
|
|
0x63,0xa9,0x30,0x40,0x66,0xb2,0xf9,0xb6,0xe3,0x34,0xe8,0x67,0x30,0xe1,0x43,
|
|
0x0b,0x87,0xff,0xc9,0xbe,0x72,0x10,0x5e,0x23,0xf0,0x9b,0xa7,0x48,0x65,0xbf,
|
|
0x09,0x88,0x7b,0xcd,0x72,0xbc,0x2e,0x79,0x9b,0x7b,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
|
|
static BYTE msPubKey2[] = {
|
|
0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xa9,0x02,0xbd,0xc1,0x70,0xe6,
|
|
0x3b,0xf2,0x4e,0x1b,0x28,0x9f,0x97,0x78,0x5e,0x30,0xea,0xa2,0xa9,0x8d,0x25,
|
|
0x5f,0xf8,0xfe,0x95,0x4c,0xa3,0xb7,0xfe,0x9d,0xa2,0x20,0x3e,0x7c,0x51,0xa2,
|
|
0x9b,0xa2,0x8f,0x60,0x32,0x6b,0xd1,0x42,0x64,0x79,0xee,0xac,0x76,0xc9,0x54,
|
|
0xda,0xf2,0xeb,0x9c,0x86,0x1c,0x8f,0x9f,0x84,0x66,0xb3,0xc5,0x6b,0x7a,0x62,
|
|
0x23,0xd6,0x1d,0x3c,0xde,0x0f,0x01,0x92,0xe8,0x96,0xc4,0xbf,0x2d,0x66,0x9a,
|
|
0x9a,0x68,0x26,0x99,0xd0,0x3a,0x2c,0xbf,0x0c,0xb5,0x58,0x26,0xc1,0x46,0xe7,
|
|
0x0a,0x3e,0x38,0x96,0x2c,0xa9,0x28,0x39,0xa8,0xec,0x49,0x83,0x42,0xe3,0x84,
|
|
0x0f,0xbb,0x9a,0x6c,0x55,0x61,0xac,0x82,0x7c,0xa1,0x60,0x2d,0x77,0x4c,0xe9,
|
|
0x99,0xb4,0x64,0x3b,0x9a,0x50,0x1c,0x31,0x08,0x24,0x14,0x9f,0xa9,0xe7,0x91,
|
|
0x2b,0x18,0xe6,0x3d,0x98,0x63,0x14,0x60,0x58,0x05,0x65,0x9f,0x1d,0x37,0x52,
|
|
0x87,0xf7,0xa7,0xef,0x94,0x02,0xc6,0x1b,0xd3,0xbf,0x55,0x45,0xb3,0x89,0x80,
|
|
0xbf,0x3a,0xec,0x54,0x94,0x4e,0xae,0xfd,0xa7,0x7a,0x6d,0x74,0x4e,0xaf,0x18,
|
|
0xcc,0x96,0x09,0x28,0x21,0x00,0x57,0x90,0x60,0x69,0x37,0xbb,0x4b,0x12,0x07,
|
|
0x3c,0x56,0xff,0x5b,0xfb,0xa4,0x66,0x0a,0x08,0xa6,0xd2,0x81,0x56,0x57,0xef,
|
|
0xb6,0x3b,0x5e,0x16,0x81,0x77,0x04,0xda,0xf6,0xbe,0xae,0x80,0x95,0xfe,0xb0,
|
|
0xcd,0x7f,0xd6,0xa7,0x1a,0x72,0x5c,0x3c,0xca,0xbc,0xf0,0x08,0xa3,0x22,0x30,
|
|
0xb3,0x06,0x85,0xc9,0xb3,0x20,0x77,0x13,0x85,0xdf,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
|
|
static BYTE msPubKey3[] = {
|
|
0x30,0x82,0x02,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x02,0x01,0x00,0xf3,0x5d,0xfa,0x80,0x67,0xd4,
|
|
0x5a,0xa7,0xa9,0x0c,0x2c,0x90,0x20,0xd0,0x35,0x08,0x3c,0x75,0x84,0xcd,0xb7,
|
|
0x07,0x89,0x9c,0x89,0xda,0xde,0xce,0xc3,0x60,0xfa,0x91,0x68,0x5a,0x9e,0x94,
|
|
0x71,0x29,0x18,0x76,0x7c,0xc2,0xe0,0xc8,0x25,0x76,0x94,0x0e,0x58,0xfa,0x04,
|
|
0x34,0x36,0xe6,0xdf,0xaf,0xf7,0x80,0xba,0xe9,0x58,0x0b,0x2b,0x93,0xe5,0x9d,
|
|
0x05,0xe3,0x77,0x22,0x91,0xf7,0x34,0x64,0x3c,0x22,0x91,0x1d,0x5e,0xe1,0x09,
|
|
0x90,0xbc,0x14,0xfe,0xfc,0x75,0x58,0x19,0xe1,0x79,0xb7,0x07,0x92,0xa3,0xae,
|
|
0x88,0x59,0x08,0xd8,0x9f,0x07,0xca,0x03,0x58,0xfc,0x68,0x29,0x6d,0x32,0xd7,
|
|
0xd2,0xa8,0xcb,0x4b,0xfc,0xe1,0x0b,0x48,0x32,0x4f,0xe6,0xeb,0xb8,0xad,0x4f,
|
|
0xe4,0x5c,0x6f,0x13,0x94,0x99,0xdb,0x95,0xd5,0x75,0xdb,0xa8,0x1a,0xb7,0x94,
|
|
0x91,0xb4,0x77,0x5b,0xf5,0x48,0x0c,0x8f,0x6a,0x79,0x7d,0x14,0x70,0x04,0x7d,
|
|
0x6d,0xaf,0x90,0xf5,0xda,0x70,0xd8,0x47,0xb7,0xbf,0x9b,0x2f,0x6c,0xe7,0x05,
|
|
0xb7,0xe1,0x11,0x60,0xac,0x79,0x91,0x14,0x7c,0xc5,0xd6,0xa6,0xe4,0xe1,0x7e,
|
|
0xd5,0xc3,0x7e,0xe5,0x92,0xd2,0x3c,0x00,0xb5,0x36,0x82,0xde,0x79,0xe1,0x6d,
|
|
0xf3,0xb5,0x6e,0xf8,0x9f,0x33,0xc9,0xcb,0x52,0x7d,0x73,0x98,0x36,0xdb,0x8b,
|
|
0xa1,0x6b,0xa2,0x95,0x97,0x9b,0xa3,0xde,0xc2,0x4d,0x26,0xff,0x06,0x96,0x67,
|
|
0x25,0x06,0xc8,0xe7,0xac,0xe4,0xee,0x12,0x33,0x95,0x31,0x99,0xc8,0x35,0x08,
|
|
0x4e,0x34,0xca,0x79,0x53,0xd5,0xb5,0xbe,0x63,0x32,0x59,0x40,0x36,0xc0,0xa5,
|
|
0x4e,0x04,0x4d,0x3d,0xdb,0x5b,0x07,0x33,0xe4,0x58,0xbf,0xef,0x3f,0x53,0x64,
|
|
0xd8,0x42,0x59,0x35,0x57,0xfd,0x0f,0x45,0x7c,0x24,0x04,0x4d,0x9e,0xd6,0x38,
|
|
0x74,0x11,0x97,0x22,0x90,0xce,0x68,0x44,0x74,0x92,0x6f,0xd5,0x4b,0x6f,0xb0,
|
|
0x86,0xe3,0xc7,0x36,0x42,0xa0,0xd0,0xfc,0xc1,0xc0,0x5a,0xf9,0xa3,0x61,0xb9,
|
|
0x30,0x47,0x71,0x96,0x0a,0x16,0xb0,0x91,0xc0,0x42,0x95,0xef,0x10,0x7f,0x28,
|
|
0x6a,0xe3,0x2a,0x1f,0xb1,0xe4,0xcd,0x03,0x3f,0x77,0x71,0x04,0xc7,0x20,0xfc,
|
|
0x49,0x0f,0x1d,0x45,0x88,0xa4,0xd7,0xcb,0x7e,0x88,0xad,0x8e,0x2d,0xec,0x45,
|
|
0xdb,0xc4,0x51,0x04,0xc9,0x2a,0xfc,0xec,0x86,0x9e,0x9a,0x11,0x97,0x5b,0xde,
|
|
0xce,0x53,0x88,0xe6,0xe2,0xb7,0xfd,0xac,0x95,0xc2,0x28,0x40,0xdb,0xef,0x04,
|
|
0x90,0xdf,0x81,0x33,0x39,0xd9,0xb2,0x45,0xa5,0x23,0x87,0x06,0xa5,0x55,0x89,
|
|
0x31,0xbb,0x06,0x2d,0x60,0x0e,0x41,0x18,0x7d,0x1f,0x2e,0xb5,0x97,0xcb,0x11,
|
|
0xeb,0x15,0xd5,0x24,0xa5,0x94,0xef,0x15,0x14,0x89,0xfd,0x4b,0x73,0xfa,0x32,
|
|
0x5b,0xfc,0xd1,0x33,0x00,0xf9,0x59,0x62,0x70,0x07,0x32,0xea,0x2e,0xab,0x40,
|
|
0x2d,0x7b,0xca,0xdd,0x21,0x67,0x1b,0x30,0x99,0x8f,0x16,0xaa,0x23,0xa8,0x41,
|
|
0xd1,0xb0,0x6e,0x11,0x9b,0x36,0xc4,0xde,0x40,0x74,0x9c,0xe1,0x58,0x65,0xc1,
|
|
0x60,0x1e,0x7a,0x5b,0x38,0xc8,0x8f,0xbb,0x04,0x26,0x7c,0xd4,0x16,0x40,0xe5,
|
|
0xb6,0x6b,0x6c,0xaa,0x86,0xfd,0x00,0xbf,0xce,0xc1,0x35,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,
|
|
0x01 };
|
|
|
|
static BOOL WINAPI verify_ms_root_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
|
|
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
|
|
PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL ret = verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara,
|
|
pPolicyStatus);
|
|
|
|
if (ret && !pPolicyStatus->dwError)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey = { { 0 } };
|
|
BOOL isMSRoot = FALSE;
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs[] = {
|
|
{ sizeof(msPubKey1), msPubKey1 },
|
|
{ sizeof(msPubKey2), msPubKey2 },
|
|
{ sizeof(msPubKey3), msPubKey3 },
|
|
};
|
|
PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN rootChain =
|
|
pChainContext->rgpChain[pChainContext->cChain -1 ];
|
|
PCCERT_CONTEXT root =
|
|
rootChain->rgpElement[rootChain->cElement - 1]->pCertContext;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; !isMSRoot && i < ARRAY_SIZE(keyBlobs); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
msPubKey.PublicKey.cbData = keyBlobs[i].cbData;
|
|
msPubKey.PublicKey.pbData = keyBlobs[i].pbData;
|
|
if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
|
|
X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING,
|
|
&root->pCertInfo->SubjectPublicKeyInfo, &msPubKey))
|
|
isMSRoot = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (isMSRoot)
|
|
pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
typedef BOOL (WINAPI *CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc)(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
|
|
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
|
|
PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus);
|
|
|
|
static void dump_policy_para(PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA para)
|
|
{
|
|
if (para)
|
|
{
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("cbSize = %d\n", para->cbSize);
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("dwFlags = %08x\n", para->dwFlags);
|
|
TRACE_(chain)("pvExtraPolicyPara = %p\n", para->pvExtraPolicyPara);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BOOL WINAPI CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
|
|
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
|
|
PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
|
|
{
|
|
static HCRYPTOIDFUNCSET set = NULL;
|
|
BOOL ret = FALSE;
|
|
CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc verifyPolicy = NULL;
|
|
HCRYPTOIDFUNCADDR hFunc = NULL;
|
|
|
|
TRACE("(%s, %p, %p, %p)\n", debugstr_a(szPolicyOID), pChainContext,
|
|
pPolicyPara, pPolicyStatus);
|
|
if (TRACE_ON(chain))
|
|
dump_policy_para(pPolicyPara);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_INTOID(szPolicyOID))
|
|
{
|
|
switch (LOWORD(szPolicyOID))
|
|
{
|
|
case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASE):
|
|
verifyPolicy = verify_base_policy;
|
|
break;
|
|
case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_AUTHENTICODE):
|
|
verifyPolicy = verify_authenticode_policy;
|
|
break;
|
|
case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL):
|
|
verifyPolicy = verify_ssl_policy;
|
|
break;
|
|
case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS):
|
|
verifyPolicy = verify_basic_constraints_policy;
|
|
break;
|
|
case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_MICROSOFT_ROOT):
|
|
verifyPolicy = verify_ms_root_policy;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
FIXME("unimplemented for %d\n", LOWORD(szPolicyOID));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!verifyPolicy)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!set)
|
|
set = CryptInitOIDFunctionSet(
|
|
CRYPT_OID_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_POLICY_FUNC, 0);
|
|
CryptGetOIDFunctionAddress(set, X509_ASN_ENCODING, szPolicyOID, 0,
|
|
(void **)&verifyPolicy, &hFunc);
|
|
}
|
|
if (verifyPolicy)
|
|
ret = verifyPolicy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara,
|
|
pPolicyStatus);
|
|
if (hFunc)
|
|
CryptFreeOIDFunctionAddress(hFunc, 0);
|
|
TRACE("returning %d (%08x)\n", ret, pPolicyStatus->dwError);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|