Kernel stacks that re freed, can be placed on an SLIST for quick reuse. The old code was using a member of the PFN of the last stack page as the SLIST_ENTRY. This relies on the following (non-portable) assumptions:
- A stack always has a PTE associated with it.
- This PTE has a PFN associated with it.
- The PFN has an empty field that can be re-used as an SLIST_ENTRY.
- The PFN has another field that points back to the PTE, which then can be used to get the stack base.
Specifically: On x64 the PFN field is not 16 bytes aligned, so it cannot be used as an SLIST_ENTRY. (In a "usermode kernel" the other assumptions are also invalid).
The new code does what Windows does (and which seems absolutely obvious to do): Place the SLIST_ENTRY directly on the stack.
It's hardly understandable and doesn't really makes sense.
Furthermore, it breaks compatibility with 3rd party FSD that
don't implement such FSCTL.
Obviously, Windows doesn't do this.
For user mode, when probing output buffer, if it's null, length
will also be set to 0.
This avoids user mode applications being able to trigger various
asserts in ReactOS (and thus BSOD when no debugger is plugged ;-)).
NDK: Define PLUGPLAY_CONTROL_PROPERTY_DATA.Properties and PLUGPLAY_CONTROL_DEVICE_RELATIONS_DATA.Relations values.
NTOSKRNL: Map PLUGPLAY_CONTROL_PROPERTY_DATA.Properties values to IoGetDeviceProperty properties and add (dummy) code for unsupported cases.
UMPNPMGR: Use PLUGPLAY_CONTROL_PROPERTY_DATA.Properties values in PNP_GetDeviceRegProp.
- Overhaul SepCreateToken() and SepDuplicateToken() so that they
implement the "variable information area" of the token, where
immutable lists of user & groups and privileges reside, and the
"dynamic information area" (allocated separately in paged pool),
where mutable data such as the token's default DACL is stored.
Perform the necessary adaptations in SepDeleteToken() and in
NtSetInformationToken().
- Actually dereference the token's logon session, when needed, in the
'TokenSessionReference' case in NtSetInformationToken().
- Overhaul SepFindPrimaryGroupAndDefaultOwner() so that it returns
the indices of candidate primary group and default owner within the
token's user & groups array. This allows for fixing the 'TokenOwner'
and 'TokenPrimaryGroup' cases of NtSetInformationToken(), since the
owner or primary group being set *MUST* already exist in the token's
user & groups array (as a by-product, memory corruptions that existed
before due to the broken way of setting these properties disappear too).
- Lock tokens every time operations are performed on them (NOTE: we
still use a global token lock!).
- Touch the ModifiedId LUID member of tokens everytime a write operation
(property change, etc...) is made on them.
- Fix some group attributes in the SYSTEM process token, SepCreateSystemProcessToken().
- Make the SeCreateTokenPrivilege mandatory when calling NtCreateToken().
- Update the token pool tags.
- Explicitly use the Ex*ResourceLite() versions of the locking functions
in the token locking macros.
- Use TRUE/FALSE instead of 1/0 for booleans.
- Use NULL instead of 0 for null pointers.
- Print 0x prefix for hex values in DPRINTs.
- Use new annotations for SepCreateToken() and SepDuplicateToken().
Caught while debugging, in the case the ImpersonationLevel value was
uninitialized, due to the fact it was left untouched on purpose by
PsReferenceEffectiveToken().
kmtest:NtCreateSection calls CcInitializeCacheMap with a
NULL value for SectionObjectPointers. This will cause an exception when
trying to access it, which in Windows can be handled gracefully.
However accessing it while holding ViewLock means the lock will not be
released, leading to an APC_INDEX_MISMATCH bugcheck.
This solves the problem by allocating SharedCacheMap outside the lock,
then freeing it again under lock if another thread has updated SharedCacheMap
in the mean time. This is also What Windows Does(TM).
