From 292f67af5b8771d88b88f1184c7522d75861cc8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Faber Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2020 14:43:45 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] [MBEDTLS] Update to version 2.7.16. CORE-17155 --- dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/bignum.c | 146 ++- dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecp.c | 376 ++++++- dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/error.c | 6 + dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_cli.c | 984 +++++++++++------- dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.c | 6 +- dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.c | 58 +- dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_tls.c | 18 +- dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/version_features.c | 3 + dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509_crt.c | 6 + media/doc/3rd Party Files.txt | 2 +- .../reactos/libs/mbedtls/check_config.h | 10 + sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/config.h | 22 + sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecp.h | 11 +- sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/error.h | 1 + sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/md.h | 2 + sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl.h | 4 + .../reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h | 41 + sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/version.h | 8 +- 18 files changed, 1247 insertions(+), 457 deletions(-) diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/bignum.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/bignum.c index 9b806339ed3..84a43c8cba8 100644 --- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/bignum.c +++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/bignum.c @@ -253,6 +253,22 @@ void mbedtls_mpi_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y ) memcpy( Y, &T, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); } +/* + * Conditionally assign dest = src, without leaking information + * about whether the assignment was made or not. + * dest and src must be arrays of limbs of size n. + * assign must be 0 or 1. + */ +static void mpi_safe_cond_assign( size_t n, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, + unsigned char assign ) +{ + size_t i; + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) + dest[i] = dest[i] * ( 1 - assign ) + src[i] * assign; +} + /* * Conditionally assign X = Y, without leaking information * about whether the assignment was made or not. @@ -270,10 +286,9 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned X->s = X->s * ( 1 - assign ) + Y->s * assign; - for( i = 0; i < Y->n; i++ ) - X->p[i] = X->p[i] * ( 1 - assign ) + Y->p[i] * assign; + mpi_safe_cond_assign( Y->n, X->p, Y->p, assign ); - for( ; i < X->n; i++ ) + for( i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++ ) X->p[i] *= ( 1 - assign ); cleanup: @@ -1116,10 +1131,24 @@ cleanup: return( ret ); } -/* - * Helper for mbedtls_mpi subtraction +/** + * Helper for mbedtls_mpi subtraction. + * + * Calculate d - s where d and s have the same size. + * This function operates modulo (2^ciL)^n and returns the carry + * (1 if there was a wraparound, i.e. if `d < s`, and 0 otherwise). + * + * \param n Number of limbs of \p d and \p s. + * \param[in,out] d On input, the left operand. + * On output, the result of the subtraction: + * \param[in] s The right operand. + * + * \return 1 if `d < s`. + * 0 if `d >= s`. */ -static void mpi_sub_hlp( size_t n, mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, mbedtls_mpi_uint *d ) +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_sub_hlp( size_t n, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *s ) { size_t i; mbedtls_mpi_uint c, z; @@ -1130,24 +1159,18 @@ static void mpi_sub_hlp( size_t n, mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, mbedtls_mpi_uint *d ) c = ( *d < *s ) + z; *d -= *s; } - while( c != 0 ) - { - z = ( *d < c ); *d -= c; - c = z; i++; d++; - } + return( c ); } /* - * Unsigned subtraction: X = |A| - |B| (HAC 14.9) + * Unsigned subtraction: X = |A| - |B| (HAC 14.9, 14.10) */ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) { mbedtls_mpi TB; int ret; size_t n; - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, B ) < 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE ); + mbedtls_mpi_uint carry; mbedtls_mpi_init( &TB ); @@ -1171,7 +1194,18 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi if( B->p[n - 1] != 0 ) break; - mpi_sub_hlp( n, B->p, X->p ); + carry = mpi_sub_hlp( n, X->p, B->p ); + if( carry != 0 ) + { + /* Propagate the carry to the first nonzero limb of X. */ + for( ; n < X->n && X->p[n] == 0; n++ ) + --X->p[n]; + /* If we ran out of space for the carry, it means that the result + * is negative. */ + if( n == X->n ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE ); + --X->p[n]; + } cleanup: @@ -1723,18 +1757,34 @@ static void mpi_montg_init( mbedtls_mpi_uint *mm, const mbedtls_mpi *N ) *mm = ~x + 1; } -/* - * Montgomery multiplication: A = A * B * R^-1 mod N (HAC 14.36) +/** Montgomery multiplication: A = A * B * R^-1 mod N (HAC 14.36) + * + * \param[in,out] A One of the numbers to multiply. + * It must have at least as many limbs as N + * (A->n >= N->n), and any limbs beyond n are ignored. + * On successful completion, A contains the result of + * the multiplication A * B * R^-1 mod N where + * R = (2^ciL)^n. + * \param[in] B One of the numbers to multiply. + * It must be nonzero and must not have more limbs than N + * (B->n <= N->n). + * \param[in] N The modulo. N must be odd. + * \param mm The value calculated by `mpi_montg_init(&mm, N)`. + * This is -N^-1 mod 2^ciL. + * \param[in,out] T A bignum for temporary storage. + * It must be at least twice the limb size of N plus 2 + * (T->n >= 2 * (N->n + 1)). + * Its initial content is unused and + * its final content is indeterminate. + * Note that unlike the usual convention in the library + * for `const mbedtls_mpi*`, the content of T can change. */ -static int mpi_montmul( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, +static void mpi_montmul( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, const mbedtls_mpi *T ) { size_t i, n, m; mbedtls_mpi_uint u0, u1, *d; - if( T->n < N->n + 1 || T->p == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - memset( T->p, 0, T->n * ciL ); d = T->p; @@ -1755,21 +1805,33 @@ static int mpi_montmul( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B, const mbedtls_mpi *d++ = u0; d[n + 1] = 0; } - memcpy( A->p, d, ( n + 1 ) * ciL ); + /* At this point, d is either the desired result or the desired result + * plus N. We now potentially subtract N, avoiding leaking whether the + * subtraction is performed through side channels. */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, N ) >= 0 ) - mpi_sub_hlp( n, N->p, A->p ); - else - /* prevent timing attacks */ - mpi_sub_hlp( n, A->p, T->p ); - - return( 0 ); + /* Copy the n least significant limbs of d to A, so that + * A = d if d < N (recall that N has n limbs). */ + memcpy( A->p, d, n * ciL ); + /* If d >= N then we want to set A to d - N. To prevent timing attacks, + * do the calculation without using conditional tests. */ + /* Set d to d0 + (2^biL)^n - N where d0 is the current value of d. */ + d[n] += 1; + d[n] -= mpi_sub_hlp( n, d, N->p ); + /* If d0 < N then d < (2^biL)^n + * so d[n] == 0 and we want to keep A as it is. + * If d0 >= N then d >= (2^biL)^n, and d <= (2^biL)^n + N < 2 * (2^biL)^n + * so d[n] == 1 and we want to set A to the result of the subtraction + * which is d - (2^biL)^n, i.e. the n least significant limbs of d. + * This exactly corresponds to a conditional assignment. */ + mpi_safe_cond_assign( n, A->p, d, (unsigned char) d[n] ); } /* * Montgomery reduction: A = A * R^-1 mod N + * + * See mpi_montmul() regarding constraints and guarantees on the parameters. */ -static int mpi_montred( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, const mbedtls_mpi *T ) +static void mpi_montred( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, const mbedtls_mpi *T ) { mbedtls_mpi_uint z = 1; mbedtls_mpi U; @@ -1777,7 +1839,7 @@ static int mpi_montred( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint m U.n = U.s = (int) z; U.p = &z; - return( mpi_montmul( A, &U, N, mm, T ) ); + mpi_montmul( A, &U, N, mm, T ); } /* @@ -1856,13 +1918,13 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi else MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[1], A ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( &W[1], &RR, N, mm, &T ) ); + mpi_montmul( &W[1], &RR, N, mm, &T ); /* * X = R^2 * R^-1 mod N = R mod N */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, &RR ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montred( X, N, mm, &T ) ); + mpi_montred( X, N, mm, &T ); if( wsize > 1 ) { @@ -1875,7 +1937,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[j], &W[1] ) ); for( i = 0; i < wsize - 1; i++ ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( &W[j], &W[j], N, mm, &T ) ); + mpi_montmul( &W[j], &W[j], N, mm, &T ); /* * W[i] = W[i - 1] * W[1] @@ -1885,7 +1947,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[i], N->n + 1 ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[i], &W[i - 1] ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( &W[i], &W[1], N, mm, &T ) ); + mpi_montmul( &W[i], &W[1], N, mm, &T ); } } @@ -1922,7 +1984,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi /* * out of window, square X */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ) ); + mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ); continue; } @@ -1940,12 +2002,12 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi * X = X^wsize R^-1 mod N */ for( i = 0; i < wsize; i++ ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ) ); + mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ); /* * X = X * W[wbits] R^-1 mod N */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( X, &W[wbits], N, mm, &T ) ); + mpi_montmul( X, &W[wbits], N, mm, &T ); state--; nbits = 0; @@ -1958,18 +2020,18 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi */ for( i = 0; i < nbits; i++ ) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ) ); + mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ); wbits <<= 1; if( ( wbits & ( one << wsize ) ) != 0 ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montmul( X, &W[1], N, mm, &T ) ); + mpi_montmul( X, &W[1], N, mm, &T ); } /* * X = A^E * R * R^-1 mod N = A^E mod N */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_montred( X, N, mm, &T ) ); + mpi_montred( X, N, mm, &T ); if( neg && E->n != 0 && ( E->p[0] & 1 ) != 0 ) { diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecp.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecp.c index 4fecabcc0d9..f83f4db7a0b 100644 --- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecp.c +++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecp.c @@ -94,6 +94,20 @@ #include "mbedtls/ecp_internal.h" +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#else +#error "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid." +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ + #if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) #define inline __inline @@ -112,6 +126,233 @@ static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) { static unsigned long add_count, dbl_count, mul_count; #endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) +/* + * Currently ecp_mul() takes a RNG function as an argument, used for + * side-channel protection, but it can be NULL. The initial reasoning was + * that people will pass non-NULL RNG when they care about side-channels, but + * unfortunately we have some APIs that call ecp_mul() with a NULL RNG, with + * no opportunity for the user to do anything about it. + * + * The obvious strategies for addressing that include: + * - change those APIs so that they take RNG arguments; + * - require a global RNG to be available to all crypto modules. + * + * Unfortunately those would break compatibility. So what we do instead is + * have our own internal DRBG instance, seeded from the secret scalar. + * + * The following is a light-weight abstraction layer for doing that with + * HMAC_DRBG (first choice) or CTR_DRBG. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + +/* DRBG context type */ +typedef mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ecp_drbg_context; + +/* DRBG context init */ +static inline void ecp_drbg_init( ecp_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( ctx ); +} + +/* DRBG context free */ +static inline void ecp_drbg_free( ecp_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( ctx ); +} + +/* DRBG function */ +static inline int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( p_rng, output, output_len ) ); +} + +/* DRBG context seeding */ +static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + /* The list starts with strong hashes */ + const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = mbedtls_md_list()[0]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret, + secret_bytes, secret_len ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( ctx, md_info, secret_bytes, secret_len ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_zeroize( secret_bytes, secret_len ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + +/* DRBG context type */ +typedef mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ecp_drbg_context; + +/* DRBG context init */ +static inline void ecp_drbg_init( ecp_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( ctx ); +} + +/* DRBG context free */ +static inline void ecp_drbg_free( ecp_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( ctx ); +} + +/* DRBG function */ +static inline int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( p_rng, output, output_len ) ); +} + +/* + * Since CTR_DRBG doesn't have a seed_buf() function the way HMAC_DRBG does, + * we need to pass an entropy function when seeding. So we use a dummy + * function for that, and pass the actual entropy as customisation string. + * (During seeding of CTR_DRBG the entropy input and customisation string are + * concatenated before being used to update the secret state.) + */ +static int ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy(void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len) +{ + (void) ctx; + memset( out, 0, len ); + return( 0 ); +} + +/* DRBG context seeding */ +static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret, + secret_bytes, secret_len ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( ctx, ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy, NULL, + secret_bytes, secret_len ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_zeroize( secret_bytes, secret_len ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + +/* This will be used in the self-test function */ +#define ECP_ONE_STEP_KDF + +/* + * We need to expand secret data (the scalar) into a longer stream of bytes. + * + * We'll use the One-Step KDF from NIST SP 800-56C, with option 1 (H is a hash + * function) and empty FixedInfo. (Though we'll make it fit the DRBG API for + * convenience, this is not a full-fledged DRBG, but we don't need one here.) + * + * We need a basic hash abstraction layer to use whatever SHA-2 is available. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + +#define HASH_FUNC( in, ilen, out ) mbedtls_sha512_ret( in, ilen, out, 0 ); +#define HASH_BLOCK_BYTES ( 512 / 8 ) + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + +#define HASH_FUNC( in, ilen, out ) mbedtls_sha256_ret( in, ilen, out, 0 ); +#define HASH_BLOCK_BYTES ( 256 / 8 ) + +#endif /* SHA512/SHA256 abstraction */ + +/* + * State consists of a 32-bit counter plus the secret value. + * + * We stored them concatenated in a single buffer as that's what will get + * passed to the hash function. + */ +typedef struct { + size_t total_len; + uint8_t buf[4 + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; +} ecp_drbg_context; + +static void ecp_drbg_init( ecp_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( ecp_drbg_context ) ); +} + +static void ecp_drbg_free( ecp_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( ecp_drbg_context ) ); +} + +static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len ) +{ + ctx->total_len = 4 + secret_len; + memset( ctx->buf, 0, 4); + return( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret, ctx->buf + 4, secret_len ) ); +} + +static int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len ) +{ + ecp_drbg_context *ctx = p_rng; + int ret; + size_t len_done = 0; + uint8_t tmp[HASH_BLOCK_BYTES]; + + while( len_done < output_len ) + { + uint8_t use_len; + + /* This function is only called for coordinate randomisation, which + * happens only twice in a scalar multiplication. Each time needs a + * random value in the range [2, p-1], and gets it by drawing len(p) + * bytes from this function, and retrying up to 10 times if unlucky. + * + * So for the largest curve, each scalar multiplication draws at most + * 20 * 66 bytes. The minimum block size is 32 (SHA-256), so with + * rounding that means a most 20 * 3 blocks. + * + * Since we don't need to draw more that 255 blocks, don't bother + * with carry propagation and just return an error instead. We can + * change that it we even need to draw more blinding values. + */ + ctx->buf[3] += 1; + if( ctx->buf[3] == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED ); + + ret = HASH_FUNC( ctx->buf, ctx->total_len, tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( output_len - len_done > HASH_BLOCK_BYTES ) + use_len = HASH_BLOCK_BYTES; + else + use_len = output_len - len_done; + + memcpy( output + len_done, tmp, use_len ); + len_done += use_len; + } + + mbedtls_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#else /* DRBG/SHA modules */ +#error "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid." +#endif /* DRBG/SHA modules */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ @@ -1161,7 +1402,10 @@ static int ecp_randomize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *p MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &l, 1 ) ); if( count++ > 10 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED ); + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } } while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &l, 1 ) <= 0 ); @@ -1354,7 +1598,9 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_core( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R i = d; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_select_comb( grp, R, T, t_len, x[i] ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &R->Z, 1 ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) if( f_rng != 0 ) +#endif MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_jac( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) ); while( i-- != 0 ) @@ -1483,7 +1729,9 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, * * Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) if( f_rng != 0 ) +#endif MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_jac( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, R ) ); @@ -1579,7 +1827,10 @@ static int ecp_randomize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &l, 1 ) ); if( count++ > 10 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED ); + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } } while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &l, 1 ) <= 0 ); @@ -1683,7 +1934,9 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, MOD_ADD( RP.X ); /* Randomize coordinates of the starting point */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) if( f_rng != NULL ) +#endif MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, &RP, f_rng, p_rng ) ); /* Loop invariant: R = result so far, RP = R + P */ @@ -1716,7 +1969,9 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, * * Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) if( f_rng != NULL ) +#endif MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) ); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_mxz( grp, R ) ); @@ -1740,6 +1995,11 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_mul( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) char is_grp_capable = 0; #endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + ecp_drbg_context drbg_ctx; + + ecp_drbg_init( &drbg_ctx ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ /* Common sanity checks */ if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &P->Z, 1 ) != 0 ) @@ -1749,32 +2009,46 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_mul( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, P ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + if( f_rng == NULL ) + { + const size_t m_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_seed( &drbg_ctx, m, m_len ) ); + f_rng = &ecp_drbg_random; + p_rng = &drbg_ctx; + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) if ( is_grp_capable = mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( grp ) ); } - #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + #if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY) if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) ret = ecp_mul_mxz( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng ); - #endif #if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS) if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) ret = ecp_mul_comb( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) +cleanup: #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) -cleanup: - if ( is_grp_capable ) { mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( grp ); } - #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + ecp_drbg_free( &drbg_ctx ); +#endif + return( ret ); } @@ -2139,6 +2413,76 @@ cleanup: #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(ECP_ONE_STEP_KDF) +/* + * There are no test vectors from NIST for the One-Step KDF in SP 800-56C, + * but unofficial ones can be found at: + * https://github.com/patrickfav/singlestep-kdf/wiki/NIST-SP-800-56C-Rev1:-Non-Official-Test-Vectors + * + * We only use the ones with empty fixedInfo, and for brevity's sake, only + * 40-bytes output (with SHA-256 that's more than one block, and with SHA-512 + * less than one block). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + +static const uint8_t test_kdf_z[16] = { + 0x3b, 0xa9, 0x79, 0xe9, 0xbc, 0x5e, 0x3e, 0xc7, + 0x61, 0x30, 0x36, 0xb6, 0xf5, 0x1c, 0xd5, 0xaa, +}; +static const uint8_t test_kdf_out[40] = { + 0x3e, 0xf6, 0xda, 0xf9, 0x51, 0x60, 0x70, 0x5f, + 0xdf, 0x21, 0xcd, 0xab, 0xac, 0x25, 0x7b, 0x05, + 0xfe, 0xc1, 0xab, 0x7c, 0xc9, 0x68, 0x43, 0x25, + 0x8a, 0xfc, 0x40, 0x6e, 0x5b, 0xf7, 0x98, 0x27, + 0x10, 0xfa, 0x7b, 0x93, 0x52, 0xd4, 0x16, 0xaa, +}; + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + +static const uint8_t test_kdf_z[16] = { + 0xc8, 0x3e, 0x35, 0x8e, 0x99, 0xa6, 0x89, 0xc6, + 0x7d, 0xb4, 0xfe, 0x39, 0xcf, 0x8f, 0x26, 0xe1, +}; +static const uint8_t test_kdf_out[40] = { + 0x7d, 0xf6, 0x41, 0xf8, 0x3c, 0x47, 0xdc, 0x28, + 0x5f, 0x7f, 0xaa, 0xde, 0x05, 0x64, 0xd6, 0x25, + 0x00, 0x6a, 0x47, 0xd9, 0x1e, 0xa4, 0xa0, 0x8c, + 0xd7, 0xf7, 0x0c, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xa0, 0x72, 0x66, + 0x69, 0x0e, 0x25, 0xaa, 0xa1, 0x63, 0x14, 0x79, +}; + +#endif + +static int ecp_kdf_self_test( void ) +{ + int ret; + ecp_drbg_context kdf_ctx; + mbedtls_mpi scalar; + uint8_t out[sizeof( test_kdf_out )]; + + ecp_drbg_init( &kdf_ctx ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &scalar ); + memset( out, 0, sizeof( out ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &scalar, + test_kdf_z, sizeof( test_kdf_z ) ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_seed( &kdf_ctx, + &scalar, sizeof( test_kdf_z ) ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_random( &kdf_ctx, out, sizeof( out ) ) ); + + if( memcmp( out, test_kdf_out, sizeof( out ) ) != 0 ) + ret = -1; + +cleanup: + ecp_drbg_free( &kdf_ctx ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &scalar ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* ECP_ONE_STEP_KDF */ + /* * Checkup routine */ @@ -2250,6 +2594,24 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_self_test( int verbose ) if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); +#if defined(ECP_ONE_STEP_KDF) + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECP test #3 (internal KDF): " ); + + ret = ecp_kdf_self_test(); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); +#endif /* ECP_ONE_STEP_KDF */ + cleanup: if( ret < 0 && verbose != 0 ) diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/error.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/error.c index 22c88659c1b..fa0e01f919a 100644 --- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/error.c +++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/error.c @@ -76,6 +76,10 @@ #include "mbedtls/arc4.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) #include "mbedtls/base64.h" #endif @@ -518,6 +522,8 @@ void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen ) mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error" ); if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH) ) mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify" ); + if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG) ) + mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Invalid value in SSL config" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_cli.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_cli.c index aeb775560a0..8276826dfc8 100644 --- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_cli.c +++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_cli.c @@ -82,29 +82,26 @@ static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) { #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) -static void ssl_write_hostname_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t *olen ) +static int ssl_write_hostname_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; size_t hostname_len; *olen = 0; if( ssl->hostname == NULL ) - return; + return( 0 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding server name extension: %s", - ssl->hostname ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding server name extension: %s", + ssl->hostname ) ); hostname_len = strlen( ssl->hostname ); - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < hostname_len + 9 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, hostname_len + 9 ); /* * Sect. 3, RFC 6066 (TLS Extensions Definitions) @@ -148,16 +145,18 @@ static void ssl_write_hostname_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, memcpy( p, ssl->hostname, hostname_len ); *olen = hostname_len + 9; + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) -static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t *olen ) +static int ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; *olen = 0; @@ -165,21 +164,20 @@ static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * initial ClientHello, in which case also adding the renegotiation * info extension is NOT RECOMMENDED as per RFC 5746 Section 3.4. */ if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) - return; + return( 0 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" ) ); - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 5 + ssl->verify_data_len ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 5 + ssl->verify_data_len ); /* * Secure renegotiation */ - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO >> 8 ) + & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ) + & 0xFF ); *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = ( ssl->verify_data_len + 1 ) & 0xFF; @@ -188,6 +186,8 @@ static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, memcpy( p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ); *olen = 5 + ssl->verify_data_len; + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ @@ -196,14 +196,15 @@ static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) -static void ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t *olen ) +static int ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; size_t sig_alg_len = 0; const int *md; + #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) unsigned char *sig_alg_list = buf + 6; #endif @@ -211,9 +212,13 @@ static void ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *olen = 0; if( ssl->conf->max_minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) - return; + return( 0 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding signature_algorithms extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding signature_algorithms extension" ) ); + + if( ssl->conf->sig_hashes == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); for( md = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++ ) { @@ -223,13 +228,19 @@ static void ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) sig_alg_len += 2; #endif + if( sig_alg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_HASH_ALG_LIST_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "length in bytes of sig-hash-alg extension too big" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + } } - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < sig_alg_len + 6 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + /* Empty signature algorithms list, this is a configuration error. */ + if( sig_alg_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, sig_alg_len + 6 ); /* * Prepare signature_algorithms extension (TLS 1.2) @@ -275,75 +286,75 @@ static void ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( sig_alg_len ) & 0xFF ); *olen = 6 + sig_alg_len; + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -static void ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t *olen ) +static int ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; unsigned char *elliptic_curve_list = p + 6; size_t elliptic_curve_len = 0; const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *info; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id; -#else - ((void) ssl); -#endif *olen = 0; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding supported_elliptic_curves extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding supported_elliptic_curves extension" ) ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - for( grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list; *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; grp_id++ ) -#else - for( info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; info++ ) -#endif + if( ssl->conf->curve_list == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + + for( grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list; + *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + grp_id++ ) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( *grp_id ); -#endif if( info == NULL ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid curve in ssl configuration" ) ); - return; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "invalid curve in ssl configuration" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); } - elliptic_curve_len += 2; + + if( elliptic_curve_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "malformed supported_elliptic_curves extension in config" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + } } - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 6 + elliptic_curve_len ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + /* Empty elliptic curve list, this is a configuration error. */ + if( elliptic_curve_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 + elliptic_curve_len ); elliptic_curve_len = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - for( grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list; *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; grp_id++ ) -#else - for( info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; info++ ) -#endif + for( grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list; + *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + grp_id++ ) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( *grp_id ); -#endif elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = info->tls_id >> 8; elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = info->tls_id & 0xFF; } - if( elliptic_curve_len == 0 ) - return; - - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES >> 8 ) + & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES ) + & 0xFF ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( elliptic_curve_len + 2 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( elliptic_curve_len + 2 ) ) & 0xFF ); @@ -352,27 +363,28 @@ static void ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( elliptic_curve_len ) ) & 0xFF ); *olen = 6 + elliptic_curve_len; + + return( 0 ); } -static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t *olen ) +static int ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; + (void) ssl; /* ssl used for debugging only */ *olen = 0; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 ); - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 6 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } - - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS >> 8 ) + & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS ) + & 0xFF ); *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 2; @@ -381,33 +393,32 @@ static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; *olen = 6; + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t *olen ) +static int ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { int ret; unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; size_t kkpp_len; *olen = 0; /* Skip costly extension if we can't use EC J-PAKE anyway */ if( mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 ) - return; + return( 0 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding ecjpake_kkpp extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding ecjpake_kkpp extension" ) ); - if( end - p < 4 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP ) & 0xFF ); @@ -423,19 +434,20 @@ static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "generating new ecjpake parameters" ) ); ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, - p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); if( ret != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 , "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret ); - return; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 , + "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret ); + return( ret ); } ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = mbedtls_calloc( 1, kkpp_len ); if( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "allocation failed" ) ); - return; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); } memcpy( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, p + 2, kkpp_len ); @@ -446,12 +458,7 @@ static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "re-using cached ecjpake parameters" ) ); kkpp_len = ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len; - - if( (size_t)( end - p - 2 ) < kkpp_len ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p + 2, end, kkpp_len ); memcpy( p + 2, ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, kkpp_len ); } @@ -460,33 +467,33 @@ static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( kkpp_len ) & 0xFF ); *olen = kkpp_len + 4; + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) -static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t *olen ) +static int ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; *olen = 0; - if( ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE ) { - return; - } + if( ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE ) + return( 0 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" ) ); - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 5 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 5 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH >> 8 ) + & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH ) + & 0xFF ); *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 1; @@ -494,30 +501,28 @@ static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *p++ = ssl->conf->mfl_code; *olen = 5; + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -static void ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen ) +static int ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; *olen = 0; if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED ) - { - return; - } + return( 0 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding truncated_hmac extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding truncated_hmac extension" ) ); - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC ) & 0xFF ); @@ -526,32 +531,29 @@ static void ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *p++ = 0x00; *olen = 4; + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) -static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen ) +static int ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; *olen = 0; if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED || ssl->conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - return; - } + return( 0 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac " - "extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac extension" ) ); - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC ) & 0xFF ); @@ -560,65 +562,63 @@ static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *p++ = 0x00; *olen = 4; + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) -static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen ) +static int ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; *olen = 0; if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || ssl->conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) - { - return; - } + return( 0 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding extended_master_secret " - "extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding extended_master_secret extension" ) ); - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET >> 8 ) + & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET ) + & 0xFF ); *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00; *olen = 4; + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) -static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen ) +static int ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; size_t tlen = ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len; *olen = 0; if( ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED ) - { - return; - } + return( 0 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding session ticket extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding session ticket extension" ) ); - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 + tlen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + /* The addition is safe here since the ticket length is 16 bit. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 + tlen ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET ) & 0xFF ); @@ -629,44 +629,40 @@ static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *olen = 4; if( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket == NULL || tlen == 0 ) - { - return; - } + return( 0 ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "sending session ticket of length %d", tlen ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "sending session ticket of length %d", tlen ) ); memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, tlen ); *olen += tlen; + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) -static void ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen ) +static int ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) { unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; size_t alpnlen = 0; const char **cur; *olen = 0; if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL ) - { - return; - } + return( 0 ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding alpn extension" ) ); for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ ) - alpnlen += (unsigned char)( strlen( *cur ) & 0xFF ) + 1; + alpnlen += strlen( *cur ) + 1; - if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 6 + alpnlen ) - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); - return; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 + alpnlen ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN ) & 0xFF ); @@ -684,7 +680,11 @@ static void ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ ) { - *p = (unsigned char)( strlen( *cur ) & 0xFF ); + /* + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_alpn_protocols() checked that the length of + * protocol names is less than 255. + */ + *p = (unsigned char)strlen( *cur ); memcpy( p + 1, *cur, *p ); p += 1 + *p; } @@ -698,6 +698,8 @@ static void ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* Extension length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) */ buf[2] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); buf[3] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) ) & 0xFF ); + + return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ @@ -754,9 +756,10 @@ static int ssl_generate_random( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) * * \return 0 if valid, else 1 */ -static int ssl_validate_ciphersuite( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * suite_info, - const mbedtls_ssl_context * ssl, - int min_minor_ver, int max_minor_ver ) +static int ssl_validate_ciphersuite( + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * suite_info, + const mbedtls_ssl_context * ssl, + int min_minor_ver, int max_minor_ver ) { (void) ssl; if( suite_info == NULL ) @@ -791,8 +794,11 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { int ret; size_t i, n, olen, ext_len = 0; + unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p, *q; + const unsigned char *end; + unsigned char offer_compress; const int *ciphersuites; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; @@ -819,23 +825,41 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->conf->max_major_ver == 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "configured max major version is invalid, " - "consider using mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults()" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "configured max major version is invalid, consider using mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults()" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } + buf = ssl->out_msg; + end = buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; + /* - * 0 . 0 handshake type - * 1 . 3 handshake length + * Check if there's enough space for the first part of the ClientHello + * consisting of the 38 bytes described below, the session identifier (at + * most 32 bytes) and its length (1 byte). + * + * Use static upper bounds instead of the actual values + * to allow the compiler to optimize this away. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( buf, end, 38 + 1 + 32 ); + + /* + * The 38 first bytes of the ClientHello: + * 0 . 0 handshake type (written later) + * 1 . 3 handshake length (written later) * 4 . 5 highest version supported * 6 . 9 current UNIX time * 10 . 37 random bytes + * + * The current UNIX time (4 bytes) and following 28 random bytes are written + * by ssl_generate_random() into ssl->handshake->randbytes buffer and then + * copied from there into the output buffer. */ - buf = ssl->out_msg; - p = buf + 4; - mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->conf->max_major_ver, ssl->conf->max_minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, p ); + p = buf + 4; + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->conf->max_major_ver, + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, p ); p += 2; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, max version: [%d:%d]", @@ -855,7 +879,7 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) * 38 . 38 session id length * 39 . 39+n session id * 39+n . 39+n DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) - * 40+n . .. DTSL only: cookie + * 40+n . .. DTLS only: cookie * .. . .. ciphersuitelist length (2 bytes) * .. . .. ciphersuitelist * .. . .. compression methods length (1 byte) @@ -886,7 +910,8 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket != NULL && ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len != 0 ) { - ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, ssl->session_negotiate->id, 32 ); + ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, + ssl->session_negotiate->id, 32 ); if( ret != 0 ) return( ret ); @@ -896,6 +921,12 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + /* + * The first check of the output buffer size above ( + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( buf, end, 38 + 1 + 32 );) + * has checked that there is enough space in the output buffer for the + * session identifier length byte and the session identifier (n <= 32). + */ *p++ = (unsigned char) n; for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) @@ -904,12 +935,27 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, session id len.: %d", n ) ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id", buf + 39, n ); + /* + * With 'n' being the length of the session identifier + * + * 39+n . 39+n DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) + * 40+n . .. DTLS only: cookie + * .. . .. ciphersuitelist length (2 bytes) + * .. . .. ciphersuitelist + * .. . .. compression methods length (1 byte) + * .. . .. compression methods + * .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes) + * .. . .. extensions + */ + /* * DTLS cookie */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 1 ); + if( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie == NULL ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no verify cookie to send" ) ); @@ -922,6 +968,9 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len ); *p++ = ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len ); memcpy( p, ssl->handshake->verify_cookie, ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len ); p += ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len; @@ -937,6 +986,8 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) /* Skip writing ciphersuite length for now */ n = 0; q = p; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); p += 2; for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) @@ -956,12 +1007,15 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) uses_ec |= mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( ciphersuite_info ); #endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); + n++; *p++ = (unsigned char)( ciphersuites[i] >> 8 ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ciphersuites[i] ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, got %d ciphersuites (excluding SCSVs)", n ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, got %d ciphersuites (excluding SCSVs)", n ) ); /* * Add TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV @@ -971,6 +1025,7 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "adding EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO >> 8 ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ); n++; @@ -981,6 +1036,8 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->conf->fallback == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "adding FALLBACK_SCSV" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE >> 8 ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE ); n++; @@ -1011,8 +1068,10 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress len.: %d", 2 ) ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress alg.: %d %d", - MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE, MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE, + MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 3 ); *p++ = 2; *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE; *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; @@ -1023,27 +1082,45 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress alg.: %d", MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); *p++ = 1; *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; } - // First write extensions, then the total length - // + /* First write extensions, then the total length */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - ssl_write_hostname_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_hostname_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_hostname_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; #endif /* Note that TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV is always added * even if MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION is not defined. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_renegotiation_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) - ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; #endif @@ -1051,46 +1128,91 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if( uses_ec ) { - ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; - ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; } #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_extended_ms_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_alpn_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + if( ( ret = ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_session_ticket_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } ext_len += olen; #endif @@ -1098,10 +1220,12 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ((void) olen); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, total extension length: %d", - ext_len ) ); + ext_len ) ); if( ext_len > 0 ) { + /* No need to check for space here, because the extension + * writing functions already took care of that. */ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len ) & 0xFF ); p += ext_len; @@ -1145,8 +1269,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } } @@ -1155,9 +1281,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { if( len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x00 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-zero length renegotiation info" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-zero length renegotiation info" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1180,9 +1309,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, len != 1 || buf[0] != ssl->conf->mfl_code ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching max fragment length extension" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-matching max fragment length extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1198,9 +1330,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED || len != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching truncated HMAC extension" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-matching truncated HMAC extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1221,9 +1356,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || len != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching encrypt-then-MAC extension" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-matching encrypt-then-MAC extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1244,9 +1382,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || len != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching extended master secret extension" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-matching extended master secret extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1266,9 +1407,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED || len != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching session ticket extension" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-matching session ticket extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1349,8 +1493,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, buf, len ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( ret ); } @@ -1369,8 +1515,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching ALPN extension" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1550,12 +1698,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 && ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation requested, " - "but not honored by server" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "renegotiation requested, but not honored by server" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-handshake message during renego" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-handshake message during renegotiation" ) ); ssl->keep_current_message = 1; return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO ); @@ -1563,8 +1712,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } @@ -1618,11 +1769,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver || ssl->minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server version out of bounds - " - " min: [%d:%d], server: [%d:%d], max: [%d:%d]", - ssl->conf->min_major_ver, ssl->conf->min_minor_ver, - ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->max_major_ver, ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "server version out of bounds - min: [%d:%d], server: [%d:%d], max: [%d:%d]", + ssl->conf->min_major_ver, + ssl->conf->min_minor_ver, + ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->max_major_ver, + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); @@ -1659,8 +1812,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 40 + n + ext_len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } } @@ -1699,26 +1854,32 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) #endif/* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server hello, bad compression: %d", comp ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "server hello, bad compression: %d", comp ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); } /* * Initialize update checksum functions */ - ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( i ); + ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info = + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( i ); if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info == NULL ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ciphersuite info for %04x not found", i ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "ciphersuite info for %04x not found", i ) ); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } - mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info ); + mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( ssl, + ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %d", n ) ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 35, n ); @@ -1752,8 +1913,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); return( ret ); } } @@ -1762,7 +1925,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no" ) ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %04x", i ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: %d", buf[37 + n] ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: %d", + buf[37 + n] ) ); /* * Perform cipher suite validation in same way as in ssl_write_client_hello. @@ -1773,8 +1937,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver][i] == 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1785,16 +1951,21 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) } } - suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ); - if( ssl_validate_ciphersuite( suite_info, ssl, ssl->minor_ver, ssl->minor_ver ) != 0 ) + suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ); + if( ssl_validate_ciphersuite( suite_info, ssl, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->minor_ver ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name ) ); if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL #if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) @@ -1803,15 +1974,18 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp; ext = buf + 40 + n; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "server hello, total extension length: %d", ext_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, + ( "server hello, total extension length: %d", ext_len ) ); while( ext_len ) { @@ -1823,8 +1997,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ext_size + 4 > ext_len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -1844,7 +2019,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found max_fragment_length extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "found max_fragment_length extension" ) ); if( ( ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) @@ -1883,7 +2059,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found extended_master_secret extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "found extended_master_secret extension" ) ); if( ( ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) @@ -1910,7 +2087,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found supported_point_formats extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "found supported_point_formats extension" ) ); if( ( ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) @@ -1946,8 +2124,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ default: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "unknown extension found: %d (ignoring)", - ext_id ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "unknown extension found: %d (ignoring)", ext_id ) ); } ext_len -= 4 + ext_size; @@ -1964,9 +2142,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) * Renegotiation security checks */ if( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && - ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE ) + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == + MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) ); handshake_failure = 1; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) @@ -1974,12 +2154,14 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION && renegotiation_info_seen == 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)" ) ); handshake_failure = 1; } else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && - ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == + MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation not allowed" ) ); handshake_failure = 1; @@ -1988,15 +2170,18 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && renegotiation_info_seen == 1 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)" ) ); handshake_failure = 1; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ if( handshake_failure == 1 ) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } @@ -2007,7 +2192,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) -static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, +static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; @@ -2021,7 +2207,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char * * opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>; * } ServerDHParams; */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_params( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, p, end ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_params( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + p, end ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, ( "mbedtls_dhm_read_params" ), ret ); return( ret ); @@ -2106,7 +2293,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( ssl ) != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve)" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve)" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } @@ -2132,8 +2320,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, */ if( end - (*p) < 2 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message " - "(psk_identity_hint length)" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } len = (*p)[0] << 8 | (*p)[1]; @@ -2141,8 +2329,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if( end - (*p) < (int) len ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message " - "(psk_identity_hint length)" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } @@ -2184,8 +2372,9 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * opaque random[46]; * } PreMasterSecret; */ - mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->conf->max_major_ver, ssl->conf->max_minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, p ); + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->conf->max_major_ver, + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, p ); if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p + 2, 46 ) ) != 0 ) { @@ -2262,20 +2451,22 @@ static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* * Get hash algorithm */ - if( ( *md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( (*p)[0] ) ) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + if( ( *md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( (*p)[0] ) ) + == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Server used unsupported " - "HashAlgorithm %d", *(p)[0] ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "Server used unsupported HashAlgorithm %d", *(p)[0] ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } /* * Get signature algorithm */ - if( ( *pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( (*p)[1] ) ) == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) + if( ( *pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( (*p)[1] ) ) + == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server used unsupported " - "SignatureAlgorithm %d", (*p)[1] ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "server used unsupported SignatureAlgorithm %d", (*p)[1] ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } @@ -2284,13 +2475,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, */ if( mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( ssl, *md_alg ) != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server used HashAlgorithm %d that was not offered", - *(p)[0] ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "server used HashAlgorithm %d that was not offered", *(p)[0] ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used SignatureAlgorithm %d", (*p)[1] ) ); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used HashAlgorithm %d", (*p)[0] ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used SignatureAlgorithm %d", + (*p)[1] ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used HashAlgorithm %d", + (*p)[0] ) ); *p += 2; return( 0 ); @@ -2368,8 +2561,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ( ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( ret ); } @@ -2391,8 +2586,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } @@ -2411,10 +2608,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) goto exit; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key exchange message must " - "not be skipped" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "server key exchange message must not be skipped" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } @@ -2432,8 +2631,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } } /* FALLTROUGH */ @@ -2455,8 +2656,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl_parse_server_dh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } } @@ -2473,8 +2676,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } } @@ -2490,8 +2695,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ret != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } } @@ -2521,17 +2728,24 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( ssl, &p, end, &md_alg, &pk_alg ) != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } - if( pk_alg != mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ) ) + if( pk_alg != + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ) ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } } @@ -2560,8 +2774,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( p > end - 2 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } sig_len = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1]; @@ -2570,8 +2786,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( p != end - sig_len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); } @@ -2618,27 +2836,34 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "certificate required" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } /* * Verify signature */ - if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, pk_alg ) ) + if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, + pk_alg ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); } if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len ) ) != 0 ) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret ); return( ret ); } @@ -2699,8 +2924,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } @@ -2776,8 +3003,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) { - size_t sig_alg_len = ( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] << 8 ) - | ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n] ) ); + size_t sig_alg_len = + ( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] << 8 ) + | ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n] ) ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) unsigned char* sig_alg; size_t i; @@ -2795,11 +3023,14 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len], * which is one less than we need the buf to be. */ - if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n + sig_alg_len ) + if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + + 3 + n + sig_alg_len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); } @@ -2807,8 +3038,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) sig_alg = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n; for( i = 0; i < sig_alg_len; i += 2 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Supported Signature Algorithm found: %d" - ",%d", sig_alg[i], sig_alg[i + 1] ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "Supported Signature Algorithm found: %d,%d", + sig_alg[i], sig_alg[i + 1] ) ); } #endif @@ -2897,9 +3129,9 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) i = 6; ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, - (int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ), - &ssl->out_msg[i], n, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + (int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ), + &ssl->out_msg[i], n, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); if( ret != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret ); @@ -2910,10 +3142,10 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, - ssl->handshake->premaster, - MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE, - &ssl->handshake->pmslen, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + ssl->handshake->premaster, + MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE, + &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret ); return( ret ); @@ -2950,10 +3182,10 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( 3, "ECDH: Q", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.Q ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - &ssl->handshake->pmslen, - ssl->handshake->premaster, - MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->handshake->premaster, + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret ); return( ret ); @@ -2983,15 +3215,17 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( i + 2 + n > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "psk identity too long or " - "SSL buffer too short" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "psk identity too long or SSL buffer too short" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); } ssl->out_msg[i++] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 ); ssl->out_msg[i++] = (unsigned char)( n ); - memcpy( ssl->out_msg + i, ssl->conf->psk_identity, ssl->conf->psk_identity_len ); + memcpy( ssl->out_msg + i, + ssl->conf->psk_identity, + ssl->conf->psk_identity_len ); i += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) @@ -3019,8 +3253,8 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( i + 2 + n > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "psk identity or DHM size too long" - " or SSL buffer too short" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "psk identity or DHM size too long or SSL buffer too short" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); } @@ -3066,7 +3300,8 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, + "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); return( ret ); } } @@ -3259,8 +3494,9 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) * Until we encounter a server that does not, we will take this * shortcut. * - * Reason: Otherwise we should have running hashes for SHA512 and SHA224 - * in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server side. + * Reason: Otherwise we should have running hashes for SHA512 and + * SHA224 in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server + * side. */ if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) @@ -3340,8 +3576,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) ); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); } diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.c index b1028b709c9..053a11bf95e 100644 --- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.c +++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.c @@ -164,8 +164,7 @@ static int ssl_cookie_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *hmac_ctx, { unsigned char hmac_out[COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN]; - if( (size_t)( end - *p ) < COOKIE_HMAC_LEN ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( *p, end, COOKIE_HMAC_LEN ); if( mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( hmac_ctx ) != 0 || mbedtls_md_hmac_update( hmac_ctx, time, 4 ) != 0 || @@ -195,8 +194,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write( void *p_ctx, if( ctx == NULL || cli_id == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - if( (size_t)( end - *p ) < COOKIE_LEN ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( *p, end, COOKIE_LEN ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) t = (unsigned long) mbedtls_time( NULL ); diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.c index bdb79c44780..0e0b3deb37c 100644 --- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.c +++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.c @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ #define mbedtls_free free #endif +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h" #include @@ -85,6 +86,19 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx ) #define MAX_KEY_BYTES 32 /* 256 bits */ +#define TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES 4 +#define TICKET_IV_BYTES 12 +#define TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES 2 +#define TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES 16 + +#define TICKET_MIN_LEN ( TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES + \ + TICKET_IV_BYTES + \ + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES + \ + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) +#define TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN ( TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES + \ + TICKET_IV_BYTES + \ + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES ) + /* * Generate/update a key */ @@ -309,6 +323,7 @@ static int ssl_load_session( mbedtls_ssl_session *session, * The key_name, iv, and length of encrypted_state are the additional * authenticated data. */ + int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned char *start, @@ -320,9 +335,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket, mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx = p_ticket; mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key; unsigned char *key_name = start; - unsigned char *iv = start + 4; - unsigned char *state_len_bytes = iv + 12; - unsigned char *state = state_len_bytes + 2; + unsigned char *iv = start + TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES; + unsigned char *state_len_bytes = iv + TICKET_IV_BYTES; + unsigned char *state = state_len_bytes + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES; unsigned char *tag; size_t clear_len, ciph_len; @@ -333,8 +348,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket, /* We need at least 4 bytes for key_name, 12 for IV, 2 for len 16 for tag, * in addition to session itself, that will be checked when writing it. */ - if( end - start < 4 + 12 + 2 + 16 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( start, end, TICKET_MIN_LEN ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) @@ -348,9 +362,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket, *ticket_lifetime = ctx->ticket_lifetime; - memcpy( key_name, key->name, 4 ); + memcpy( key_name, key->name, TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES ); - if( ( ret = ctx->f_rng( ctx->p_rng, iv, 12 ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = ctx->f_rng( ctx->p_rng, iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) goto cleanup; /* Dump session state */ @@ -366,8 +380,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket, /* Encrypt and authenticate */ tag = state + clear_len; if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &key->ctx, - iv, 12, key_name, 4 + 12 + 2, - state, clear_len, state, &ciph_len, tag, 16 ) ) != 0 ) + iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, + /* Additional data: key name, IV and length */ + key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, + state, clear_len, state, &ciph_len, + tag, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) { goto cleanup; } @@ -377,7 +394,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket, goto cleanup; } - *tlen = 4 + 12 + 2 + 16 + ciph_len; + *tlen = TICKET_MIN_LEN + ciph_len; cleanup: #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) @@ -416,17 +433,16 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket, mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx = p_ticket; mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key; unsigned char *key_name = buf; - unsigned char *iv = buf + 4; - unsigned char *enc_len_p = iv + 12; - unsigned char *ticket = enc_len_p + 2; + unsigned char *iv = buf + TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES; + unsigned char *enc_len_p = iv + TICKET_IV_BYTES; + unsigned char *ticket = enc_len_p + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES; unsigned char *tag; size_t enc_len, clear_len; if( ctx == NULL || ctx->f_rng == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - /* See mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write() */ - if( len < 4 + 12 + 2 + 16 ) + if( len < TICKET_MIN_LEN ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) @@ -440,7 +456,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket, enc_len = ( enc_len_p[0] << 8 ) | enc_len_p[1]; tag = ticket + enc_len; - if( len != 4 + 12 + 2 + enc_len + 16 ) + if( len != TICKET_MIN_LEN + enc_len ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; goto cleanup; @@ -456,9 +472,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket, } /* Decrypt and authenticate */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &key->ctx, iv, 12, - key_name, 4 + 12 + 2, ticket, enc_len, - ticket, &clear_len, tag, 16 ) ) != 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &key->ctx, + iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, + /* Additional data: key name, IV and length */ + key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, + ticket, enc_len, + ticket, &clear_len, + tag, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) { if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED ) ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_tls.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_tls.c index 44733fbb951..66596bffc9c 100644 --- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_tls.c +++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_tls.c @@ -2119,10 +2119,20 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) ssl_read_memory( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, padlen ); mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect ); - /* Call mbedtls_md_process at least once due to cache attacks - * that observe whether md_process() was called of not */ + /* Dummy calls to compression function. + * Call mbedtls_md_process at least once due to cache attacks + * that observe whether md_process() was called of not. + * Respect the usual start-(process|update)-finish sequence for + * the sake of hardware accelerators that might require it. */ + mbedtls_md_starts( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec ); for( j = 0; j < extra_run + 1; j++ ) mbedtls_md_process( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_msg ); + { + /* The switch statement above already checks that we're using + * one of MD-5, SHA-1, SHA-256 or SHA-384. */ + unsigned char tmp[384 / 8]; + mbedtls_md_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, tmp ); + } mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec ); @@ -6553,7 +6563,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char **prot cur_len = strlen( *p ); tot_len += cur_len; - if( cur_len == 0 || cur_len > 255 || tot_len > 65535 ) + if( ( cur_len == 0 ) || + ( cur_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_NAME_LEN ) || + ( tot_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_LIST_LEN ) ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); } diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/version_features.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/version_features.c index dc6a7e22093..454c2be7f01 100644 --- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/version_features.c +++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/version_features.c @@ -339,6 +339,9 @@ static const char *features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) "MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM", #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC", #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509_crt.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509_crt.c index cc82a16570e..7b6481529b0 100644 --- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509_crt.c +++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509_crt.c @@ -382,6 +382,12 @@ static int x509_get_basic_constraints( unsigned char **p, return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + /* Do not accept max_pathlen equal to INT_MAX to avoid a signed integer + * overflow, which is an undefined behavior. */ + if( *max_pathlen == INT_MAX ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + (*max_pathlen)++; return( 0 ); diff --git a/media/doc/3rd Party Files.txt b/media/doc/3rd Party Files.txt index 5205fea7ee3..40c7a2067e6 100644 --- a/media/doc/3rd Party Files.txt +++ b/media/doc/3rd Party Files.txt @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ Used Version: 4.1.0 Website: http://www.simplesystems.org/libtiff/ Title: mbed TLS -Used Version: 2.7.15 +Used Version: 2.7.16 Website: https://tls.mbed.org/ Title: libpng diff --git a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/check_config.h b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/check_config.h index 0b9844329bb..1215e6eb95c 100644 --- a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/check_config.h +++ b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/check_config.h @@ -150,6 +150,16 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !( \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C requires a DRBG or SHA-2 module unless MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG is defined or an alternative implementation is used" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequesites" #endif diff --git a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/config.h b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/config.h index 5ccba1f0153..990589418ab 100644 --- a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/config.h +++ b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/config.h @@ -645,6 +645,28 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG + * + * When this option is disabled, mbedtls_ecp_mul() will make use of an + * internal RNG when called with a NULL \c f_rng argument, in order to protect + * against some side-channel attacks. + * + * This protection introduces a dependency of the ECP module on one of the + * DRBG or SHA modules (HMAC-DRBG, CTR-DRBG, SHA-512 or SHA-256.) For very + * constrained applications that don't require this protection (for example, + * because you're only doing signature verification, so not manipulating any + * secret, or because local/physical side-channel attacks are outside your + * threat model), it might be desirable to get rid of that dependency. + * + * \warning Enabling this option makes some uses of ECP vulnerable to some + * side-channel attacks. Only enable it if you know that's not a problem for + * your use case. + * + * Uncomment this macro to disable some counter-measures in ECP. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG + /** * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC * diff --git a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecp.h b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecp.h index 82052f33424..73eac625ea9 100644 --- a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecp.h +++ b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecp.h @@ -545,10 +545,13 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, size_t *olen, * operations for any valid m. It avoids any if-branch or * array index depending on the value of m. * - * \note If f_rng is not NULL, it is used to randomize intermediate - * results in order to prevent potential timing attacks - * targeting these results. It is recommended to always - * provide a non-NULL f_rng (the overhead is negligible). + * \note If \p f_rng is not NULL, it is used to randomize + * intermediate results to prevent potential timing attacks + * targeting these results. We recommend always providing + * a non-NULL \p f_rng. The overhead is negligible. + * Note: unless #MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG is defined, when + * \p f_rng is NULL, an internal RNG (seeded from the value + * of \p m) will be used instead. * * \param grp ECP group * \param R Destination point diff --git a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/error.h b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/error.h index 62990b691f4..2c55bccf7c4 100644 --- a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/error.h +++ b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/error.h @@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ * RSA 4 11 * ECP 4 9 (Started from top) * MD 5 5 + * SSL 5 1 (Started from 0x5E80) * CIPHER 6 8 * SSL 6 17 (Started from top) * SSL 7 31 diff --git a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/md.h b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/md.h index 754414dee40..f424903cb1f 100644 --- a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/md.h +++ b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/md.h @@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ typedef struct { * \brief This function returns the list of digests supported by the * generic digest module. * + * \note The list starts with the strongest available hashes. + * * \return A statically allocated array of digests. Each element * in the returned list is an integer belonging to the * message-digest enumeration #mbedtls_md_type_t. diff --git a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl.h b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl.h index 2e797c84c38..3d133ab8db5 100644 --- a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl.h +++ b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD -0x6700 /**< Record header looks valid but is not expected. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL -0x6680 /**< The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH -0x6600 /**< Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG -0x5E80 /**< Invalid value in SSL config */ /* * Various constants @@ -151,6 +152,9 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM 1 /*!< DTLS */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN 255 /*!< Maximum host name defined in RFC 1035 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_NAME_LEN 255 /*!< Maximum size in bytes of a protocol name in alpn ext., RFC 7301 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_LIST_LEN 65535 /*!< Maximum size in bytes of list in alpn ext., RFC 7301 */ /* RFC 6066 section 4, see also mfl_code_to_length in ssl_tls.c * NONE must be zero so that memset()ing structure to zero works */ diff --git a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h index 74716e69108..4aa746373ca 100644 --- a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h +++ b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h @@ -183,6 +183,12 @@ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD \ ) +/* Maximum size in bytes of list in sig-hash algorithm ext., RFC 5246 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_HASH_ALG_LIST_LEN 65534 + +/* Maximum size in bytes of list in supported elliptic curve ext., RFC 4492 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN 65535 + /* * Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds */ @@ -211,6 +217,41 @@ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT (1 << 0) #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK (1 << 1) +/** + * \brief This function checks if the remaining size in a buffer is + * greater or equal than a needed space. + * + * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. + * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. + * \param need Needed space in bytes. + * + * \return Zero if the needed space is available in the buffer, non-zero + * otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( const uint8_t *cur, + const uint8_t *end, size_t need ) +{ + return( ( cur > end ) || ( need > (size_t)( end - cur ) ) ); +} + +/** + * \brief This macro checks if the remaining size in a buffer is + * greater or equal than a needed space. If it is not the case, + * it returns an SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL error. + * + * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. + * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. + * \param need Needed space in bytes. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( cur, end, need ) \ + do { \ + if( mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( ( cur ), ( end ), ( need ) ) != 0 ) \ + { \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif diff --git a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/version.h b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/version.h index 815ef5159ad..289ec75efc2 100644 --- a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/version.h +++ b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/version.h @@ -67,16 +67,16 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2 #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 7 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 15 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 16 /** * The single version number has the following structure: * MMNNPP00 * Major version | Minor version | Patch version */ -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02070F00 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.7.15" -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.7.15" +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02071000 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.7.16" +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.7.16" #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C)