reactos/reactos/ntoskrnl/se/semgr.c

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/*
* COPYRIGHT: See COPYING in the top level directory
* PROJECT: ReactOS kernel
* FILE: ntoskrnl/se/semgr.c
* PURPOSE: Security manager
*
* PROGRAMMERS: No programmer listed.
*/
/* INCLUDES *****************************************************************/
#include <ntoskrnl.h>
#define NDEBUG
#include <internal/debug.h>
/* GLOBALS ******************************************************************/
PSE_EXPORTS SeExports = NULL;
SE_EXPORTS SepExports;
static ERESOURCE SepSubjectContextLock;
- Rename KiSetSystemTime to KeSetSystemTime and enhance prototype for later use. - Create Phase 1 initialization for the SRM (SeInitSystem). Right now it inserts the system boot token into object manager, which is something we forgot to do before. - Renamed ExPhase2Init to Phase1Initialization, since it's not Phase 2. - Updated Phase 1 PS Initialization to get the KeLoaderBlock pointer and use it as a context parameter when calling Phase1Initialization. - Split off Phase1Initialization into Phase1InitializationDiscard, which is the bulk of the phase 1 code (99% of it) and can be put in an .INIT section to be freed after boot. - Modify parts of the Inbv setup code. Also implement support for /SOS, and try to mimic its behaviour on NT (not fully achieved). You will need /SOS to see boot messages on the screen! FreeLDR now adds this by default to the "Debug "configuration. - Temporarily disable ReactOS Banner during boot. We will get this data from the .mc/.res file in a later patch instead of hard-coding it. - Optimize calling and usage of ExpLoadInitialProcess. - Add support for Y2K bug fix documented for Windows NT (/YEAR). - Add support to detect WinPE/MiniNT/ReactOS Live CD. - Add temporary debugging code to MmInit2 and some Mm functions to detect if these functions are being used too early, which could result in catastrophic to subtle bugs. - Add more bugchecks when failures occur, and enhance others. Also add more codes to ntoskrnl.mc. - Disable calls to ObfDereferenceDeviceMap since it's not yet implemented. svn path=/trunk/; revision=25624
2007-01-25 01:13:09 +00:00
extern ULONG ExpInitializationPhase;
/* PROTOTYPES ***************************************************************/
static BOOLEAN SepInitExports(VOID);
/* FUNCTIONS ****************************************************************/
- Rename KiSetSystemTime to KeSetSystemTime and enhance prototype for later use. - Create Phase 1 initialization for the SRM (SeInitSystem). Right now it inserts the system boot token into object manager, which is something we forgot to do before. - Renamed ExPhase2Init to Phase1Initialization, since it's not Phase 2. - Updated Phase 1 PS Initialization to get the KeLoaderBlock pointer and use it as a context parameter when calling Phase1Initialization. - Split off Phase1Initialization into Phase1InitializationDiscard, which is the bulk of the phase 1 code (99% of it) and can be put in an .INIT section to be freed after boot. - Modify parts of the Inbv setup code. Also implement support for /SOS, and try to mimic its behaviour on NT (not fully achieved). You will need /SOS to see boot messages on the screen! FreeLDR now adds this by default to the "Debug "configuration. - Temporarily disable ReactOS Banner during boot. We will get this data from the .mc/.res file in a later patch instead of hard-coding it. - Optimize calling and usage of ExpLoadInitialProcess. - Add support for Y2K bug fix documented for Windows NT (/YEAR). - Add support to detect WinPE/MiniNT/ReactOS Live CD. - Add temporary debugging code to MmInit2 and some Mm functions to detect if these functions are being used too early, which could result in catastrophic to subtle bugs. - Add more bugchecks when failures occur, and enhance others. Also add more codes to ntoskrnl.mc. - Disable calls to ObfDereferenceDeviceMap since it's not yet implemented. svn path=/trunk/; revision=25624
2007-01-25 01:13:09 +00:00
BOOLEAN
NTAPI
- Rename KiSetSystemTime to KeSetSystemTime and enhance prototype for later use. - Create Phase 1 initialization for the SRM (SeInitSystem). Right now it inserts the system boot token into object manager, which is something we forgot to do before. - Renamed ExPhase2Init to Phase1Initialization, since it's not Phase 2. - Updated Phase 1 PS Initialization to get the KeLoaderBlock pointer and use it as a context parameter when calling Phase1Initialization. - Split off Phase1Initialization into Phase1InitializationDiscard, which is the bulk of the phase 1 code (99% of it) and can be put in an .INIT section to be freed after boot. - Modify parts of the Inbv setup code. Also implement support for /SOS, and try to mimic its behaviour on NT (not fully achieved). You will need /SOS to see boot messages on the screen! FreeLDR now adds this by default to the "Debug "configuration. - Temporarily disable ReactOS Banner during boot. We will get this data from the .mc/.res file in a later patch instead of hard-coding it. - Optimize calling and usage of ExpLoadInitialProcess. - Add support for Y2K bug fix documented for Windows NT (/YEAR). - Add support to detect WinPE/MiniNT/ReactOS Live CD. - Add temporary debugging code to MmInit2 and some Mm functions to detect if these functions are being used too early, which could result in catastrophic to subtle bugs. - Add more bugchecks when failures occur, and enhance others. Also add more codes to ntoskrnl.mc. - Disable calls to ObfDereferenceDeviceMap since it's not yet implemented. svn path=/trunk/; revision=25624
2007-01-25 01:13:09 +00:00
SepInitializationPhase0(VOID)
{
- Rename KiSetSystemTime to KeSetSystemTime and enhance prototype for later use. - Create Phase 1 initialization for the SRM (SeInitSystem). Right now it inserts the system boot token into object manager, which is something we forgot to do before. - Renamed ExPhase2Init to Phase1Initialization, since it's not Phase 2. - Updated Phase 1 PS Initialization to get the KeLoaderBlock pointer and use it as a context parameter when calling Phase1Initialization. - Split off Phase1Initialization into Phase1InitializationDiscard, which is the bulk of the phase 1 code (99% of it) and can be put in an .INIT section to be freed after boot. - Modify parts of the Inbv setup code. Also implement support for /SOS, and try to mimic its behaviour on NT (not fully achieved). You will need /SOS to see boot messages on the screen! FreeLDR now adds this by default to the "Debug "configuration. - Temporarily disable ReactOS Banner during boot. We will get this data from the .mc/.res file in a later patch instead of hard-coding it. - Optimize calling and usage of ExpLoadInitialProcess. - Add support for Y2K bug fix documented for Windows NT (/YEAR). - Add support to detect WinPE/MiniNT/ReactOS Live CD. - Add temporary debugging code to MmInit2 and some Mm functions to detect if these functions are being used too early, which could result in catastrophic to subtle bugs. - Add more bugchecks when failures occur, and enhance others. Also add more codes to ntoskrnl.mc. - Disable calls to ObfDereferenceDeviceMap since it's not yet implemented. svn path=/trunk/; revision=25624
2007-01-25 01:13:09 +00:00
SepInitLuid();
if (!SepInitSecurityIDs()) return FALSE;
if (!SepInitDACLs()) return FALSE;
if (!SepInitSDs()) return FALSE;
SepInitPrivileges();
if (!SepInitExports()) return FALSE;
/* Initialize the subject context lock */
ExInitializeResource(&SepSubjectContextLock);
/* Initialize token objects */
SepInitializeTokenImplementation();
/* Clear impersonation info for the idle thread */
PsGetCurrentThread()->ImpersonationInfo = NULL;
PspClearCrossThreadFlag(PsGetCurrentThread(),
CT_ACTIVE_IMPERSONATION_INFO_BIT);
/* Initialize the boot token */
ObInitializeFastReference(&PsGetCurrentProcess()->Token, NULL);
ObInitializeFastReference(&PsGetCurrentProcess()->Token,
SepCreateSystemProcessToken());
return TRUE;
}
- Rename KiSetSystemTime to KeSetSystemTime and enhance prototype for later use. - Create Phase 1 initialization for the SRM (SeInitSystem). Right now it inserts the system boot token into object manager, which is something we forgot to do before. - Renamed ExPhase2Init to Phase1Initialization, since it's not Phase 2. - Updated Phase 1 PS Initialization to get the KeLoaderBlock pointer and use it as a context parameter when calling Phase1Initialization. - Split off Phase1Initialization into Phase1InitializationDiscard, which is the bulk of the phase 1 code (99% of it) and can be put in an .INIT section to be freed after boot. - Modify parts of the Inbv setup code. Also implement support for /SOS, and try to mimic its behaviour on NT (not fully achieved). You will need /SOS to see boot messages on the screen! FreeLDR now adds this by default to the "Debug "configuration. - Temporarily disable ReactOS Banner during boot. We will get this data from the .mc/.res file in a later patch instead of hard-coding it. - Optimize calling and usage of ExpLoadInitialProcess. - Add support for Y2K bug fix documented for Windows NT (/YEAR). - Add support to detect WinPE/MiniNT/ReactOS Live CD. - Add temporary debugging code to MmInit2 and some Mm functions to detect if these functions are being used too early, which could result in catastrophic to subtle bugs. - Add more bugchecks when failures occur, and enhance others. Also add more codes to ntoskrnl.mc. - Disable calls to ObfDereferenceDeviceMap since it's not yet implemented. svn path=/trunk/; revision=25624
2007-01-25 01:13:09 +00:00
BOOLEAN
NTAPI
SepInitializationPhase1(VOID)
{
NTSTATUS Status;
PAGED_CODE();
/* Insert the system token into the tree */
Status = ObInsertObject((PVOID)(PsGetCurrentProcess()->Token.Value &
~MAX_FAST_REFS),
NULL,
0,
0,
NULL,
NULL);
ASSERT(NT_SUCCESS(Status));
/* FIXME: TODO \\ Security directory */
return TRUE;
}
- Rename KiSetSystemTime to KeSetSystemTime and enhance prototype for later use. - Create Phase 1 initialization for the SRM (SeInitSystem). Right now it inserts the system boot token into object manager, which is something we forgot to do before. - Renamed ExPhase2Init to Phase1Initialization, since it's not Phase 2. - Updated Phase 1 PS Initialization to get the KeLoaderBlock pointer and use it as a context parameter when calling Phase1Initialization. - Split off Phase1Initialization into Phase1InitializationDiscard, which is the bulk of the phase 1 code (99% of it) and can be put in an .INIT section to be freed after boot. - Modify parts of the Inbv setup code. Also implement support for /SOS, and try to mimic its behaviour on NT (not fully achieved). You will need /SOS to see boot messages on the screen! FreeLDR now adds this by default to the "Debug "configuration. - Temporarily disable ReactOS Banner during boot. We will get this data from the .mc/.res file in a later patch instead of hard-coding it. - Optimize calling and usage of ExpLoadInitialProcess. - Add support for Y2K bug fix documented for Windows NT (/YEAR). - Add support to detect WinPE/MiniNT/ReactOS Live CD. - Add temporary debugging code to MmInit2 and some Mm functions to detect if these functions are being used too early, which could result in catastrophic to subtle bugs. - Add more bugchecks when failures occur, and enhance others. Also add more codes to ntoskrnl.mc. - Disable calls to ObfDereferenceDeviceMap since it's not yet implemented. svn path=/trunk/; revision=25624
2007-01-25 01:13:09 +00:00
BOOLEAN
NTAPI
SeInit(VOID)
{
/* Check the initialization phase */
switch (ExpInitializationPhase)
{
case 0:
- Rename KiSetSystemTime to KeSetSystemTime and enhance prototype for later use. - Create Phase 1 initialization for the SRM (SeInitSystem). Right now it inserts the system boot token into object manager, which is something we forgot to do before. - Renamed ExPhase2Init to Phase1Initialization, since it's not Phase 2. - Updated Phase 1 PS Initialization to get the KeLoaderBlock pointer and use it as a context parameter when calling Phase1Initialization. - Split off Phase1Initialization into Phase1InitializationDiscard, which is the bulk of the phase 1 code (99% of it) and can be put in an .INIT section to be freed after boot. - Modify parts of the Inbv setup code. Also implement support for /SOS, and try to mimic its behaviour on NT (not fully achieved). You will need /SOS to see boot messages on the screen! FreeLDR now adds this by default to the "Debug "configuration. - Temporarily disable ReactOS Banner during boot. We will get this data from the .mc/.res file in a later patch instead of hard-coding it. - Optimize calling and usage of ExpLoadInitialProcess. - Add support for Y2K bug fix documented for Windows NT (/YEAR). - Add support to detect WinPE/MiniNT/ReactOS Live CD. - Add temporary debugging code to MmInit2 and some Mm functions to detect if these functions are being used too early, which could result in catastrophic to subtle bugs. - Add more bugchecks when failures occur, and enhance others. Also add more codes to ntoskrnl.mc. - Disable calls to ObfDereferenceDeviceMap since it's not yet implemented. svn path=/trunk/; revision=25624
2007-01-25 01:13:09 +00:00
/* Do Phase 0 */
return SepInitializationPhase0();
- Rename KiSetSystemTime to KeSetSystemTime and enhance prototype for later use. - Create Phase 1 initialization for the SRM (SeInitSystem). Right now it inserts the system boot token into object manager, which is something we forgot to do before. - Renamed ExPhase2Init to Phase1Initialization, since it's not Phase 2. - Updated Phase 1 PS Initialization to get the KeLoaderBlock pointer and use it as a context parameter when calling Phase1Initialization. - Split off Phase1Initialization into Phase1InitializationDiscard, which is the bulk of the phase 1 code (99% of it) and can be put in an .INIT section to be freed after boot. - Modify parts of the Inbv setup code. Also implement support for /SOS, and try to mimic its behaviour on NT (not fully achieved). You will need /SOS to see boot messages on the screen! FreeLDR now adds this by default to the "Debug "configuration. - Temporarily disable ReactOS Banner during boot. We will get this data from the .mc/.res file in a later patch instead of hard-coding it. - Optimize calling and usage of ExpLoadInitialProcess. - Add support for Y2K bug fix documented for Windows NT (/YEAR). - Add support to detect WinPE/MiniNT/ReactOS Live CD. - Add temporary debugging code to MmInit2 and some Mm functions to detect if these functions are being used too early, which could result in catastrophic to subtle bugs. - Add more bugchecks when failures occur, and enhance others. Also add more codes to ntoskrnl.mc. - Disable calls to ObfDereferenceDeviceMap since it's not yet implemented. svn path=/trunk/; revision=25624
2007-01-25 01:13:09 +00:00
case 1:
- Rename KiSetSystemTime to KeSetSystemTime and enhance prototype for later use. - Create Phase 1 initialization for the SRM (SeInitSystem). Right now it inserts the system boot token into object manager, which is something we forgot to do before. - Renamed ExPhase2Init to Phase1Initialization, since it's not Phase 2. - Updated Phase 1 PS Initialization to get the KeLoaderBlock pointer and use it as a context parameter when calling Phase1Initialization. - Split off Phase1Initialization into Phase1InitializationDiscard, which is the bulk of the phase 1 code (99% of it) and can be put in an .INIT section to be freed after boot. - Modify parts of the Inbv setup code. Also implement support for /SOS, and try to mimic its behaviour on NT (not fully achieved). You will need /SOS to see boot messages on the screen! FreeLDR now adds this by default to the "Debug "configuration. - Temporarily disable ReactOS Banner during boot. We will get this data from the .mc/.res file in a later patch instead of hard-coding it. - Optimize calling and usage of ExpLoadInitialProcess. - Add support for Y2K bug fix documented for Windows NT (/YEAR). - Add support to detect WinPE/MiniNT/ReactOS Live CD. - Add temporary debugging code to MmInit2 and some Mm functions to detect if these functions are being used too early, which could result in catastrophic to subtle bugs. - Add more bugchecks when failures occur, and enhance others. Also add more codes to ntoskrnl.mc. - Disable calls to ObfDereferenceDeviceMap since it's not yet implemented. svn path=/trunk/; revision=25624
2007-01-25 01:13:09 +00:00
/* Do Phase 1 */
return SepInitializationPhase1();
- Rename KiSetSystemTime to KeSetSystemTime and enhance prototype for later use. - Create Phase 1 initialization for the SRM (SeInitSystem). Right now it inserts the system boot token into object manager, which is something we forgot to do before. - Renamed ExPhase2Init to Phase1Initialization, since it's not Phase 2. - Updated Phase 1 PS Initialization to get the KeLoaderBlock pointer and use it as a context parameter when calling Phase1Initialization. - Split off Phase1Initialization into Phase1InitializationDiscard, which is the bulk of the phase 1 code (99% of it) and can be put in an .INIT section to be freed after boot. - Modify parts of the Inbv setup code. Also implement support for /SOS, and try to mimic its behaviour on NT (not fully achieved). You will need /SOS to see boot messages on the screen! FreeLDR now adds this by default to the "Debug "configuration. - Temporarily disable ReactOS Banner during boot. We will get this data from the .mc/.res file in a later patch instead of hard-coding it. - Optimize calling and usage of ExpLoadInitialProcess. - Add support for Y2K bug fix documented for Windows NT (/YEAR). - Add support to detect WinPE/MiniNT/ReactOS Live CD. - Add temporary debugging code to MmInit2 and some Mm functions to detect if these functions are being used too early, which could result in catastrophic to subtle bugs. - Add more bugchecks when failures occur, and enhance others. Also add more codes to ntoskrnl.mc. - Disable calls to ObfDereferenceDeviceMap since it's not yet implemented. svn path=/trunk/; revision=25624
2007-01-25 01:13:09 +00:00
default:
- Rename KiSetSystemTime to KeSetSystemTime and enhance prototype for later use. - Create Phase 1 initialization for the SRM (SeInitSystem). Right now it inserts the system boot token into object manager, which is something we forgot to do before. - Renamed ExPhase2Init to Phase1Initialization, since it's not Phase 2. - Updated Phase 1 PS Initialization to get the KeLoaderBlock pointer and use it as a context parameter when calling Phase1Initialization. - Split off Phase1Initialization into Phase1InitializationDiscard, which is the bulk of the phase 1 code (99% of it) and can be put in an .INIT section to be freed after boot. - Modify parts of the Inbv setup code. Also implement support for /SOS, and try to mimic its behaviour on NT (not fully achieved). You will need /SOS to see boot messages on the screen! FreeLDR now adds this by default to the "Debug "configuration. - Temporarily disable ReactOS Banner during boot. We will get this data from the .mc/.res file in a later patch instead of hard-coding it. - Optimize calling and usage of ExpLoadInitialProcess. - Add support for Y2K bug fix documented for Windows NT (/YEAR). - Add support to detect WinPE/MiniNT/ReactOS Live CD. - Add temporary debugging code to MmInit2 and some Mm functions to detect if these functions are being used too early, which could result in catastrophic to subtle bugs. - Add more bugchecks when failures occur, and enhance others. Also add more codes to ntoskrnl.mc. - Disable calls to ObfDereferenceDeviceMap since it's not yet implemented. svn path=/trunk/; revision=25624
2007-01-25 01:13:09 +00:00
/* Don't know any other phase! Bugcheck! */
KeBugCheckEx(UNEXPECTED_INITIALIZATION_CALL,
0,
ExpInitializationPhase,
0,
0);
return FALSE;
}
}
BOOLEAN
NTAPI
SeInitSRM(VOID)
{
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes;
UNICODE_STRING Name;
HANDLE DirectoryHandle;
HANDLE EventHandle;
NTSTATUS Status;
/* Create '\Security' directory */
RtlInitUnicodeString(&Name,
L"\\Security");
InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjectAttributes,
&Name,
OBJ_PERMANENT,
0,
NULL);
Status = ZwCreateDirectoryObject(&DirectoryHandle,
DIRECTORY_ALL_ACCESS,
&ObjectAttributes);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DPRINT1("Failed to create 'Security' directory!\n");
return FALSE;
}
/* Create 'LSA_AUTHENTICATION_INITALIZED' event */
RtlInitUnicodeString(&Name,
L"\\LSA_AUTHENTICATION_INITALIZED");
InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjectAttributes,
&Name,
OBJ_PERMANENT,
DirectoryHandle,
SePublicDefaultSd);
Status = ZwCreateEvent(&EventHandle,
EVENT_ALL_ACCESS,
&ObjectAttributes,
SynchronizationEvent,
FALSE);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DPRINT1("Failed to create 'LSA_AUTHENTICATION_INITALIZED' event!\n");
NtClose(DirectoryHandle);
return FALSE;
}
ZwClose(EventHandle);
ZwClose(DirectoryHandle);
/* FIXME: Create SRM port and listener thread */
return TRUE;
}
static BOOLEAN INIT_FUNCTION
SepInitExports(VOID)
{
SepExports.SeCreateTokenPrivilege = SeCreateTokenPrivilege;
SepExports.SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege = SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege;
SepExports.SeLockMemoryPrivilege = SeLockMemoryPrivilege;
SepExports.SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege = SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege;
SepExports.SeUnsolicitedInputPrivilege = SeUnsolicitedInputPrivilege;
SepExports.SeTcbPrivilege = SeTcbPrivilege;
SepExports.SeSecurityPrivilege = SeSecurityPrivilege;
SepExports.SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege = SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege;
SepExports.SeLoadDriverPrivilege = SeLoadDriverPrivilege;
SepExports.SeCreatePagefilePrivilege = SeCreatePagefilePrivilege;
SepExports.SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege = SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege;
SepExports.SeSystemProfilePrivilege = SeSystemProfilePrivilege;
SepExports.SeSystemtimePrivilege = SeSystemtimePrivilege;
SepExports.SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege = SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege;
SepExports.SeCreatePermanentPrivilege = SeCreatePermanentPrivilege;
SepExports.SeBackupPrivilege = SeBackupPrivilege;
SepExports.SeRestorePrivilege = SeRestorePrivilege;
SepExports.SeShutdownPrivilege = SeShutdownPrivilege;
SepExports.SeDebugPrivilege = SeDebugPrivilege;
SepExports.SeAuditPrivilege = SeAuditPrivilege;
SepExports.SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege = SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege;
SepExports.SeChangeNotifyPrivilege = SeChangeNotifyPrivilege;
SepExports.SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege = SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege;
SepExports.SeNullSid = SeNullSid;
SepExports.SeWorldSid = SeWorldSid;
SepExports.SeLocalSid = SeLocalSid;
SepExports.SeCreatorOwnerSid = SeCreatorOwnerSid;
SepExports.SeCreatorGroupSid = SeCreatorGroupSid;
SepExports.SeNtAuthoritySid = SeNtAuthoritySid;
SepExports.SeDialupSid = SeDialupSid;
SepExports.SeNetworkSid = SeNetworkSid;
SepExports.SeBatchSid = SeBatchSid;
SepExports.SeInteractiveSid = SeInteractiveSid;
SepExports.SeLocalSystemSid = SeLocalSystemSid;
SepExports.SeAliasAdminsSid = SeAliasAdminsSid;
SepExports.SeAliasUsersSid = SeAliasUsersSid;
SepExports.SeAliasGuestsSid = SeAliasGuestsSid;
SepExports.SeAliasPowerUsersSid = SeAliasPowerUsersSid;
SepExports.SeAliasAccountOpsSid = SeAliasAccountOpsSid;
SepExports.SeAliasSystemOpsSid = SeAliasSystemOpsSid;
SepExports.SeAliasPrintOpsSid = SeAliasPrintOpsSid;
SepExports.SeAliasBackupOpsSid = SeAliasBackupOpsSid;
SepExports.SeAuthenticatedUsersSid = SeAuthenticatedUsersSid;
SepExports.SeRestrictedSid = SeRestrictedSid;
SepExports.SeAnonymousLogonSid = SeAnonymousLogonSid;
SepExports.SeUndockPrivilege = SeUndockPrivilege;
SepExports.SeSyncAgentPrivilege = SeSyncAgentPrivilege;
SepExports.SeEnableDelegationPrivilege = SeEnableDelegationPrivilege;
SeExports = &SepExports;
return TRUE;
}
VOID SepReferenceLogonSession(PLUID AuthenticationId)
{
UNIMPLEMENTED;
}
VOID SepDeReferenceLogonSession(PLUID AuthenticationId)
{
UNIMPLEMENTED;
}
NTSTATUS
NTAPI
SeDefaultObjectMethod(IN PVOID Object,
IN SECURITY_OPERATION_CODE OperationType,
IN PSECURITY_INFORMATION SecurityInformation,
IN OUT PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecurityDescriptor,
IN OUT PULONG ReturnLength OPTIONAL,
IN OUT PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *OldSecurityDescriptor,
IN POOL_TYPE PoolType,
IN PGENERIC_MAPPING GenericMapping)
{
PAGED_CODE();
/* Select the operation type */
switch (OperationType)
{
/* Setting a new descriptor */
case SetSecurityDescriptor:
/* Sanity check */
ASSERT((PoolType == PagedPool) || (PoolType == NonPagedPool));
/* Set the information */
return ObSetSecurityDescriptorInfo(Object,
SecurityInformation,
SecurityDescriptor,
OldSecurityDescriptor,
PoolType,
GenericMapping);
case QuerySecurityDescriptor:
/* Query the information */
return ObQuerySecurityDescriptorInfo(Object,
SecurityInformation,
SecurityDescriptor,
ReturnLength,
OldSecurityDescriptor);
case DeleteSecurityDescriptor:
/* De-assign it */
return ObDeassignSecurity(OldSecurityDescriptor);
case AssignSecurityDescriptor:
/* Assign it */
ObAssignObjectSecurityDescriptor(Object, SecurityDescriptor, PoolType);
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
default:
/* Bug check */
KeBugCheckEx(SECURITY_SYSTEM, 0, STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER, 0, 0);
}
/* Should never reach here */
ASSERT(FALSE);
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
VOID
NTAPI
SeCaptureSubjectContextEx(IN PETHREAD Thread,
IN PEPROCESS Process,
OUT PSECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectContext)
{
BOOLEAN CopyOnOpen, EffectiveOnly;
PAGED_CODE();
/* Save the unique ID */
SubjectContext->ProcessAuditId = Process->UniqueProcessId;
/* Check if we have a thread */
if (!Thread)
{
/* We don't, so no token */
SubjectContext->ClientToken = NULL;
}
else
{
/* Get the impersonation token */
SubjectContext->ClientToken =
PsReferenceImpersonationToken(Thread,
&CopyOnOpen,
&EffectiveOnly,
&SubjectContext->ImpersonationLevel);
}
/* Get the primary token */
SubjectContext->PrimaryToken = PsReferencePrimaryToken(Process);
}
/*
* @implemented
*/
VOID
NTAPI
SeCaptureSubjectContext(OUT PSECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectContext)
{
/* Call the internal API */
SeCaptureSubjectContextEx(PsGetCurrentThread(),
PsGetCurrentProcess(),
SubjectContext);
}
/*
* @implemented
*/
VOID STDCALL
SeLockSubjectContext(IN PSECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectContext)
{
PAGED_CODE();
KeEnterCriticalRegion();
ExAcquireResourceExclusiveLite(&SepSubjectContextLock, TRUE);
}
/*
* @implemented
*/
VOID STDCALL
SeUnlockSubjectContext(IN PSECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectContext)
{
PAGED_CODE();
ExReleaseResourceLite(&SepSubjectContextLock);
KeLeaveCriticalRegion();
}
/*
* @implemented
*/
VOID STDCALL
SeReleaseSubjectContext(IN PSECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectContext)
{
PAGED_CODE();
if (SubjectContext->PrimaryToken != NULL)
{
ObFastDereferenceObject(&PsGetCurrentProcess()->Token, SubjectContext->PrimaryToken);
}
if (SubjectContext->ClientToken != NULL)
{
ObDereferenceObject(SubjectContext->ClientToken);
}
}
/*
* @implemented
*/
NTSTATUS STDCALL
SeDeassignSecurity(PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *SecurityDescriptor)
{
PAGED_CODE();
if (*SecurityDescriptor != NULL)
{
ExFreePool(*SecurityDescriptor);
*SecurityDescriptor = NULL;
}
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
/*
* @unimplemented
*/
NTSTATUS STDCALL
SeAssignSecurityEx(IN PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR ParentDescriptor OPTIONAL,
IN PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR ExplicitDescriptor OPTIONAL,
OUT PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *NewDescriptor,
IN GUID *ObjectType OPTIONAL,
IN BOOLEAN IsDirectoryObject,
IN ULONG AutoInheritFlags,
IN PSECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectContext,
IN PGENERIC_MAPPING GenericMapping,
IN POOL_TYPE PoolType)
{
UNIMPLEMENTED;
return STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
/*
* FUNCTION: Creates a security descriptor for a new object.
* ARGUMENTS:
* ParentDescriptor =
* ExplicitDescriptor =
* NewDescriptor =
* IsDirectoryObject =
* SubjectContext =
* GeneralMapping =
* PoolType =
* RETURNS: Status
*
* @implemented
*/
NTSTATUS STDCALL
SeAssignSecurity(PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR _ParentDescriptor OPTIONAL,
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR _ExplicitDescriptor OPTIONAL,
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *NewDescriptor,
BOOLEAN IsDirectoryObject,
PSECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectContext,
PGENERIC_MAPPING GenericMapping,
POOL_TYPE PoolType)
{
PISECURITY_DESCRIPTOR ParentDescriptor = _ParentDescriptor;
PISECURITY_DESCRIPTOR ExplicitDescriptor = _ExplicitDescriptor;
PISECURITY_DESCRIPTOR Descriptor;
PTOKEN Token;
ULONG OwnerLength = 0;
ULONG GroupLength = 0;
ULONG DaclLength = 0;
ULONG SaclLength = 0;
ULONG Length = 0;
ULONG Control = 0;
ULONG_PTR Current;
PSID Owner = NULL;
PSID Group = NULL;
PACL Dacl = NULL;
PACL Sacl = NULL;
PAGED_CODE();
/* Lock subject context */
SeLockSubjectContext(SubjectContext);
if (SubjectContext->ClientToken != NULL)
{
Token = SubjectContext->ClientToken;
}
else
{
Token = SubjectContext->PrimaryToken;
}
/* Inherit the Owner SID */
if (ExplicitDescriptor != NULL && ExplicitDescriptor->Owner != NULL)
{
DPRINT("Use explicit owner sid!\n");
Owner = ExplicitDescriptor->Owner;
Object Manager Patch. This patch continues the work done in the previous patch and makes the following changes in order to support OB 2.0 (it basically temporarily fixes a highly incorrect implementation so that caller code will be ready to work with the OB 2.0 without change): 1) The documented Object Create Information Structure and semantics implemented. All Object Attributes and passed data from user-mode is now probed and saved into this object create structure when ObCreateObject is called. 2) ObCreateObject does NOT PERFORM ANY OTHER OPERATION EXCEPT CREATING THE OBJECT ANYMORE. ObCreateObject will NOT insert the Object into the tree and other operations. These are now done correctly by ObInsertObject. Therefore, the biggest hurdle was changing pieces of code which assumed ObCreateObject would be enough. 3) ObInsertObject uses the captured create info for all operations isntead of the Object Attributes. 4) ObFindObject now uses the captured info as well. 5) The OBject name and directory are now stored in the documented Object Name Information, always allocated and freed from non paged pool. HACKS: 5) Because the registry code is horribly broken and doesn't use ObFindObjectByName, the old ObFindObject had to be temporarily duplicated into CmpFindObject. 7) Win32k used ObInsertObject in CsrInsertObject as a way to create a handle inside csrss. However, OBInsertObject now does more then this. As a temporary hack, ObpCreateHandle is exported from the kernel and called from win32k. A fix needs to be done for this, but I don't know the design of win32k+csrss well enough to find a solution. 8) SEH has been commented out in some places of the new probing code because it breaks smss and explorer. These need to be investigated (seh did not exist in the previous code, so this is not really a hack) 9) Named objects with a parent directory are NOT allowed. However because of bugs in kernel32, the new check has been temporarily disabled. (this check did not exist in the previous code, so this is not really a hack) The next patch will add a proper ObFindObject which will support a more complete Parse Procedure with context and security information. This is needed for proper registry access (requested by Eric Kohl) and for proper functionality of the Desktop/File creation, which should use the Parse routine, and not the Create Handle Routine. This will also make it possible to remove some previous hacks and pave the way for a fixed Iop/IoCreateFile svn path=/trunk/; revision=15395
2005-05-18 19:26:47 +00:00
if (ExplicitDescriptor->Control & SE_SELF_RELATIVE)
{
Owner = (PSID)(((ULONG_PTR)Owner) + (ULONG_PTR)ExplicitDescriptor);
Object Manager Patch. This patch continues the work done in the previous patch and makes the following changes in order to support OB 2.0 (it basically temporarily fixes a highly incorrect implementation so that caller code will be ready to work with the OB 2.0 without change): 1) The documented Object Create Information Structure and semantics implemented. All Object Attributes and passed data from user-mode is now probed and saved into this object create structure when ObCreateObject is called. 2) ObCreateObject does NOT PERFORM ANY OTHER OPERATION EXCEPT CREATING THE OBJECT ANYMORE. ObCreateObject will NOT insert the Object into the tree and other operations. These are now done correctly by ObInsertObject. Therefore, the biggest hurdle was changing pieces of code which assumed ObCreateObject would be enough. 3) ObInsertObject uses the captured create info for all operations isntead of the Object Attributes. 4) ObFindObject now uses the captured info as well. 5) The OBject name and directory are now stored in the documented Object Name Information, always allocated and freed from non paged pool. HACKS: 5) Because the registry code is horribly broken and doesn't use ObFindObjectByName, the old ObFindObject had to be temporarily duplicated into CmpFindObject. 7) Win32k used ObInsertObject in CsrInsertObject as a way to create a handle inside csrss. However, OBInsertObject now does more then this. As a temporary hack, ObpCreateHandle is exported from the kernel and called from win32k. A fix needs to be done for this, but I don't know the design of win32k+csrss well enough to find a solution. 8) SEH has been commented out in some places of the new probing code because it breaks smss and explorer. These need to be investigated (seh did not exist in the previous code, so this is not really a hack) 9) Named objects with a parent directory are NOT allowed. However because of bugs in kernel32, the new check has been temporarily disabled. (this check did not exist in the previous code, so this is not really a hack) The next patch will add a proper ObFindObject which will support a more complete Parse Procedure with context and security information. This is needed for proper registry access (requested by Eric Kohl) and for proper functionality of the Desktop/File creation, which should use the Parse routine, and not the Create Handle Routine. This will also make it possible to remove some previous hacks and pave the way for a fixed Iop/IoCreateFile svn path=/trunk/; revision=15395
2005-05-18 19:26:47 +00:00
}
}
else
{
if (Token != NULL)
{
DPRINT("Use token owner sid!\n");
Owner = Token->UserAndGroups[Token->DefaultOwnerIndex].Sid;
}
else
{
DPRINT("Use default owner sid!\n");
Owner = SeLocalSystemSid;
}
Control |= SE_OWNER_DEFAULTED;
}
OwnerLength = ROUND_UP(RtlLengthSid(Owner), 4);
/* Inherit the Group SID */
if (ExplicitDescriptor != NULL && ExplicitDescriptor->Group != NULL)
{
DPRINT("Use explicit group sid!\n");
Group = ExplicitDescriptor->Group;
if (ExplicitDescriptor->Control & SE_SELF_RELATIVE)
{
Group = (PSID)(((ULONG_PTR)Group) + (ULONG_PTR)ExplicitDescriptor);
}
}
else
{
if (Token != NULL)
{
DPRINT("Use token group sid!\n");
Group = Token->PrimaryGroup;
}
else
{
DPRINT("Use default group sid!\n");
Group = SeLocalSystemSid;
}
Control |= SE_OWNER_DEFAULTED;
}
GroupLength = ROUND_UP(RtlLengthSid(Group), 4);
/* Inherit the DACL */
if (ExplicitDescriptor != NULL &&
(ExplicitDescriptor->Control & SE_DACL_PRESENT) &&
!(ExplicitDescriptor->Control & SE_DACL_DEFAULTED))
{
DPRINT("Use explicit DACL!\n");
Dacl = ExplicitDescriptor->Dacl;
if (Dacl != NULL && (ExplicitDescriptor->Control & SE_SELF_RELATIVE))
{
Dacl = (PACL)(((ULONG_PTR)Dacl) + (ULONG_PTR)ExplicitDescriptor);
}
Control |= SE_DACL_PRESENT;
}
else if (ParentDescriptor != NULL &&
(ParentDescriptor->Control & SE_DACL_PRESENT))
{
DPRINT("Use parent DACL!\n");
/* FIXME: Inherit */
Dacl = ParentDescriptor->Dacl;
if (Dacl != NULL && (ParentDescriptor->Control & SE_SELF_RELATIVE))
{
Dacl = (PACL)(((ULONG_PTR)Dacl) + (ULONG_PTR)ParentDescriptor);
}
Control |= (SE_DACL_PRESENT | SE_DACL_DEFAULTED);
}
else if (Token != NULL && Token->DefaultDacl != NULL)
{
DPRINT("Use token default DACL!\n");
/* FIXME: Inherit */
Dacl = Token->DefaultDacl;
Control |= (SE_DACL_PRESENT | SE_DACL_DEFAULTED);
}
else
{
DPRINT("Use NULL DACL!\n");
Dacl = NULL;
Control |= (SE_DACL_PRESENT | SE_DACL_DEFAULTED);
}
DaclLength = (Dacl != NULL) ? ROUND_UP(Dacl->AclSize, 4) : 0;
/* Inherit the SACL */
if (ExplicitDescriptor != NULL &&
(ExplicitDescriptor->Control & SE_SACL_PRESENT) &&
!(ExplicitDescriptor->Control & SE_SACL_DEFAULTED))
{
DPRINT("Use explicit SACL!\n");
Sacl = ExplicitDescriptor->Sacl;
if (Sacl != NULL && (ExplicitDescriptor->Control & SE_SELF_RELATIVE))
{
Sacl = (PACL)(((ULONG_PTR)Sacl) + (ULONG_PTR)ExplicitDescriptor);
}
Control |= SE_SACL_PRESENT;
}
else if (ParentDescriptor != NULL &&
(ParentDescriptor->Control & SE_SACL_PRESENT))
{
DPRINT("Use parent SACL!\n");
/* FIXME: Inherit */
Sacl = ParentDescriptor->Sacl;
if (Sacl != NULL && (ParentDescriptor->Control & SE_SELF_RELATIVE))
{
Sacl = (PACL)(((ULONG_PTR)Sacl) + (ULONG_PTR)ParentDescriptor);
}
Control |= (SE_SACL_PRESENT | SE_SACL_DEFAULTED);
}
SaclLength = (Sacl != NULL) ? ROUND_UP(Sacl->AclSize, 4) : 0;
/* Allocate and initialize the new security descriptor */
Length = sizeof(SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) +
OwnerLength + GroupLength + DaclLength + SaclLength;
DPRINT("L: sizeof(SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) %d OwnerLength %d GroupLength %d DaclLength %d SaclLength %d\n",
sizeof(SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR),
OwnerLength,
GroupLength,
DaclLength,
SaclLength);
Descriptor = ExAllocatePool(PagedPool,
Length);
if (Descriptor == NULL)
{
DPRINT1("ExAlloctePool() failed\n");
/* FIXME: Unlock subject context */
return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
}
RtlZeroMemory( Descriptor, Length );
RtlCreateSecurityDescriptor(Descriptor,
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION);
Descriptor->Control = (USHORT)Control | SE_SELF_RELATIVE;
Current = (ULONG_PTR)Descriptor + sizeof(SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR);
if (SaclLength != 0)
{
RtlCopyMemory((PVOID)Current,
Sacl,
SaclLength);
Descriptor->Sacl = (PACL)((ULONG_PTR)Current - (ULONG_PTR)Descriptor);
Current += SaclLength;
}
if (DaclLength != 0)
{
RtlCopyMemory((PVOID)Current,
Dacl,
DaclLength);
Descriptor->Dacl = (PACL)((ULONG_PTR)Current - (ULONG_PTR)Descriptor);
Current += DaclLength;
}
if (OwnerLength != 0)
{
RtlCopyMemory((PVOID)Current,
Owner,
OwnerLength);
Descriptor->Owner = (PSID)((ULONG_PTR)Current - (ULONG_PTR)Descriptor);
Current += OwnerLength;
DPRINT("Owner of %x at %x\n", Descriptor, Descriptor->Owner);
}
else
DPRINT("Owner of %x is zero length\n", Descriptor);
if (GroupLength != 0)
{
memmove((PVOID)Current,
Group,
GroupLength);
Descriptor->Group = (PSID)((ULONG_PTR)Current - (ULONG_PTR)Descriptor);
}
/* Unlock subject context */
SeUnlockSubjectContext(SubjectContext);
*NewDescriptor = Descriptor;
DPRINT("Descrptor %x\n", Descriptor);
ASSERT(RtlLengthSecurityDescriptor(Descriptor));
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
static BOOLEAN
SepSidInToken(PACCESS_TOKEN _Token,
PSID Sid)
{
ULONG i;
PTOKEN Token = (PTOKEN)_Token;
PAGED_CODE();
if (Token->UserAndGroupCount == 0)
{
return FALSE;
}
for (i=0; i<Token->UserAndGroupCount; i++)
{
if (RtlEqualSid(Sid, Token->UserAndGroups[i].Sid))
{
if (Token->UserAndGroups[i].Attributes & SE_GROUP_ENABLED)
{
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
/*
* FUNCTION: Determines whether the requested access rights can be granted
* to an object protected by a security descriptor and an object owner
* ARGUMENTS:
* SecurityDescriptor = Security descriptor protecting the object
* SubjectSecurityContext = Subject's captured security context
* SubjectContextLocked = Indicates the user's subject context is locked
* DesiredAccess = Access rights the caller is trying to acquire
* PreviouslyGrantedAccess = Specified the access rights already granted
* Privileges = ?
* GenericMapping = Generic mapping associated with the object
* AccessMode = Access mode used for the check
* GrantedAccess (OUT) = On return specifies the access granted
* AccessStatus (OUT) = Status indicating why access was denied
* RETURNS: If access was granted, returns TRUE
*
* @implemented
*/
BOOLEAN STDCALL
SeAccessCheck(IN PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecurityDescriptor,
IN PSECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectSecurityContext,
IN BOOLEAN SubjectContextLocked,
IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
IN ACCESS_MASK PreviouslyGrantedAccess,
OUT PPRIVILEGE_SET* Privileges,
IN PGENERIC_MAPPING GenericMapping,
IN KPROCESSOR_MODE AccessMode,
OUT PACCESS_MASK GrantedAccess,
OUT PNTSTATUS AccessStatus)
{
LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES Privilege;
ACCESS_MASK CurrentAccess, AccessMask;
PACCESS_TOKEN Token;
ULONG i;
PACL Dacl;
BOOLEAN Present;
BOOLEAN Defaulted;
PACE CurrentAce;
PSID Sid;
NTSTATUS Status;
PAGED_CODE();
/* Check if this is kernel mode */
if (AccessMode == KernelMode)
{
/* Check if kernel wants everything */
if (DesiredAccess & MAXIMUM_ALLOWED)
{
/* Give it */
*GrantedAccess = GenericMapping->GenericAll;
*GrantedAccess |= (DesiredAccess &~ MAXIMUM_ALLOWED);
*GrantedAccess |= PreviouslyGrantedAccess;
}
else
{
/* Give the desired and previous access */
*GrantedAccess = DesiredAccess | PreviouslyGrantedAccess;
}
/* Success */
*AccessStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
return TRUE;
}
/* Check if we didn't get an SD */
if (!SecurityDescriptor)
{
/* Automatic failure */
*AccessStatus = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
return FALSE;
}
/* Check for invalid impersonation */
if ((SubjectSecurityContext->ClientToken) &&
(SubjectSecurityContext->ImpersonationLevel < SecurityImpersonation))
{
*AccessStatus = STATUS_BAD_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL;
return FALSE;
}
/* Check for no access desired */
if (!DesiredAccess)
{
/* Check if we had no previous access */
if (!PreviouslyGrantedAccess)
{
/* Then there's nothing to give */
*AccessStatus = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
return FALSE;
}
/* Return the previous access only */
*GrantedAccess = PreviouslyGrantedAccess;
*AccessStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
*Privileges = NULL;
return TRUE;
}
/* Acquire the lock if needed */
if (!SubjectContextLocked) SeLockSubjectContext(SubjectSecurityContext);
/* Map given accesses */
RtlMapGenericMask(&DesiredAccess, GenericMapping);
if (PreviouslyGrantedAccess)
RtlMapGenericMask(&PreviouslyGrantedAccess, GenericMapping);
CurrentAccess = PreviouslyGrantedAccess;
Token = SubjectSecurityContext->ClientToken ?
SubjectSecurityContext->ClientToken : SubjectSecurityContext->PrimaryToken;
/* Get the DACL */
Status = RtlGetDaclSecurityDescriptor(SecurityDescriptor,
&Present,
&Dacl,
&Defaulted);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
if (SubjectContextLocked == FALSE)
{
SeUnlockSubjectContext(SubjectSecurityContext);
}
*AccessStatus = Status;
return FALSE;
}
/* RULE 1: Grant desired access if the object is unprotected */
if (Present == TRUE && Dacl == NULL)
{
if (SubjectContextLocked == FALSE)
{
SeUnlockSubjectContext(SubjectSecurityContext);
}
*GrantedAccess = DesiredAccess;
*AccessStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
return TRUE;
}
CurrentAccess = PreviouslyGrantedAccess;
/* RULE 2: Check token for 'take ownership' privilege */
Privilege.Luid = SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege;
Privilege.Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;
if (SepPrivilegeCheck(Token,
&Privilege,
1,
PRIVILEGE_SET_ALL_NECESSARY,
AccessMode))
{
CurrentAccess |= WRITE_OWNER;
if ((DesiredAccess & ~VALID_INHERIT_FLAGS) ==
(CurrentAccess & ~VALID_INHERIT_FLAGS))
{
if (SubjectContextLocked == FALSE)
{
SeUnlockSubjectContext(SubjectSecurityContext);
}
*GrantedAccess = CurrentAccess;
*AccessStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
return TRUE;
}
}
/* RULE 3: Check whether the token is the owner */
Status = RtlGetOwnerSecurityDescriptor(SecurityDescriptor,
&Sid,
&Defaulted);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DPRINT1("RtlGetOwnerSecurityDescriptor() failed (Status %lx)\n", Status);
if (SubjectContextLocked == FALSE)
{
SeUnlockSubjectContext(SubjectSecurityContext);
}
*AccessStatus = Status;
return FALSE;
}
if (Sid && SepSidInToken(Token, Sid))
{
CurrentAccess |= (READ_CONTROL | WRITE_DAC);
if ((DesiredAccess & ~VALID_INHERIT_FLAGS) ==
(CurrentAccess & ~VALID_INHERIT_FLAGS))
{
if (SubjectContextLocked == FALSE)
{
SeUnlockSubjectContext(SubjectSecurityContext);
}
*GrantedAccess = CurrentAccess;
*AccessStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
return TRUE;
}
}
/* Fail if DACL is absent */
if (Present == FALSE)
{
if (SubjectContextLocked == FALSE)
{
SeUnlockSubjectContext(SubjectSecurityContext);
}
*GrantedAccess = 0;
*AccessStatus = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
return FALSE;
}
/* RULE 4: Grant rights according to the DACL */
CurrentAce = (PACE)(Dacl + 1);
for (i = 0; i < Dacl->AceCount; i++)
{
Sid = (PSID)(CurrentAce + 1);
if (CurrentAce->Header.AceType == ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE)
{
if (SepSidInToken(Token, Sid))
{
if (SubjectContextLocked == FALSE)
{
SeUnlockSubjectContext(SubjectSecurityContext);
}
*GrantedAccess = 0;
*AccessStatus = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
return FALSE;
}
}
else if (CurrentAce->Header.AceType == ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE)
{
if (SepSidInToken(Token, Sid))
{
AccessMask = CurrentAce->AccessMask;
RtlMapGenericMask(&AccessMask, GenericMapping);
CurrentAccess |= AccessMask;
}
}
else
{
DPRINT1("Unknown Ace type 0x%lx\n", CurrentAce->Header.AceType);
}
CurrentAce = (PACE)((ULONG_PTR)CurrentAce + CurrentAce->Header.AceSize);
}
if (SubjectContextLocked == FALSE)
{
SeUnlockSubjectContext(SubjectSecurityContext);
}
DPRINT("CurrentAccess %08lx\n DesiredAccess %08lx\n",
CurrentAccess, DesiredAccess);
*GrantedAccess = CurrentAccess & DesiredAccess;
if (DesiredAccess & MAXIMUM_ALLOWED)
{
*GrantedAccess = CurrentAccess;
*AccessStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
return TRUE;
}
else if ((*GrantedAccess & ~VALID_INHERIT_FLAGS) ==
(DesiredAccess & ~VALID_INHERIT_FLAGS))
{
*AccessStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
return TRUE;
}
else
{
DPRINT1("Denying access for caller: granted 0x%lx, desired 0x%lx (generic mapping %p)\n",
*GrantedAccess, DesiredAccess, GenericMapping);
*AccessStatus = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
return FALSE;
}
}
NTSTATUS STDCALL
NtAccessCheck(IN PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecurityDescriptor,
IN HANDLE TokenHandle,
IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
IN PGENERIC_MAPPING GenericMapping,
OUT PPRIVILEGE_SET PrivilegeSet,
OUT PULONG ReturnLength,
OUT PACCESS_MASK GrantedAccess,
OUT PNTSTATUS AccessStatus)
{
SECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectSecurityContext = {0};
KPROCESSOR_MODE PreviousMode;
PTOKEN Token;
NTSTATUS Status;
PAGED_CODE();
DPRINT("NtAccessCheck() called\n");
PreviousMode = KeGetPreviousMode();
if (PreviousMode == KernelMode)
{
*GrantedAccess = DesiredAccess;
*AccessStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Status = ObReferenceObjectByHandle(TokenHandle,
TOKEN_QUERY,
SepTokenObjectType,
PreviousMode,
(PVOID*)&Token,
NULL);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DPRINT1("Failed to reference token (Status %lx)\n", Status);
return Status;
}
/* Check token type */
if (Token->TokenType != TokenImpersonation)
{
DPRINT1("No impersonation token\n");
ObDereferenceObject(Token);
return STATUS_ACCESS_VIOLATION;
}
/* Check impersonation level */
if (Token->ImpersonationLevel < SecurityAnonymous)
{
DPRINT1("Invalid impersonation level\n");
ObDereferenceObject(Token);
return STATUS_ACCESS_VIOLATION;
}
SubjectSecurityContext.ClientToken = Token;
SubjectSecurityContext.ImpersonationLevel = Token->ImpersonationLevel;
/* Lock subject context */
SeLockSubjectContext(&SubjectSecurityContext);
if (SeAccessCheck(SecurityDescriptor,
&SubjectSecurityContext,
TRUE,
DesiredAccess,
0,
&PrivilegeSet,
GenericMapping,
PreviousMode,
GrantedAccess,
AccessStatus))
{
Status = *AccessStatus;
}
else
{
Status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
/* Unlock subject context */
SeUnlockSubjectContext(&SubjectSecurityContext);
ObDereferenceObject(Token);
DPRINT("NtAccessCheck() done\n");
return Status;
}
NTSTATUS
NTAPI
NtAccessCheckByType(IN PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecurityDescriptor,
IN PSID PrincipalSelfSid,
IN HANDLE ClientToken,
IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
IN POBJECT_TYPE_LIST ObjectTypeList,
IN ULONG ObjectTypeLength,
IN PGENERIC_MAPPING GenericMapping,
IN PPRIVILEGE_SET PrivilegeSet,
IN ULONG PrivilegeSetLength,
OUT PACCESS_MASK GrantedAccess,
OUT PNTSTATUS AccessStatus)
{
UNIMPLEMENTED;
return STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
NTSTATUS
NTAPI
NtAccessCheckByTypeAndAuditAlarm(IN PUNICODE_STRING SubsystemName,
IN HANDLE HandleId,
IN PUNICODE_STRING ObjectTypeName,
IN PUNICODE_STRING ObjectName,
IN PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecurityDescriptor,
IN PSID PrincipalSelfSid,
IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
IN AUDIT_EVENT_TYPE AuditType,
IN ULONG Flags,
IN POBJECT_TYPE_LIST ObjectTypeList,
IN ULONG ObjectTypeLength,
IN PGENERIC_MAPPING GenericMapping,
IN BOOLEAN ObjectCreation,
OUT PACCESS_MASK GrantedAccess,
OUT PNTSTATUS AccessStatus,
OUT PBOOLEAN GenerateOnClose)
{
UNIMPLEMENTED;
return STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
NTSTATUS
NTAPI
NtAccessCheckByTypeResultList(IN PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecurityDescriptor,
IN PSID PrincipalSelfSid,
IN HANDLE ClientToken,
IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
IN POBJECT_TYPE_LIST ObjectTypeList,
IN ULONG ObjectTypeLength,
IN PGENERIC_MAPPING GenericMapping,
IN PPRIVILEGE_SET PrivilegeSet,
IN ULONG PrivilegeSetLength,
OUT PACCESS_MASK GrantedAccess,
OUT PNTSTATUS AccessStatus)
{
UNIMPLEMENTED;
return STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
NTSTATUS
NTAPI
NtAccessCheckByTypeResultListAndAuditAlarm(IN PUNICODE_STRING SubsystemName,
IN HANDLE HandleId,
IN PUNICODE_STRING ObjectTypeName,
IN PUNICODE_STRING ObjectName,
IN PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecurityDescriptor,
IN PSID PrincipalSelfSid,
IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
IN AUDIT_EVENT_TYPE AuditType,
IN ULONG Flags,
IN POBJECT_TYPE_LIST ObjectTypeList,
IN ULONG ObjectTypeLength,
IN PGENERIC_MAPPING GenericMapping,
IN BOOLEAN ObjectCreation,
OUT PACCESS_MASK GrantedAccess,
OUT PNTSTATUS AccessStatus,
OUT PBOOLEAN GenerateOnClose)
{
UNIMPLEMENTED;
return STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
NTSTATUS
NTAPI
NtAccessCheckByTypeResultListAndAuditAlarmByHandle(IN PUNICODE_STRING SubsystemName,
IN HANDLE HandleId,
IN HANDLE ClientToken,
IN PUNICODE_STRING ObjectTypeName,
IN PUNICODE_STRING ObjectName,
IN PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecurityDescriptor,
IN PSID PrincipalSelfSid,
IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
IN AUDIT_EVENT_TYPE AuditType,
IN ULONG Flags,
IN POBJECT_TYPE_LIST ObjectTypeList,
IN ULONG ObjectTypeLength,
IN PGENERIC_MAPPING GenericMapping,
IN BOOLEAN ObjectCreation,
OUT PACCESS_MASK GrantedAccess,
OUT PNTSTATUS AccessStatus,
OUT PBOOLEAN GenerateOnClose)
{
UNIMPLEMENTED;
return STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
VOID STDCALL
SeQuerySecurityAccessMask(IN SECURITY_INFORMATION SecurityInformation,
OUT PACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess)
{
*DesiredAccess = 0;
if (SecurityInformation & (OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION | DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION))
{
*DesiredAccess |= READ_CONTROL;
}
if (SecurityInformation & SACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION)
{
*DesiredAccess |= ACCESS_SYSTEM_SECURITY;
}
}
VOID STDCALL
SeSetSecurityAccessMask(IN SECURITY_INFORMATION SecurityInformation,
OUT PACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess)
{
*DesiredAccess = 0;
if (SecurityInformation & (OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION | GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION))
{
*DesiredAccess |= WRITE_OWNER;
}
if (SecurityInformation & DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION)
{
*DesiredAccess |= WRITE_DAC;
}
if (SecurityInformation & SACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION)
{
*DesiredAccess |= ACCESS_SYSTEM_SECURITY;
}
}
/* EOF */